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13 - US foreign policy under Reagan and Bush

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2010

By
Beth Fischer
Edited by
Melvyn P. Leffler  and
Odd Arne Westad
Melvyn P. Leffler
Affiliation:
University of Virginia
Odd Arne Westad
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science
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Summary

What role did President Ronald Reagan and President George H. W. Bush play in ending the Cold War? Three distinct schools of thought have arisen in response to this question. The first school maintains that the United States triumphed in the Cold War by destroying its nemesis, the USSR. These “triumphalists” focus primarily on the Reagan years and contend that the administration brought about the end of the Cold War by hastening (even causing) the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this view, the Reagan administration was keenly aware of the fragile state of the USSR. Thus, it adopted a hardline policy to push its enemy toward collapse. This policy included an unprecedented military buildup, the introduction of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and tough rhetoric. Ultimately, the Reagan administration proved victorious: the Soviets could not keep pace with the administration’s military expenditures, nor could they match US technological advances. Consequently, the Kremlin was forced to surrender. Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leader, had no option other than to become more conciliatory toward Washington. The ultimate triumph came in 1991, however, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

A second school of thought turns this logic on its head. In this view, the Reagan administration’s hardline policies were an impediment to ending the Cold War. The president’s virulent anti-Communism, his belligerent rhetoric, SDI, and the military buildup combined to make it more difficult for Gorbachev to pursue improved relations with the West.

Type
Chapter
Information
The Cambridge History of the Cold War , pp. 267 - 288
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

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