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Reciprocation is central to conflict deescalation. How a country reciprocates-and how its domestic public and international rival respond to its reciprocation-can play an important role in shaping the trajectory of conflicts. Moving beyond conventional understandings in international relations that focus on balanced reciprocity between states, we propose two additional general forms of reciprocation: semi-reciprocity (reciprocation perceivably less than received) and super-reciprocity (more than received). We situate our theory in a hard case for deescalation, the US-China trade war, where relative-gains concerns are salient amid great power rivalry. Employing novel dyadic experiments that capture strategic interactions between states, we show, for the first time, how different strategies of reciprocation shape the domestic feasibilities of deescalation. The findings reveal how different forms and sequences of reciprocation shape the prospect of rapprochement, shedding light on the public dynamics underlying different pathways of deescalating a trade war that has profoundly impacted the world.
Does the 'Muslim World' signify a geopolitical bloc, a civilizational unit, or a theological ideal? This Element interrogates the concept of the Muslim World as a persistent yet under-theorized category in International Relations (IR). Although widely invoked in policy discourse, academic literature, and public debate, the term often functions as a geopolitical shorthand that essentializes Muslim-majority societies and obscures their internal diversity. Rather than accepting or rejecting the term outright, this Element offers a critical reconstruction. Drawing on constructivist IR theory, postcolonial studies, and Islamic intellectual traditions, we reconceptualize the Muslim World as a transnational public sphere shaped by shared debates, symbols, institutions, and histories that generate varying degrees of referential coherence across societies. By treating the Muslim World as historically contingent, internally plural, and relational rather than fixed or monolithic, this Element advances the agenda of Global IR and the project of 'worlding beyond the West.'
The number of international human rights institutions and countries participating in them has risen dramatically in recent decades, precipitating debates about why countries make such commitments and whether these commitments improve member's human rights behavior. These debates have centered on a small number of human rights treaties, with far less attention paid to the larger number of international organizations (IOs) that aim to promote human rights. The Element argues and then demonstrates that state decisions about joining these IOs depends on the institutional design of the organizations, specifically sovereignty costs for member states. These costs stem from the constraints that IOs impose and vary substantially. Emerging democracies are most likely to enter high sovereignty cost IOs. Furthermore, organizations that generate higher sovereignty costs tend to produce better human rights outcomes than those generating fewer sovereignty costs for all regimes. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
In recent years, a group of influential authoritarian states has emerged that fall between the ranks of great powers and small states. These authoritarian middle-powers – such as Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates – exert considerable influence, particularly in their region. Yet this development has been overlooked in favor of a focus on superpowers, especially China and Russia. We therefore lack a framework for understanding their behavior and impact. This Element offers the first comprehensive analysis of how non-democratic middle-powers engage abroad. Drawing on critical case studies, it shows how the combination of authoritarian politics and mid-level status leads to distinctive foreign policies. In particular, these strategies erode global democratic norms and institutions through a combination of hard power and transnational repression tempered by hedging and legitimation strategies. In this way, authoritarian middle-powers are helping to unravel the liberal rules-based order. This title is available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Hedging has been widely viewed as an optimal foreign policy for small and middle powers. However, hedging was more effective in some cases than others and ultimately proved detrimental for certain states. This Element contributes to knowledge about hedging by explaining why some smaller powers can hedge successfully between competing great powers while others fail, suffering serious harm. It develops a theoretical model consisting of international-systemic and state-level variables that determine hedging outcomes. It then tests the model using cases in the post-Soviet space (Georgia, Ukraine) and Southeast Asia (Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines) exposed to great power rivalry but exhibiting different hedging outcomes. It shows that hedging failure occurs due to changes in three key variables – structural uncertainty, availability of protective options, and decisionmakers' geopolitical prudence – and interactions between them. The Element highlights the limits to smaller power hedging and argues that hedging should not be taken for granted.
Debate over how to recognize and understand change and continuity has long animated the field of International Relations. This Element brings norm-oriented and practice-oriented approaches into conversation to advance a wide-ranging account of change and continuity in global politics. It elaborates four scenarios in which norm and practice interactions produce change and continuity: relative continuity and a tight coupling of practices and norms; change through accidental incompetence; new competencies that create disjunctures; and change through deliberate contestation. It demonstrates the utility of the approach using empirical illustrations from the fields of global health and development. The Element also shows the wider applicability of the scenarios for major contemporary debates about change in global governance and security. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
War is bad for nature, yet relatively little attention has been devoted to environmental military ethics by just war theorists and philosophers of war. Most wars since 1945 have been civil conflicts, often in areas containing the greatest biodiversity. Combining environmental ethics with ethics of war, this Element examines how the environmental crisis should challenge and change the rules of war. While environmental wartime regulation has been addressed rarely by just war theorists, environmental jus ad bellum has hardly been tackled at all. Can environmental harm trigger a new justification for war? Can targeting nature constitute terrorism? And what would be a proportionate response to 'environmental aggression'? With global degradation and climate change right around the corner, this Element discusses some of the most pressing practical ethics issues of our times, suggesting that grave environmental transgressions should be combatted by measures that do not themselves cause disproportionate harm to nature.
