This chapter reconceives core symptoms of schizophrenia by shifting the explanatory centre of gravity from putative structural breakdowns of time-consciousness to its affective distortion as rooted in the living, situated body. Drawing on Heidegger’s existential temporality and Merleau-Ponty’s embodied, social and psychopathological temporality, the authors propose ‘schizophrenic vulnerability’ as a world-involving mode of dysregulation in which affective ‘irruptions’ alter saliency and meaning in past–present–future relations without abolishing structure itself. This argument unfolds across six progressive steps: a critical review of clinical phenomenology’s shift from structural to affective accounts of time, exegetical analyses of relevant notions in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, schizophrenia’s prodromal phase, embodied affective temporality in schizophrenia, intersubjective affective temporality in schizophrenia, and a case study of ‘mission delusions’ in which an affectively charged future mandate reorganises existential time. The chapter concludes by emphasising a perspective that situates schizophrenia at the mind–body–world interface, deepening dialogue between phenomenology and psychiatry.

As the sites for astronomical observations changed, and astronomers transported their observing instruments from the Earth’s surface to higher and higher into the atmosphere, and then into space, the science they acquired, and the work required, also changed. The search for better seeing and access to the full electromagnetic spectrum inspired astronomers to seek higher ground, first by constructing observatories on remote mountains, then by building instruments lifted by balloons, and finally by instruments to be transported by rockets. Now astronomers observe with tools permanently housed in space. Advances toward and for spaceflight, which brought the astronomer’s eye from mountains to space, reshaped the physical sites of astronomy, what it meant to do astronomical work, and our understanding of the universe itself.

This chapter describes reasons for managing risk, outlines corporate governance and discusses the main models of risk management.

Swift learned about foreign affairs from one of England’s greatest diplomats, Sir William Temple, friend of William III and champion of balance-of-power foreign policy. But he became chief apologist for the notorious foreign policy maneuver by which Britain abandoned William's Grand Alliance to negotiate a ceasefire with archenemy France. The Whig opposition accused Swift and the Tories of ushering in foreign hegemony and domestic absolutism – and most critics today insist Swift was an authoritarian political thinker and devotee of Thomas Hobbes. Yet Britain and France negotiated the Peace of Utrecht (1713), a milestone of international cooperation, the first major treaty to include “balance of power” in its provisions, and the inspiration of Enlightenment philosophical projects of “perpetual peace,” ultimately including the European Union. This paradox reveals the need to study Swift’s views on international politics in both theory and practice. The key lies in his universalist conception of balance of power.

Edwin Hubble is widely regarded as the leading observational cosmologist of the twentieth century. In this chapter we examine the observational approach that Hubble brought to his researches on galaxies (or extragalactic nebulae as he preferred to call them) in the 1920s and 1930s. We also scrutinize his general writings about those researches and the development of science to highlight his views on the relationship between observation and theory, including his views on the notion of an expanding universe. For Hubble, at its core, the practice of science was to do with the discovery of laws, and the explanation of these laws by theories, as well as the testing of theories by further observations and experiments.

The history of astronomy and the history of philosophy are inextricably fused. This chapter highlights some of the dramatic episodes when astronomy confronted philosophical issues in metaphysics – questions regarding the objects astronomy studies; in epistemology – what is the most fruitful way to acquire knowledge in astronomy? And finally the ultimate existential question – what kind of a science is astronomy? Is it even a natural science at all?

Social stressors are frequent in everyday life. Examples are conflicts and disputes with other persons, separation and loss of partners, and interaction and self-assertion problems. If such situations are accompanied by injustice, harassment, breach of trust, and humiliation, and if possibilities to defend oneself are limited, then intense negative reactions can arise, for example, embitterment. This is a complex and burning emotion that includes feelings of frustration, self-reproach, anger, fury, aggression, helplessness, despair, insult, degradation, and hopelessness. Embitterment is familiar to everyone and can already be observed in childhood. As injustice is experienced as aggression towards oneself, embitterment can be understood as a form of counter aggression that tries to equalize by taking revenge, even if this has dire costs for oneself. A way to prevent such dysfunctional developments or heal negative experiences is to use wisdom. There is much scientific and experimental research in this field that has defined wisdom as the capacity to deal with difficult situations and dilemmas in life, offering options to ameliorate despair, aggression, and embitterment.

