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The composition of the directly elected European Parliament does not precisely reflect the “real” balance of political forces in the European Community. As long as the national political systems decide most of what there is to be decided politically, and everything really important, European elections are additional national second-order elections. They are determined more by the domestic political cleavages than by alternatives originating in the EC, but in a different way than if nine first-order national elections took place simultaneously. This is the case because European elections occur at different stages of the national political systems' respective “electoral cycles”. Such a relationship between a second-order arena and the chief arena of a political system is not at all unusual. What is new here, is that one second-order political arena is related to nine different first-order arenas. A first analysis of European election results satisfactorily justifies the assumption that European Parliament direct elections should be treated as nine simultaneous national second-order elections.
There were several resounding resignations from the Papandreou government in 1995, each contributing to the continuous deterioration of its image. Minister of Justice G. Kouvelakis was the first to go, in early February, soon to be followed by Minister of Public Order S. Papathemelis in late March. Both were undermined by A. Livanis, Papandreou’s eminence grise since the 1960s and now Vice-Minister to the Prime Minister (soon to be promoted). Minister for Tourism D. Livanos finally resigned in June, after months of rumours involving casino licences. Others were to prove more resilient, like I. Potakis (then Minister of the Presidency of Government), unmoved by the revelation of his blatant nepotism in May. The most significant resignation, however, was that of K. Simitis, who had already been the first to announce his candidacy for Papandreou’s succession. By resigning on 11 September both from the government (as Minister of Commerce and Industry, Energy, and Technology) and from PASOK’s Executive, he distanced himself from Papandreou in the most emphatic manner, while he also precipitated the long-awaited cabinet reshuffle.
This article contributes to our understanding of merits and weaknesses associated with the subnational comparative case study. Despite its methodological strengths and the increasing importance of subnational units in politics, the subnational comparative case study remains underutilized in comparative politics. The root cause of the method’s merits lies in the substantive importance of subnational units in politics; at the same time, however, the difficulty of abstracting theory from local specificities hinders the wide utilization of this method. Through examining some important studies in comparative politics and Chinese politics that use comparative case studies, I identify problems in case selection and in achieving generalizability in research design of subnational comparative case studies.
This paper analyses welfare regime changes in Serbia and their impact on social enterprise development in the last two decades. We cover the period of significant transition-related reforms within the welfare state, with important implications on the position of these enterprises. Using data gathered from the qualitative field research, our study shows that there are two broad groups of factors that are important for development of the new generation of social enterprises, those that emerged in the last decade with an idea to foster entrepreneurial spirit and expanded into new domains other than those providing assistance to the marginalized groups. First, their decision to enter the social economy sector still depends on the environment created by the state. Secondly, their sustainability is affected by the factors typically found in any other enterprise of comparable scale like business skills, capacity to form networks and partner with relevant stakeholders.
This article examines Civil War commemoration in St. Louis, Missouri, to demonstrate not only that Memorial Day celebrations followed an atypical path in this border-state city, but that shifts in how Memorial Day was celebrated strongly affected which groups were able to participate. Public Civil War commemoration in St. Louis became increasingly reconciliationist in the early 1870s as the public rejected continued Reconstruction, with the result that Memorial Day became a joint Union and Confederate commemoration. Women and Black men were increasingly excluded, leaving white men, both native-born and German American, to control the narrative of the day. In the 1880s, the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR), gained enough power in the city to seize control of Memorial Day and change it into a commemoration that honored the Union cause only. This shift also created space for Black veterans and women of both races to participate through their membership in the GAR and its auxiliary, the Woman’s Relief Corps.
In political science the field of cabinet decision-making is still largely terra incognita, and there is no theoretical framework to help us interpret the available material in a meaningful way. As a first step, this article suggests that cabinet decision-making is structured by two sources of disagreement: the departments headed by the cabinet ministers, and the parties or factions these ministers represent. After a brief overview of different combinations of departmental and political heterogeneity in different countries, the Dutch cabinet is examined in more detail. It is characterized by strong departmental heterogeneity and more recently by political heterogeneity as well. Various attempts to contain these centrifugal forces - recognition of the cabinet, a strong position for the Prime Minister and for the Minister of Finance, cabinet committees, and an Inner Cabinet - have not been successful. This could be because political and departmental heterogeneity are mutually reinforcing. However, there is also some evidence that, in the Dutch case at least, these centrifugal forces are counterbalancing, or even completely unrelated to each other.
There is no doubt that political science has always been characterised by a normative afflatus. Verba was deeply concerned with understanding how democracy works in practice and how it can survive over the course of time. Lasswell constantly argued that political science should focus on problem-solving in order to improve the quality of citizens’ lives. David Easton clearly indicated that political science ought to focus on major problems that must be immediately addressed. For Sartori, political science should be conducted for society’s sake and should produce useful and applicable knowledge; for Ostrom and Putnam, it should help citizens; and for Katznelson, it should focus on how to pursue “a more decent politics and society under dangerous and difficult conditions”. For many reasons internal and external to the discipline, these normative roots and goals have been forgotten in recent decades. It is time to restore the normative afflatus of political science by pushing it to become more normative-based, more solution-seeking, more engaged and more critical.
