This part invites the reader to survey a variety of ethical traditions that have historically informed, and still inform, our educational thought and practice. Dedicating a section to ethical traditions in education comes with obvious challenges. Not only is there an almost infinite number of traditions one could justifiably consider; it is also unclear what traditions rooted in the past can contribute to the complex and ever-changing concerns of the present age. Some of our readers no doubt share Hannah Arendt’s view that the dismantling of metaphysics has also meant that “the thread of tradition is broken and that we shall not be able to renew it,” leaving us with little more than “a fragmented past, which has lost its certainty of evaluation.”

Why educate? This question has been considered throughout history and around the world. Many reasons and rationales have been proposed. Some are overlapping, while others are competing. Considering why to educate is important for considering how to educate: that is, what policies, curriculum, and pedagogy to use, in relation to purposes. This chapter discusses some of the major frameworks underpinning various educational practices that have taken place historically and today. The aim is to elaborate ethical frameworks as they relate to justifications for educational practices, before giving some examples to clarify and demonstrate how choices among frameworks make a difference in relation to practice. Additionally, the chapter considers some of the noteworthy limitations of each.

This chapter begins by addressing settler colonialism and how it has affected and influenced educational practices in the United States. The authors discuss how they define decolonization and ask themselves and their readers if it is truly possible to decolonize schooling in the United States. They offer the concept of a critical settler consciousness to push back against settler colonization, and give multiple examples of communities and schools that are decolonizing their curriculums. The authors emphasize that decolonizing the curriculum is not easy; it is complicated, convoluted, and often unclear. They conclude that there is hope in the communities, parents, and students employing decolonizing practices to educate their young people.

This chapter explores some central features of morality in terms of what are commonly regarded as virtues. A virtue is a disposition that is an important feature of one’s character. As such, a virtue endures over an extended period of time, not just for a brief moment. Still, a virtue such as honesty implies its regular exercise. However, one can occasionally behave dishonestly without this undermining its standing as one’s virtue. The notion that some emphasis on basic moral virtues should be included in K-12 and college education has long received strong public support. However, there has also been widespread disagreement about just how this should be done and with what ends in mind. Presumably, some general uncertainty, if not disagreement, about the nature and foundation of morality accounts for much of this. This uncertainty is discussed in terms of reasonableness.

This chapter explores the connections between ethics, the phenomenological (and hermeneutical) traditions, and education. It focuses on the idea of the subject, showing phenomenology’s contrast with the modernist picture of the autonomous subject. The chapter first briefly traces the idea of the subject in phenomenology through four representative figures – Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Levinas – and then sketches their approaches to ethics. Then it pivots to four ethical concepts in philosophy of education in this tradition – understanding, risk, subjectification, and responsibility – by connecting them to phenomenological tradition’s broad conception of the subject. The chapter brings into relief the contribution phenomenology makes to envisioning living well together and human flourishing, and education’s role in fostering ethical subjects that would enact such societies.

This chapter explores the concept of virtue (de) in Confucianism and Daoism, which are the two prominent indigenous traditions in ancient China. It is argued that virtue, from an ancient Chinese paradigm, is essentially about moral excellence and influence. In the Confucian traditions, virtue is manifested in the exaltation of moral goodness and ethical charisma of exemplary persons. In the Daoist traditions, virtue is encapsulated in the emptying of one’s heart-mind and in noncoercive action. Chinese ethics in the ancient past stress the utmost importance of (inter)personal cultivation of virtues and role-modeling. School leaders, teachers, students, and other educational stakeholders should develop themselves and others morally so as to collectively achieve dao (the Way), which is a shared vision of human excellence.

This chapter considers the major Abrahamic faiths on a continuum from dynamic to dogmatic. On the dynamic side lies the God of covenant and a life consistent with an open society. On the dogmatic side lies the ruler of the universe and a life aligned with a closed society. Readings of Abraham’s story leaning toward the dynamic end of this continuum are more authentic than those tending toward the dogmatic end. Dynamic readings of Abraham’s legacy are also more ethically robust and their transmission more genuinely educational, conceived as initiation into intelligent worldviews while learning from and about alternatives. This dialogical concept of education, called the “pedagogy of difference,” can lead us out of our current morass in which people of deep difference are increasingly incapable of communicating with one another.

The chapter discusses the influence of utilitarianism on education. It begins by introducing the core principles of utilitarianism. The chapter then argues that it is possible to distinguish between two major strands within the utilitarian view of education: one that focuses on promoting the happiness of each individual, and the other on enhancing the happiness of the greatest number by creating facilitating social conditions for it. Each of these two strands is separately examined. The chapter also maintains that the second strand had a lasting impact on education that finds its clearest current expression in the emphasis on education’s role in economic development. Finally, the chapter suggests that reviving certain traditional forms of utilitarianism has significant potential to improve education.