This chapter offers a phenomenological reconfiguration of vulnerability in borderline personality disorder (BPD). The focus is on the temporal embedding of self-experience. Departing from dominant biological and cognitive models, the chapter examines how temporal fragmentation and affective instability influence the formation of BPD identity. Drawing on the authors’ previous qualitative findings and Roman Ingarden’s stratified model of identity, the analysis uncovers a paradoxical temporal structure. BPD experience is marked by discontinuity between a detached past and an immersive present as well as entanglement marked by the persistence of the wounding past. The resulting tensions produce a dual-layered identity. The static stratum consists of persistent identifications with wounded historicity and rigid self–world interpretations, while the dynamic stratum manifests as frequent, affect-driven self-recreations. The latter overwhelms the integrative function of the static layer, resulting in a cyclical structure of self-experience that inhibits narrative coherence and developmental change. Consequently, BPD temporality undermines the possibility of novelty, agency, and future-oriented self-regulation, resulting in a form of identity that is both unstable and rigidly structured by past harms. Ingarden’s philosophical framework thus provides a scaffold for the temporal disruption being constitutive of felt vulnerability in BPD.

I introduce the “equality–difference paradox.” This is the observation that ethnically homogenous countries like Ireland and Denmark tend to have low levels of income inequality, while countries such as the United States and South Africa, with high levels of ethnic diversity, tend to have higher levels of income inequality. I situate this paradox within the context of historical and contemporary demographic change. I explore possible explanations of the paradox in relation to Sierra Leone, South Africa, Denmark, the United States, China, and India. The paradox draws attention to two broader issues: first, the role of pluralism in complex, globalized, multicultural societies; and second, how ongoing efforts to address the paradox raise fundamental questions about how we organize future societies. I conclude this chapter by closing Part II of the book and orienting towards Part III, which explores three possible futures of economic inequality and capitalism.

These conclusions do not intend to summarize and even less to close the debate but instead to revert to the main issues addressed during the conference and maybe identify further issues for research. All contributors agree that not only a discussion on democracy and representation in and by international organisations is not purely speculative or theoretical, but that it seems necessary today. Despite this, contributors are not all in agreement on the need to use the concept of representation when discussing democratization of international organizations. Some question the link between democracy and representation, or whether using representative systems is even feasible in international organizations. This, in turn, leads to the various definitions of the concept of representation in political science and in law. A multiple international representation system (MIRS) as proposed by Besson and Marti is based on a strict concept of democratic representation and contrasts with other more flexible concepts such as ‘descriptive’ or ‘mimetic’ representation. In the end, the chapters address the merits of various systems, including in existing processes of global governance, for further democratizing international organisations.

Many contemporary international organizations (IOs) are empowered to adopt international law that claims to bind their Member States (and, directly or indirectly, their peoples). Certain IOs have also become members of other Ios or, at least, active participants in international lawmaking processes that claim to bind those IOs and their Member States (and their peoples).Generally speaking IOs play a central role in contemporary international lawmaking: they institutionalize most of the processes through which international law is adopted today, be it through international conferences, international courts, or as IO secondary law. From the perspective of the democratic legitimacy of international law, this raises the question of the conditions under which those Ios may be regarded as democratic representatives of their Member States’ peoples and, accordingly, under which the international law they have the right or discretion to adopt inside and outside of IO organs and processes may claim to bind those peoples legitimately.

This chapter examines how inner conflict and difficulties with habit regulation render agents with bipolar disorder vulnerable to concerns about authenticity. Because what they value or care about depends on whether they are manic, depressed, or in remission, they may not have a strong grasp of who they ‘really’ are. To make sense of this, some theorists have maintained that a ‘true self’ account of authenticity is needed. However, authenticity is not merely a matter of discovering some ‘true self’ that captures someone’s essence; it also involves self-creation. This chapter describes how an agent’s habits of behaviour, attention, and affective engagement are central to the self. By way of habit regulation, agents navigate fluctuating environmental conditions, balance competing priorities, and gain a sense of what really matters to them. Because subjects with bipolar disorder encounter difficulties with habit regulation, their sense of self destabilizes and they become concerned about authenticity.

In this chapter, we trace the history of how the EU emerged as a leader in using development aid and diplomacy to restrict migration, particularly from Africa. We also broadly describe the scope of migration management projects, including their intended impact on state capacity, economic development, a country’s domestic governance including civil society, and the return of a country’s nationals via forced and voluntary repatriation. We then turn to the EUTF, analyzing where and how the EU spent more than €5 billion across the African continent. We explore which actors benefited the most, what projects received the most funding, and where these interventions had the most impact. Overall, the EUTF prioritized state capacity, security, and economic development, while civil society and other non-state actors received significantly smaller allocations.