In her two recent operas, Heart Chamber (2017–19) and Infinite Now (2015–16), Chaya Czernowin uses vocal ensembles to embody a single character. In a 2016 article, she explained that she wanted to liberate the individual voice from its fixed emotional, social and individual conventions (especially its ingrained pathos), and to work with the voice as a free imaginative sonic material, using the ensemble technique to achieve this. This article argues that the voice ensemble technique amplifies and intensifies the pathos of the voice rather than eliminating it. Recognising that the voice has strong somatic qualities since it is produced in the body, I suggest a material-musical analysis, based on the theories of Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht and Brian Massumi, that focuses on the body, the sensual experience and the physical space, and rejects the hermeneutic tradition that refers to meaning and interpretation only. What emerges is that the voices, instrumentation and electronics of the ensemble are designed to embody the inner body and the outer space at the same time. The voice ensemble may split and produce multi-layered mental–physical states, and express how traditional dichotomies, such as culture/nature, body/mind and subject/object, can meld into multi-perspective processual movements. It is in this intersection of sound and drama, manifesting the corporeal, that the unique power of opera is evinced.

A relatively novel approach of autonomous navigation employing platform dynamics as the primary process model raises new implementational challenges. These are related to: (i) potential numerical instabilities during longer flights; (ii) the quality of model self-calibration and its applicability to different flights; (iii) the establishment of a global estimation methodology when handling different initialisation flight phases; and (iv) the possibility of reducing computational load through model simplification. We propose a unified strategy for handling different flight phases with a combination of factorisation and a partial Schmidt–Kalman approach. We then investigate the stability of the in-air initialisation and the suitability of reusing pre-calibrated model parameters with their correlations. Without GNSS updates, we suggest setting a subset of the state vector as ‘considered’ states within the filter to remove their estimation from the remaining observations. We support all propositions with new empirical evidence: first in model-parameter self-calibration via optimal smoothing and second through applying our methods on three test flights with dissimilar durations and geometries. Our experiments demonstrate a significant improvement in autonomous navigation quality for twelve different scenarios.

Treatment of mental illness in the United States is woefully inadequate. One-third of adults report having a mental health condition or substance use disorder, but less than half receive treatment for their condition.

Access is the problem. The U.S. is short on mental health professionals: more psychiatrists are needed and psychologists and social workers are overextended. Proposed solutions are to (1) increase reimbursement rates for psychiatrists and other mental health practitioners, and (2) use a wider range of providers, including nurses and family support specialists—all good ideas. My focus however is on two other forces that are moving into the behavioral health area, offering both financing and technologies to extend the reach of mental health services—private equity and telemental health.

First, private equity firms see high demand in this market. Behavioral health is desperately needed but is highly fragmented and lacking in innovation. Private equity is attracted to outpatient programs that target specific conditions that have evidence-based clinical models—programs aimed at addiction, eating disorders, and autism; these areas require less capital. Federal and state reimbursement is available, some regulations have been relaxed to allow remote prescribing of medicine; and innovative telehealth tools can be used. The problem is that private equity has a poor track record in both nursing home care and behavioral care for teens. The private equity model and its financial incentives are at odds with good care.

Second, telemental health tools, already in use because of the need during the pandemic, appear attractive. These tools require less capital to treat a higher volume of patients and promise much improved access to mental health treatment for populations that could not get such care because of travel distance, costs, and time limitations. The problem is that the telemental health tools have yet to be subjected to evidence-based testing.

My goal in this article is to test whether these two developments – private equity and telemental health —can improve access for patients at an acceptable level of quality. I conclude that both have substantial problems and I offer a range of regulatory approaches to control patient abuses and poor quality.

Many insurers exclude coverage for transgender individuals. Litigation challenging these exclusions has increased. Most of these cases successfully advance equality claims by arguing that trans exclusions discriminate based on sex. That is, procedures performed on patients for reasons unrelated to gender affirming care are being denied to transgender individuals. There are, however, limitations to this argument. First, some courts may construe care narrowly and hold that some procedures are unique to gender affirming care that have no analog in other contexts. Second, a court that is hostile to the sex discrimination argument might hold that the denial does not arise from sex discrimination, but rather, because of the kind of diagnosis at issue. Further, the sex discrimination argument might force transgender individuals into making claims based on a binarized gender identity which may not conform with their lived experience.

Claims based on the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act of 2008 (MHPAEA) can address these shortcomings. This Act prohibits insurers from discriminating against mental health diagnoses—for example, procedures that insurers cover because of medical or surgical diagnoses should also be covered if indicated for mental health diagnoses. Gender dysphoria is a recognized mental health diagnosis. Transgender individuals seeking gender affirming care arising from gender dysphoria can thus claim that exclusions of coverage violate the MHPAEA. Some transgender individuals might raise concerns that such an approach would lead to increased medicalization of trans identity. However, an MHPAEA claim would only appear in cases where a transgender individual is voluntarily submitting themselves to medical assistance in order to advance their own autonomy.

When federal district court Judge Carlton Reeves penned his opinion in U.S. v. Mississippi,1 the case that seemed poised to overhaul Mississippi’s suffering mental health system, he began with the story of Ms. Melanie Worsham, a mental health patient, also a certified peer support specialist. Ms. Worsham works to help those like herself who suffer with lifelong serious mental illness (SMI) to “overcome the obstacles that might be getting in their way of living the life they want to live.” She also assists those with SMI by aiding in “navigating the system, to find resources, and then just being moral support.”2

What is it that makes us judge two proofs of the same theorem to be the same or different? This is not an idle question: one central aspect of judging mathematics is the novelty of the mathematics presented. This is important everywhere, from the peer-review system, to assigning international prestige, to funding agencies’ grant decisions. It even matters to some extent in examinations, to avoid accusations of collusion. Surprisingly, philosophers of mathematics have not paid the question of novelty much attention. In this Article, we will consider the appealing conjecture that the main ideas that make up the proof, the essence of a proof, can indeed be identified and that very different styles of proofs can share common main ideas. Further, that a particular theorem can be proved using quite different, independent main ideas. As a means of exploring whether this is plausible, we will present a number of novel proofs of the following theorem.

That the world we seem to experience around us might be nothing but a simulation – perhaps generated by a demon or super-computer – is a perennial theme in science fiction movies. Muriel Leuenberger explores a recent example.