This chapter is organized according to two complementary sections. The first examines ethical practice as an extension of liberal humanism, a series of operating assumptions that present select claims of discrete subjects and individualized responsibility. Liberal humanism colludes with capitalistic claims of value and a foregrounding of articulated rights over and above any semblance of collective justice. From this frame extend a series of research practices that “make sense” in particular ways and according to procedurized claims of ethical practice. Part two engages with an alternative ethical practice that is termed “relational materialism.” Relational materialism refuses the governing processes endemic to liberal humanism in favor of an affirmative ethical practice animated by transformative potential – the resistive assumption that we might become otherwise through generating a future yet unknown. Rather than solely describing or reconstituting the normative status quo (as is seen in conventional research), relationally materialist inquiry begins with an ethic of refusal such that we might experiment with alternative ways of living that are not governed by the ubiquitous claims of liberal humanism.

Considering the increasing privatization of public schools in the United States, the authors of this chapter utilize contractarianism to critique neoliberal practices. Textual evidence is drawn on to show the influence of contractarian arguments on neoliberal thinkers such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich Hayek. After an explanation of the contractarianism of Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, the authors show that the neoliberal versions of the social contract are both incompatible with the tradition writ large and internally inconsistent philosophically. Rather than a public characterized by privatization, and the undermining of public schools that results, the authors argue for a public in which responsibility, obligation, and freedom are not contradictory terms, and a vision of public schools in which teachers successfully bring about those ethical goals.

This chapter asks, How might racial justice be pursued in educational contexts? For example, do racial disparities in quality of treatment in schools require that all students experience the treatment previously reserved for the relatively (racially) advantaged, or should expectations be shifted toward some new standard for all? In order to better engage issues and appropriately address them with a mind to future interventions and continued progress, this chapter argues that it is necessary to clarify the confusions present in much of the discourse surrounding race and educational ethics.

In our contribution to the debate on African ethics and education, this chapter provides the reader with some insights into the interplay between African ethics and education through the fundamental principles of Ubuntu. Despite some of the criticism raised against Ubuntu as moral philosophy, this chapter shows how the principles of Ubuntu influence character formation in education in Southern Africa. It is through education that morally appropriate behavior is transmitted from one generation to the other. To avoid generalization on a culturally diverse continent like Africa, the chapter makes specific reference to the sub-Saharan countries of Zimbabwe and, to a lesser extent, Botswana and Zambia. The chapter claims that Ubuntu, as a conduit for moral development, has not been given adequate attention in the field of education. Ubuntu is important in creating the kind of citizens Africa needs, individuals who are critical thinkers, whose allegiance is to humanity rather than to personalities and localities. Transmitted through education, Ubuntu helps citizens to embrace democracy and diversity. Ubuntu principles of communalism, justice, love, humility, tolerance, and honesty can be used to address challenges besetting education in Africa and society in general and to promote national and human development.

In this chapter the author provides a summary of Colin Wilson’s new existentialism as distinguished from historical existential philosophies. Wilson’s “Outsider” becomes a prototype for freedom, in a heroic and individualistic vein. Next, the author examines Wilson’s emphasis on self-preoccupation and consciousness as a symptom of existentialism in general. Using the work of important Black existentialists, the author offers a relational rather than an individualist interpretation of new existentialism. By being concerned with social justice, the chapter utilizes what are known as pedagogies of discomfort and calls for critical action. In the third section, the chapter presents Whitehead’s rhythms of learning and radical empiricism of “style” as an alternative to Wilson’s outsider, who advances a mistaken Husserlian interpretation of Whitehead’s philosophy. Whitehead, alternatively, holds that experience is richer than consciousness achieved and accrued. Finally, in the last section, the author offers new existentialism’s revolutionary vision for a new university.

This chapter provides a rationale for, and outlines of, a democratic ethical framework for defining the moral responsibilities of school leaders working within political conditions of growing inequality, authoritarian state governments, and populist parental-rights movements. Facing these conditions, many leaders are tempted toward a position of liberal neutrality, a (false) removal of politics designed to minimize anger or retribution by parents and legislatures. A democratic, communal ethic orients the responsibilities of the school leader around democratic values, and the educational interests of the students. Moral responsibility requires leaders to embrace liberalism’s pluralism but also its strong egalitarianism, by educating students in both the hopeful and the tragic forms of knowledge and shared social existence that constitute the national democratic project.

African American teachers are in high demand in urban schools. Presupposing these spaces as operating within a matrix of domination for African Americans in the United States, in this chapter, two African American scholars of differing genders model womanist thinking as politic educational ethics and praxis. hooks, Fanon, and Lorde elucidate the Black subject’s ontological condition as a problem of spectatorship. Womanist theory responds to sociopolitical forces devaluing the self as minoritized subject. Through critical self-reflexivity that acknowledges the debilitating white normative gaze and the inner turmoil of its subjugation, womanist thinking offers a normative syntax of freedom. A womanist praxis of radical subjectivity and a pedagogy of love excavates one’s inner visions for oneself and for one’s students that engenders self-authorship.