This Element advances a theory of social cues to explain how international institutions legitimize foreign policy. It reframes legitimization as a type of identity politics. Institutions confer legitimacy by sending social cues that exert pressures to conform and alleviate social–relational concerns regarding norm abidance, group participation, and status and image. Applied to the domain of humanitarian wars, the argument implies that liberal democracies vis-à-vis NATO can influence citizens and policymakers within their community, the primary participants of these military operations. Case studies, news media, a survey of policymakers, and survey experiments conducted in multiple countries validate the social cue theory while refuting alternative arguments relating to legality, material burden sharing, Western regionalism, and rational information transmission. The Element provides an understanding of institutional legitimacy that challenges existing perspectives and contributes to debates about multilateralism, humanitarian intervention, and identity. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Over the years, the US has intervened covertly in many countries to remove dictators, subvert elected leaders, and support coups. Explanations for this focus on characteristics of target countries or strategic incentives to pursue regime change. This Element provides an account of domestic political factors constraining US presidents' authorization of covert foreign-imposed regime change operations (FIRCs), arguing that congressional attention to covert action alters the Executive's calculus by increasing the political costs associated with this secretive policy instrument. It shows that congressional attention is the result of institutional battles over abuses of executive authority and has a significant constraining effect independent of codified rules and partisan disputes. These propositions are tested using content analysis of the Congressional Record, statistical analysis of Cold War covert FIRCs, and causal-process evidence relating to covert interventions in Chile, Angola, Central America, Afghanistan, etc.
This Element applies a new version of liberalism to international relations (IR), one that derives from the political theory of John Locke. It begins with a survey of liberal IR theories, showing that the main variants of this approach have all glossed over classical liberalism's core concern: fear of the state's concentrated power and the imperative of establishing institutions to restrain its inevitable abuse. The authors tease out from Locke's work its 'realist' elements: his emphasis on politics, power, and restraints on power (the 'Lockean tripod'). They then show how this Lockean approach (1) complements existing liberal approaches and answers some of the existing critiques directed toward them, (2) offers a broader analytical framework for several very different strands of IR literature, and (3) has broad theoretical and practical implications for international relations.
Foreign ministers are prominent actors in foreign affairs, often second only to heads of government in their influence. Yet, despite the growing awareness of the importance of key actors, and their backgrounds, in the study of international relations, foreign ministers remain understudied. In this Element, we make an important empirical contribution by presenting an original dataset on the personal and professional background of foreign ministers, spanning thirteen countries and more than 200 years. We use these data to answer three questions: who are the foreign ministers, why are foreign ministers with particular features appointed, and why do some foreign ministers have longer tenure than others? We find that foreign ministers tend to be men of politics who are appointed both on the basis of their affinity to, and to complement the experiences of, the head of government. We also find that foreign ministers stay longer in office when they perform well or are expected to do so, but that they are more likely to lose their posts when conditions make heads of government more prone to 'pin blame' on them to deflect criticism from foreign policy failures.
The central argument set out in this Element is that the combination of a perceived radical change in the threat environment post 9/11, and the new capabilities afforded by the long silent reach of the drone, have put pressure on the previously accepted legal frameworks justifying the use of force. This has resulted in disagreements - both articulated and unarticulated - in how the Western allies should respond to both the legal and operational innovations in the use of force that drones have catalysed. The Element focuses on the responses of the UK, France, and Germany to these developments in the context of the changing US approach to the use of force. Locating itself at the interface of international law and politics, this is the first attempt to look at the interplay between technological innovations, legal justifications, and inter-alliance politics in the context of the use of armed drones.
SSR is a key element of the transitions out of war, aiming at the establishment of accountable and legitimate institutions able to prevent and sanction the use of violence. While recognizing the need to include local actors, donor policies still focus mostly on the state as a provider of security. Second generation SSR has emphasized the need to include local communities and recognize the existence of non-state actors in the provision of security and justice. However, recognition is not enough. This Element promotes a radical re-think of SSR in the context of conflict and war. Guiding question for the considerations is how can security sector reform be set up and implemented to contribute to constructive and inclusive state-society relations, and build the path to long-lasting peace? This Element argues that a focus on functional equivalents, minorities, gender, and human rights is key for the design, implementation, and success of SSR. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.
