AI will greatly challenge product liability since it is based on assumptions as to physical objects distributed through organised linear value chains which do not necessarily apply in the AI context. AI systems further challenge both liability compartmentalisation based on separate risk spheres and the notion of defectiveness. The European Product Liability Regime is based on a linear value chain, whereas with AI, systems may be distributed differently. The realities of new value chains call for a number of adjustments to central product liability concepts, which will widen the scope of product liability rules. Further, AI may in fact have the potential to ultimately dissolve the very notion of product liability itself.

Data is one of the most valuable resources in the twenty-first century. Property rights are a tried-and-tested legal response to regulating valuable assets. With non-personal, machine-generated data within an EU context, mainstream IP options are not available, although certain types of machine generated data may be protected as trade secrets or within sui generis database protection. However, a new IP right is not needed. The formerly proposed EU data producer’s right is a cautionary tale for jurisdictions considering a similar model. A new property right would both strengthen the position of de facto data holders and drive up costs. However, with data, there are valuable lessons to be learned from constructed commons models.

Whether AI should be given legal personhood should not be framed in binary terms. Instead, this issue should be analysed in terms of a sliding-scale spectrum. On one axis, there is the quantity and quality of the bundle of rights and obligations that legal personhood entails. The other axis is the level of the relevant characteristics that courts may include in conferring legal personhood.

The conferral of personhood is a choice made by legal systems, but just because it can be done, does not mean that it should. Analogies made between AI systems and corporations are superficial and flawed. For instance, the demand for asset partitioning does not apply to AI systems in the same way that it does with corporations and may lead to moral hazards. Conferring personhood on AI systems would also need to be accompanied with governance structures equivalent to those that accompany corporate legal personhood. Further, the metaphorical ghost of data as property needs to be exorcised.

This chapter explores several fundamental features of ancient Greek and Roman ethics and considers some ways in which these features are still influential in contemporary education. Ancient ethics was generally undergirded by a substantive cosmology and related philosophical anthropology; ancient thinkers often affirmed the existence of some sort of objective logos that served as the ordering principle of the cosmos and in accordance with which human beings ought to order their lives. This two-fold commitment resulted in a focus on cultivating virtue. The chapter also discusses three educational arenas in which commitment to features of ancient ethics is manifested today: arguments for “flourishing” as an aim of education, “character education” initiatives, and the contemporary K-12 “classical education” movement.

What kind(s) of thinking and doing should inform how teachers might lead (working) lives that are “ethical,” and how should this translate to preservice teacher education? Two broad schools of thought are identified: teaching as an inherently “‘moral” endeavor, driven by “values” and requiring an educational approach to teacher formation; and teaching as a “profession” requiring formation following models of executive education found in other vocations, particularly medicine. After reviewing these two perspectives, consideration is given to programs that might best address these aims, assuming this is needed beyond learning on the job. The chapter concludes by identifying promising practices, established and emerging practices, across both moral and professional understandings, arguing that in each case these need to be adapted and developed to meet the needs of teachers more equally across a diverse range of cultural contexts.

Feminist ethics, the project of living with gender in all its varieties while also seeking to undo gender-related limitations, seems simultaneously retrograde, repetitive, and utterly necessary. This chapter seeks to make connections among several major feminist philosophers and transgender theorists, including Mary Wollstonecraft, Anna Julia Cooper, Simone de Beauvoir, whose work unfolds these interconnections and differences in ways that also work through the contradictions of wanting to recognize how diverse women are but also not wanting to remain within the complex and constitutive but insufficient cultural definitions of gender.

This chapter provides definitions of academic freedom and its legal precedents, stemming from the First Amendment. The authors note the tension placed on the concept as it occupies a space between the purposes of democratic legitimation and the promotion of democratic competence. The strain on conceptualizations of academic freedom is exacerbated by a lack of legal clarity and the ambiguity of some of its key elements. Contemporary challenges, including the neoliberalization of the university and political attacks in the form of “divisive concepts” bills, will continue to test the discursive power of “academic freedom.”

