The covering of women has become the mark of Islam's new visibility in urban Turkey since the 1980s. Women wearing long, loose overcoats and headscarves tightly framing their faces and covering their necks and bosoms are now a familiar part of the urban scene, as well as of university campuses. They are usually referred to as İslamci (Islamist) women, sometimes also as dinci (religionist), gerici (regressive), irticacı (reactionary), kara peçeli (black veiled) or türbanlı (turbaned). Thus in the lexicon of Turkish identity, these women constitute a group defined through oppositional terms, similar to such ephitets as “leftist” women and “femininist” women. The words “Kemalist” and/or “Atatürkist” women have concurrently gained new political significance in denoting women (often professional elites) who, as against the so-called Islamist women, proclaim their allegience to Atatürk and his principles, i.e. speak from a pro-western, pro-state, secular-nationalistic and gender egalitarian position.

The process of contemporary globalization in its most general form involves a tension between universalism and particularism (see Robertson, 1992, pp. 8-61). On the one hand, with Francis Fukuyama’s “the end of history thesis” which suggests universalization of liberal democracy, along with the globalization of free market ideology, the dissolution of differences into sameness can be said to mark an emergence of cultural homogenization. On the other hand, it can be suggested that particularistic conflicts have begun to dictate the mode of articulation of political practices and ideological/discursive forms in global relations, which draws our attention to the tendency towards cultural heteroge-nization. Arjun Appadurai asserts in this context that “the central problem of today’s global interactions is the tension between cultural homogenization and cultural heterogenization”, or, as he puts it:

the central feature of global culture today is the politics of the mutual effort of sameness and difference to cannibalize one another and thus to proclaim their successful hijacking of the twin Enlightenment ideas of the triumphantly universal and the resiliently particular (Appadurai, 1990, p. 17).

The 1980s witnessed the rise of feminist and Islamic fundamentalist movements in Turkey. In diametrically opposed ways, both movements pushed the debate over women's issues and rights in Turkey into the spotlight of public discussion. The feminist movement made visible, and condemned, acts of physical violence against women, problematized women's lack of substantive rights, and the articles of the Criminal Code that discriminate against women. For the Islamic fundamentalists, on the other hand, women's right to wear headscarves in educational institutions and government offices was a focal and continuous rallying point throughout the 1980s. Less prominent have been campaigns by Islamic groups to segregate men and women in public life, by calling for separate buses, hospitals for men and women. While the feminist movement remained an informally organized, non-parliamentary opposition group, Islamists gained ground within state institutions by virtue of being a vocal constituency of the conservative ruling party in power since 1983. Apparently in response to the heightened debate concerning women's status, in the latter half of the 1980s and especially in the past year the government put legal measures into effect, creating legal obligations at the international level and institutional structures at the governmental level to address issues concerning women.

In a report prepared by a German geologist in 1917, Çukurova was designated as the most important region of cotton agriculture in Ottoman Anatolia. At the turn of the 21st century, the corporations of two families from Çukurova, Sabancı and Karamehmet, ranked among the largest 65 of the world. No other region of the former Ottoman Empire produced such wealth. This paper traces its generation back to nineteenth century processes of capital accumulation through the development of the port-town of Mersin.

When introducing this survey, it is necessary to say a word of justification about the time limits adopted. The year 1500 has been selected as an approximate starting point, because only during the reign of Sultan Bayezid II (1481-1512) do Ottoman tax registers become frequent enough to allow even approximate conclusions with respect to agricultural production. However when dealing with certain regions of the Empire, we need to adopt an even later starting point. After all, part of this paper deals with ‘Syria’ in the broad sense of the word, that is, the region bordering the eastern Mediterranean between Anatolia and Egypt; and this area was only conquered by the Ottomans in 1516. As to Tunisia, to which the present paper will also refer, this country only became part of the Ottoman Empire in 1533 or 1570.

This article focuses on a particular monument in Tophane, the Workers' Monument, which has been subjected to destructions ever since the time it was put in place in 1973 and which still stands in the same place as a crippled and unidentifiable body. Many people have referred to it as a “monster.” The term “monster” points to unacceptable forms of life, cast aside as “abnormal,” and can be of use in tracing how certain memories are crushed or abandoned and become aberrant. Thus, I argue that the story of the destruction of the Workers' Monument cannot be read independently of the performative command of the state, best observed in erecting Atatürk monuments all over the country as visual embodiments of power and furthermore securing and protecting them against destruction by the force of law. Monuments contribute to the closure of the past as a dead body. However, they also forge a regime of memory and desire that serves power. I dwell on the issue of monuments in Turkey in that interstice between life and death, that is, in their “monstrosity,” so as to reflect on what remains unrepresentable within the complex history—in other words, to reflect on the problem of power, history, and memory/counter-memory.

According to the deputy chief of the General Staff and other Turkish officers, it is hoped eventually to make the Tunçeli [Tunceli] region into a “second Switzerland,” as it is extremely beautiful. It appears to me, however, that its inaccessibility and the difficulties which visitors experience while travelling in Turkey will be considerable obstacles to the realisation of this dream.

A. Ross, Military attaché to the British representative in Turkey, 5 September 1938

Understanding the identity construction of a minority requires an understanding of the intricate interplay between the real and the symbolical groups it belongs to. In such a context, individuals and groups adopt identity strategies (at the personal or/and the collective level) by means of which they assert their existence, their social visibility, and their integration in the wider community, while at the same time valuing and establishing their own internal coherence. The case of the Muslim minority in Western Thrace is a very good example of this identity construction, which arose from incessant dynamic confrontations between the dominant values of the majority and the affirmation of their own individual ones. Taking into consideration the socio-historical context, this paper will try to analyze the complex interplay of national, ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural identities of the minority groups constituting the Muslim minority of Thrace.