Chapter 5 builds on the previous discussion of procurement by analyzing how politicians’ use of career control tools can distort the allocation of public contracts. Through qualitative accounts, it documents how mayors and bureaucrats manipulate bidding processes to ensure that contracts are awarded to firms with partisan ties. Contract-level data reveals striking patterns: despite the geographic proximity of districts, over 80 percent of firms that are awarded contracts operate in just one district. The geographic concentration of contract allocation indicates that entry into procurement markets depends on cultivating ties with local politicians and bureaucrats. The chapter also shows that politicized contracting is especially prevalent in competitive districts and where mayors harbor ambitions for higher office, as these contexts heighten incentives to trade contracts for political support. Survey experiments confirm bureaucrats’ expectations that partisan firms are favored over more experienced but politically neutral competitors. These findings converge to depict procurement as a highly politicized process that undermines efficiency, reduces competition, and ultimately produces lower-quality infrastructure. By linking political ambition, electoral competition, and procurement practices, the chapter illustrates how career control mechanisms translate into the systematic misallocation of public resources.

Chapter 7 reflects on the book’s findings and their broader implications. It underscores that state capacity is not determined solely by formal rules or resources, but by the everyday power relations between politicians and bureaucrats. Investments in infrastructure, personnel, or technology matter, but their effectiveness depends on how politicians and bureaucrats interact. The book highlights the “grey zone” between fully politicized and fully meritocratic systems, arguing that most states fall somewhere in between. Ghana exemplifies this dynamic, but the theory also applies elsewhere. Comparative evidence from India and Indonesia shows similar patterns: politicians exploit career controls to extract loyalty and manipulate bureaucratic action, especially in competitive electoral contexts. These parallels suggest the argument has broad external validity. The chapter also considers how the equilibrium might shift. Reforms that strengthen bureaucratic autonomy, insulate career management, or increase transparency in procurement could reduce partisan manipulation. Yet such reforms are politically difficult, as they challenge the very tools politicians rely on. By situating bureaucratic management at the heart of governance outcomes, the chapter points toward future research on how institutional design can mitigate corruption and enhance equitable service delivery in developing democracies.

Chapter 2 develops the theoretical framework that underpins the book. It argues that politicians in developing democracies face a dual incentive: they need competent bureaucrats who can implement programs effectively, yet they also desire control over those bureaucrats to secure loyalty and political advantage. As a result, politicians often recruit based on merit but retain formal or informal levers of influence, such as control over promotions or geographic transfers. The chapter distinguishes between programmatic and non-programmatic distribution, emphasizing that politicians often require bureaucratic loyalty to engage in non-programmatic distribution. Further, politicians have greater incentives to engage in non-programmatic distribution when local elections are highly competitive. Accordingly, I expect that intense local electoral competition will result in worse governance outcomes, including higher levels of corruption and partisan allocation of public goods. This framework provides the theoretical lens to interpret the empirical evidence presented in subsequent chapters and situates the book’s contribution within broader debates on state capacity, bureaucratic autonomy, clientelism, and democratic accountability.