In its fourth year in office, the Nationalist (conservative) Government proceeded on its path of economic liberalisation coupled with increased public spending. These and related subjects continued to be the main issues in Maltese politics, since they represent a major policy departure from the economic policies pursued during the previous sixteen years of Labour Government. The Government held that, in contrast with previous protectionist and often austere policies, liberalisation increased consumer choice, raised the quality of life, motivated local manufacturers to compete with foreign products, and put the country on the path towards future membership of the EC.
This article investigates the impact of electoral reforms on entry barriers in political markets. The discussion starts by delineating the theoretical boundaries of various political markets, such as those for participation, parties and government. By taking a cue from industrial organisation theory, the article offers an analysis of entry barriers, both hard and soft, along with their operationalisation for empirical research. Based on this theoretical framework, a single hypothesis is investigated. It posits that the modification of the entry barriers in the market for parties leads to changes in the concentration of the popular vote for party lists. An observable implication of this relationship would be if an electoral reform that raises entry barriers led to subsequent increases in the Herfindahl index (a measure of market concentration), and vice versa. This proposition is empirically tested by a comparative analysis of a new database covering Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia. The analysis offers support for the following proposition: in most cases the changes in the entry barriers led to a corresponding change of concentration in the market for parties.
The new Hungarian cabinet has been in power since 23 May 1990, following the first free elections since 1945. In addition to some expert appointments, three parties are represented as members of the governing coalition: the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokrata Frum, MDF), the Independent Smallholders Party (Fggetlen Kisguzdapurt, FKGP) and the Christian Democratic People's Party (Keresztnydernokruta Npprt, KDNP). The Prime Minister, Jzsef Antall, is the party leader of the largest party in parliament, the MDF, and has been in power since the cabinet first took office.
Accepting defeat in the aftermath of elections is crucial for the stability of democracies. But in times of intense polarization, the voluntary consent of electoral losers seems less obvious. In this paper, I study whether affective and perceived ideological polarization amplify the winner–loser gap in political support. Using multilevel growth curve modelling on pre and post‐election panel data from the British Election Study Internet Panel collected during the 2015 and 2019 UK general elections, I show that the winner–loser gap is indeed more pronounced amongst voters with higher levels of affective and perceived ideological polarization. Moreover, the results illustrate that polarized voters experience a stark decrease in their support for the political system following their electoral loss. Given the high and, in some Western democracies, rising polarization levels, these findings have important implications for losers’ consent and the stability of democracies in election times.
In the light of the climate crisis, ‘green transitions’ are inevitable to address the environmental harm caused by fossil capitalism. The article argues that the pathway of such green transitions is closely interrelated with welfare setups, as the answer to the questions ‘who wins, who loses; who supports, who opposes the green transition—and why?’ is strongly dependent on the welfare setup of a given economy. The welfare state not only stabilises the economy, prevents deprivation and balances class interests, it also structures interest constellations, material living conditions, and cultural lifestyles. Hence, which ‘green social risks’ need to be addressed, which social groups will seek to have a voice in a green transition, which transition routes are seen as legitimate, and which societal cleavages emerge around the transition—all these factors are shaped by the welfare setup of a country. Drawing on comparative welfare state theory, the article provides an analytical starting point for considering country-specific factors of green transitions and thus, outlines the potential of this political science research strand for debates on eco-social policy, politics, and polity.
Nonprofit interactions with businesses have become increasingly diverse, but which nonprofits establish relationships, and to what extent do relationships depend on the form or type of tie? Focusing on nonprofit collaboration with businesses and donations from businesses, we test arguments based on sociological institutionalism and resource dependence theory. We find that nonprofits relying on earned income, nonprofits led by individuals with management degrees, and rationalized nonprofits all are more likely to report collaborations with businesses, aligning with expectations from institutional theory. For donative ties between businesses and nonprofits, we find that rationalized nonprofits are more likely to have charitable gifts from businesses. However, nonprofits with earned income are less likely to have business donations, and funding diversity has a salient positive effect. These results reveal important but paradoxical institutional and resource dependence effects. We conclude with a discussion of our divergent findings and set an agenda for additional research on the topic.
This article attempts to view the idea of a “crisis of democracy” through a lens of individualization of the society. As the consequence of the impact of the individualization on existing liberal democracy, new forms of niggling democracy have been emerging. This article maps varieties of such emerging democracies in contemporary Japanese society.
This article is part of a broader study of women's representation and influence in the corporatist sector of public decision-making in Sweden. In an international perspective, Sweden has a remarkably high proportion of women politicians on all levels (between 30–45%), and women constitute about half of the participants in the labour market and of union members. However, in the decision-making processes of the unions and in corporatist arrangements, women are highly under-represented. And, as this study shows, in some cases women are more under-represented today than they were 30 or 40 years ago. One of the results of the high degree of corporatism in Sweden has thus been that women and women's interests have been more marginalised in corporatist arrangements than in traditional politics.