The radical ethics of critical theory, from Marx to Habermas, proposes principles through which ethical deliberations might be pursued. The radical nature of Habermas’s ethics involves a recognition of “the other” as worthy and valid in their own right. Such radical openness to others has the potential of transforming us toward what is better. When an individual’s conception of the good life necessitates an awareness and orientation toward what is good for “others,” ethics converges with the moral point of view through what is just: the good life as synonymous with just living. The chapter begins with a compelling story of a Ugandan peaceworker through which the authors draw out critical ethical principles. Then, the authors apply the radical ethics of Habermas’s critical theory to the contemporary US policy discourse around trans athletes’ participation in school sports. That discourse is analyzed according the principles introduced through the story at the beginning of the chapter.

The aim of this chapter is to establish that children are owed a sense of their own interiority. The chapter argues that although the literature on philosophy of childhood constitutes an advance on the deficit model of childhood insofar as it supports children’s rights and childhood goods, it risks reifying adult-child relations by continuing to essentialize childhood. While Gareth B. Matthews’ theory of development as socially and linguistically mediated begins to shift the focus toward the child’s own inner life, it falls short insofar as it fails to challenge the fact/value dichotomy. Drawing upon Iris Murdoch’s philosophy, the chapter concludes that a rejection of this dichotomy is in fact necessary for developing the notion of a morally inflected consciousness that is as available to children as it is adults.

This chapter explores health policies and practices in schools, paying special attention to the presumed placement of health in schools and the ethical entanglements that arise because of this supposition. Evidence is provided to demonstrate that school health–related policies and practices are rarely born out of neutral “habits of mind” but are often influenced by various political, moral, and empirical agendas. In providing these historical and contemporary examples, research reveals important complexities and contestations. Ultimately, the chapter highlights the ethical problematics that are bound up in the taken-for-grantedness on giving schools complicated social problems to remedy. The chapter provides an alternative approach to health education through encouraging teachers and students to engage in critical explorations of existing health policies and projects. The authors hope to help unravel entanglements, expose contradictions, and shed light on the some of the ethical quandaries of these health-related projects.

This chapter advocates for an emotion-aware approach to climate change ethics education. The authors begin by reviewing traditional strategies, both noting their strengths and limitations and highlighting how these traditional approaches often neglect the role of emotion in climate change ethics education. From here the authors discuss five philosophical frameworks that motivate and give substance to a more emotion-aware approach. They then detail four central pedagogical elements that are characteristic of this approach, explaining how these elements give shape to a distinctive and compelling pedagogical approach to climate change ethics education. They conclude by discussing both the benefits and challenges of adopting a more emotion-aware strategy.

This chapter explores the connection between ethics and mindful leadership in education by situating the discussion within the tradition of moral and ethical leadership. Drawing on virtue ethics, the concept of virtuous mindful leadership is proposed. This leadership construct refers to the present-moment attention to self, people, and events that reflects the leader’s moral character. This form of leadership transcends a leader’s obligation to adhere to moral rules or ensure good outcomes to the leader’s ethics, conduct, and role-modeling. A virtuous, mindful leader contributes to human flourishing by helping others to achieve eudaemonic well-being. In educational administration, such a leader creates and sustains a school culture of authentic mindfulness, promotes social justice education, and supports mindful collaboration with staff.

This chapter focuses on the accelerating pace and unprecedented reach of technological innovation. Ethical issues, evident, for example, in the impacts of social media and the burgeoning applications of artificial intelligence, raise questions as to how technological advances align with and alter human values and ways of life. Education is pivotal where such questions are concerned, but its role may be constrained by technologically amplified forms of cultural and temporal parochialism, and technologically enhanced efforts optimize education in terms of narrowly configured outcomes aligned with prevailing forms of meritocratic order. Alternatively, evolving forms of educational practice may provide, in the form of ethically responsive, intergenerational practical deliberation, a counterweight to the cascading social and cultural influence of emerging technology.

In the realm of education, broadly conceived, meta-ethical theories and normative ethical frameworks can draw on a variety of understandings and analyses of the human condition or aims of schooling. Engaging with pressing ethical issues and arising dilemmas, the contributors in this part are in discourse with ethical traditions and their forms of application to create alternate expositions of morality and universal standards for evaluating educational practice and theory. In doing so, they take up R. S. Peters’ charge in innovative ways that reaffirm the salience of philosophy to education’s formative role in society.