In order to secure the necessary evidence for bringing offenders to justice, law enforcement officers are given powers to invade the freedom of individuals in the process of criminal investigations. These powers are not, however, unlimited; in modern democratic states the relationship between the public authorities and individuals is governed not by the arbitrary exercise of power but by power exercised within the constraints of law. Having said that, law enforcement officers do not always exercise their powers within the permitted limits. Where law enforcement officers exceed their powers, evidence may be obtained to incriminate the suspect in trial. The question of whether such evidence can be taken as a basis for judgement in Turkish law is the main concern of this article.

Scholars engaged in the study of nationalism have often stressed an analytical distinction between the rise of nationalism and the growth of nations since nationalism, by its very nature, has always preceded the nation (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Smith, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1990). In the case of Turkey, the rise of nationalist movements rooted in Ottoman Turkism has been well-documented by studies focussing on their pioneering leaders, publications and institutions. Efforts aimed at the making of a Turkish nation, however, coincided with the period following the establishment of the Turkish nation-state. This new phase of Turkish nationalism differed from the preceding nationalist movements of the late Ottoman era, in its concern with the consolidation of a form of its own. It borrowed elements from, but also deviated from, the expansionist, pan-Turkist tendencies of the earlier era.

The first labor code of the Turkish Republic was enacted in 1936 and became effective in 1937. The most significant feature of this code was the time taken by the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) to legislate it. Negotiations began in 1925 with discussions of the Service Code draft bill. In the course of fifteen years TGNA discussed five draft bills and in 1936 a final draft was accepted. Between then and 1950, when the Republican People's Party (RPP) lost the election to the Democrat Party (DP), the scope of the labor code was extended without any alteration in its ideological content.

The political crisis of modernity has given rise to a number of studies in the area of political history that are disproportionately concerned with civil society. This consequently has spawned the development of broad theoretical frameworks concerning civil society and the public sphere. One of the lesser-treated subjects within this context has been public opinion. Developed primarily by post-Enlightenment liberal political theory, the notions of civil society and the public sphere had been presented as major alternatives to the domain of the power politics of the Machiavellian tradition. In order to place public opinion on a sound theoretical basis, there arose the need to promote historical empirical studies of it across national contexts over time. . One of the most significant tasks confronting comparative historical sociologists today is uncovering the origin of public opinion, which this paper undertakes to do within an Ottoman context.

This project started as an update of the volume by Ward and Rustow on political modernization in Japan and Turkey. I think we all agree that we have moved on to something entirely different, and original. Comparisons of Japan and Turkey in terms of industrialization, westernization and so forth are obviously quite absurd, but what still has validity is the question of how these two non-Western societies encountered the West and modernity. The paper will focus on questions of perceptions and mentalities which have not been discussed at length previously. In this paper, I will look at some general themes in the beginning, and then focus more specifically on the encounters of several Ottomans with the West in comparison with the experience of their Japanese counterparts.

How are Turkey's insecurities relevant to the analysis of its international relations? While it is interesting to look at how particular security concerns have affected Turkey's foreign policies at various moments in history, this article will take a different route. Following the distinction that David Campbell has drawn between “Foreign Policy” (through which others are rendered “foreign) and “foreign policy” (through which relations with others are managed), the article will explore how Turkey's insecurities have shaped a Foreign Policy that rests on the West/non-West divide. While the literature has analyzed specific acts of foreign policy and how they were crafted in response to specific military insecurities, the role that Turkey's non-military and non-specific insecurities have played in shaping its international relations has remained understudied. Thus, the literature has not been able to fully account for the centrality of Turkey's western orientation to its security. The argument here proceeds in three steps: First, the article draws attention to the necessity of looking at non-material as well as material insecurities in designing research on foreign policy. Second, it illustrates this necessity by focusing on the case of Turkey's foreign policy. Thirdly, in view of this second point the article highlights the centrality of Turkey's western orientation (i.e., its Foreign Policy) to its security, more persuasively than studies that exclusively focus on the material aspects of security.

The recent decision of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in Regina (Hodkin and another) v Registrar General for Births, Deaths and Marriages concerned the registration of the premises belonging to the Church of Scientology in London as a place of worship, specifically for the purpose of enabling a marriage to take place there which would be valid in law. This article examines the continuing significance of a registered place of worship in the English law rules on formalities of marriage. It provides a brief history of the role of religion in the solemnization of marriages in England and Wales, and the emergence of the “place of worship” as a constituent element in the celebration of a valid marriage. The role of marriage at a registered place of worship in the current legislation governing the formalities of marriage is considered, along with the impact on that scheme of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. The exceptional character of the approach adopted by English law is highlighted by a comparative survey of laws on the solemnization of marriages, which also demonstrates some of the problems arising out of alternative solutions. Finally, recent attempts to reform the law are noted, followed by some concluding remarks on possible future developments.

The past fifteen years have witnessed a veritable explosion of mass media productions aimed at immigrant populations in Germany. Facilitated by new communication technologies, television channels and radio stations from former “home countries” and elsewhere have become available to immigrants via satellite and the internet. Daily newspapers produced in Ankara, Belgrade, or Warsaw can be bought at German newspaper stands. There has also been a proliferation of mass media venues created locally, by and for immigrants themselves, and nowhere is this landscape of immigrant media more evolved than in the case of Turkish-language media in Berlin.

Recently, Turkish foreign policy, compared to the 1990s, has manifested a number of puzzlements. They range from the rapprochement with Greece, the turnabout over Cyprus, mediation efforts involving a series of regional conflicts to a policy seeking an improvement in relations with Armenia and Kurds of Northern Iraq. These puzzlements have increasingly transformed Turkey from being cited as a “post-Cold War warrior” or a “regional coercive power” to a “benign” if not “soft” power. Academic literature has tried to account for these puzzlements and the accompanying transformation in Turkish foreign policy from a wide range of theoretical perspectives. This literature has undoubtedly enriched our understanding of what drives Turkish foreign policy. At the same time, this literature has not paid adequate attention to the role of economic factors shaping Turkish foreign policy as we approach the end of the first decade of the new century. This article aims to highlight this gap and at the same time offer a preliminary conceptual framework based on Richard Rosecrance's notion of the “trading state” and Robert Putnam's idea of “two-level diplomatic games” to explore the impact of economic considerations on Turkish foreign policy.

The shift to a market economy is a more complex story than the standard “transition” narrative implies. Shopping tourism is a socio-cultural phenomenon that illuminates the shifting relationship between the state, its citizenry, and the market. Its existence is predetermined by a weak state and incorporation into a global economy. Shopping tourism offers a link between the socialist economy of shortage and the post-socialist informal economy. It has opened a survival niche for the unemployed and constitutes a school of entrepreneurship and consumer practices. The discourses surrounding shopping tourism have reflected anxieties about incorporation, social reordering, and blatant consumerism; recreational tourism mirrors their normalization. The Bulgarian suitcase trade to Turkey also elucidates the interplay between new consumerism and old nationalism and their insertion into the debates about Bulgaria's ideological reorientation. Bulgarian Europeanness in the 1990s was constructed against two principal foils—the socialist past and the Ottoman legacy. Ironically, the stereotypical East was constructed as the stereotypical West in a way in which market and ideological categories intermingle and foreshadow a Bulgarian consumerist “Return to Europe.” To elaborate these arguments, the article draws on an analysis of newspaper ads, statistical data, travel guides, internet travelogues, and interviews.