Chapter 1 introduces the key concepts of the book, lays out the main argument, and discusses the empirical approach and data used in later chapters. It emphasizes that variation in governance outcomes cannot be understood without examining the incentives and interactions of politicians, bureaucrats, and voters. Ultimately, I argue that politicians in developing democracies have incentives to hire competent bureaucrats but will simultaneously retain tools to influence their career progression. Using tools of career control – interference in bureaucrats’ promotions, work locations, and day-to-day work tasks – politicians can extract bureaucratic loyalty. The introduction also situates the book within existing scholarship. The empirical strategy combines qualitative interviews, survey experiments, and observational data, largely drawn from Ghana but supplemented with comparative insights. Ultimately, the chapter frames the book as an inquiry into how the competing incentives of politicians and bureaucrats shape governance.

Chapter 6 shifts from procurement to the spatial allocation of local public goods, examining how partisan considerations shape the placement of infrastructure in communities. It begins by outlining the formal planning processes, in which bureaucrats are expected to design allocations based on community needs. However, interviews and prior research reveal frequent deviations from these plans, often driven by political pressure. Using data from Ghana’s Central Region, the chapter shows a strong correlation between the ruling party’s prior vote share and the number of projects a community receives. At the same time, the analysis highlights the role of need: poorer communities are more likely to secure projects than wealthier ones. These patterns suggest a dual influence – politicians seek to reward co-partisan communities, while bureaucrats attempt to prioritize developmental considerations. To probe this further, the chapter employs a survey experiment across eighty local governments. Results confirm that bureaucrats perceive both partisanship and need as influential, but partisan alignment often outweighs need in determining outcomes. The evidence thus reveals a tug-of-war between politicians and bureaucrats, with distributive outcomes shaped by the balance of partisan incentives and bureaucratic resistance. This politicization of allocation ultimately undermines equitable and efficient public service delivery.

Chapter 4 examines how politicians’ ability to influence bureaucrats’ careers creates opportunities for corruption in public procurement. Drawing on surveys and interviews with bureaucrats across local governments in Ghana, it finds that nearly half of bureaucrats believe procurement contracts are awarded uncompetitively, often in exchange for party financing. These perceptions highlight the vulnerability of procurement processes to partisan manipulation. A key mechanism through which politicians secure bureaucratic compliance is career control, particularly the threat of geographic transfers. Bureaucrats who resist corrupt demands risk reassignment to less desirable locations, a sanction that can disrupt both professional advancement and personal lives. Evidence from a survey experiment underscores this fear: bureaucrats anticipate that opposing corruption would trigger punitive transfers. By focusing on career management as a channel of influence, the chapter contributes to broader debates on bureaucratic autonomy and political interference. It also demonstrates that corruption is not merely the result of bureaucrats’ individual incentives but of institutionalized practices that bind bureaucrats’ careers to politicians’ partisan strategies.

Chapter 3 introduces Ghana as the central case study. Ghana is a lower-middle-income country in West Africa that transitioned to a multi-party democracy in 1992. Since then, two dominant parties – the New Patriotic Party and the National Democratic Congress – have alternated peacefully in power. The chapter outlines the institutional structure of local governance. The country is divided into districts, each led by a mayor-like political head appointed by the president, and administered by a District Coordinating Director, the top local bureaucrat. Local governments are responsible for development planning and receive central transfers to construct infrastructure such as schools, roads, and markets. Using a combination of qualitative interviews and quantitative data, the chapter shows that bureaucrats working in local governments are largely recruited based on merit rather than partisan loyalty. Despite this meritocratic entry point, bureaucrats remain vulnerable to political influence once in position. The chapter establishes the institutional and political backdrop necessary for understanding the dynamics of bureaucratic control explored in later chapters.