This Element argues that governments allocate adjustment burdens strategically to protect their supporters, imposing adjustment costs upon the supporters of their opponents, who then protest in response. Using large-N micro-level survey data from three world regions and a global survey, it discusses the local political economy of International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending. It finds that opposition supporters in countries under IMF structural adjustment programs (SAP) are more likely to report that the IMF SAP increased economic hardships than government supporters and countries without IMF exposure. In addition, it finds that partisan gaps in IMF SAP evaluations widen in IMF program countries with an above-median number of conditions, suggesting that opposition supporters face heavier adjustment burdens, and that opposition supporters who think SAPs made their lives worse are more likely to protest. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
The strategic rivalry between the United States and China has heightened since COVID-19. Secondary states face increasing difficulties maintaining a 'hedging' strategy between the United States and China. This Element introduces a preference-for-change model to explain the policy variations of states during the order transition. It suggests that policymakers will perceive a potential change in the international order through a cost–benefit prism. The interplays between the perceived costs and the perception of benefits from the order transition will shape states' policy choices among four strategic options: (1) hedging to bet on uncertainties; (2) bandwagoning with rising powers to support changes; (3) balancing against rising powers to resist changes; and (4) buck-passing to ignore changes. Four case studies (Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Thailand) are conducted to explore the policy choices of regional powers during the international order transition. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Digital technologies are reshaping the global economy and complicating cooperation over its governance. Innovations in technology and business propel a new, digitally-driven phase of globalization defined by the expansion of cross-border information flows that is provoking political conflict and policy discord. This Element argues that the activities of digital value chains (DVCs), the central economic actors in digital globalization, complicate international economic relations. DVC activities can erode individual privacy, shift tax burdens, and cement monopoly positions. These outcomes generate a new politics of globalization, and governments are responding with increasing restrictions on cross-border data flows. This monograph: 1) explains the new sources of political division stemming from digital globalization; 2) documents policy barriers to digital trade; 3) presents a framework to explain digital trade barriers across countries; and 4) assesses the prospects for international cooperation on digital governance, which requires countries move beyond coordinated liberalization and toward coordinated regulation.
This Element addresses questions of division of labor and concentration of authority among intergovernmental organizations by examining multilevel governance in the Global South. It focuses on the policy domains of peace and security and human rights in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and its central finding is that the extent of governance regionalization varies across regions and issue areas. In the domain of peace and security, governance is most regionalized in Africa. In the domain of human rights protection, governance is most regionalized in the LAC region. Given the phenomenon of regional specialization, the Element makes the case for the greater explanatory power of regional drivers of regional institutional development. This Element is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
The international architecture of peacebuilding and statebuilding is currently responding to a shift from 'analogue' to 'digital' approaches in international relations. This is affecting conflict management, intervention, peacebuilding, and the all-important role of civil society. This Element analyses the potential that these new digital forms of international relations offer for the reform of peace praxis – namely, the enhancement of critical agency across networks and scales, the expansion of claims for rights and the mitigation of obstacles posed by sovereignty, locality, and territoriality. The Element also addresses the parallel limitations of digital technologies in terms of political emancipation related to subaltern claims, the risk of co-optation by historical and analogue power structures, institutions, and actors. We conclude that though aspects of emerging digital approaches to making peace are promising, they cannot yet bypass or resolve older, analogue conflict dynamics revolving around power-relations, territorialism, and state formation.
This Element offers a novel, highly relevant perspective towards Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), which are development and financial organizations at the same time. Based on the elaborate institutional logics perspective borrowed from organizational sociology, it uncovers the complex trade-offs between financial and development pressures faced by MDBs and explains variation in organizational responses thereto across types of MDBs. The argument is tested with an original dataset using Data Envelopment Analysis to explain variation in response patterns across MDBs. The analysis shows that lending to the private sector as well as being predominantly owned by borrowing members increase MDBs' emphasis on the financial at the expense of the development nature. Thereby, this Element provides unique insights into MDBs' responses to their dual nature and significantly advances our understanding of MDB lending operations, drawing attention to the complexities involved in the unique MDB business model.
Token forces – tiny national troop contributions in much larger coalitions – have become ubiquitous in UN peacekeeping. This Element examines how and why this contribution type has become the most common form of participation in UN peace operations despite its limited relevance for missions' operational success. It conceptualizes token forces as a path-dependent unintended consequence of the norm of multilateralism in international uses of military force. The norm extends states' participation options by giving coalition builders an incentive to accept token forces; UN-specific types of token forces emerged as states learned about this option and secretariat officials adapted to state demand for it. The Element documents the growing incidence of token forces in UN peacekeeping, identifies the factors disposing states to contribute token forces, and discusses how UN officials channel token participation. The Element contributes to the literatures on UN peacekeeping, military coalitions, and the impacts of norms in international organizations.