This paper examines the impact underground literature (yeraltıedebiyatı) has on influencing the opinions and beliefsof Turkey’s youth regarding issues of contemporary importance. Inorder to understand the relevance of this genre to Turkish youth culture, wehave not only examined the debate surrounding the topic in popular and academiccircles, but also asked the readers themselves their opinions about theirexperience with the genre (in both its imported Western and homegrown Turkishvariants) and its relevance to their lives. For our purposes, theeffect of such texts on readers is the primaryfocus, and ours is the first mixed-media study to conduct a methodological,data-based investigation into the composition and opinions of undergroundliterature’s readers. Thus, our study supplements a lack in theexisting scholarship by offering concrete qualitative and quantitative data thatwill better elucidate our knowledge of the relationship between undergroundliterature and Turkish youth attitudes, as well as the potential the genre mighthold for the future of Turkey’s youth.

Ethical considerations for the use of unregistered interventions for Ebola virus disease have sparked considerable debate among academic and clinical ethicists. In August 2014 the World Health Organization (WHO) convened a panel of experts to discuss approaches to the outbreak in West Africa, with the goal of determining "whether it is ethical to use unregistered interventions with unknown adverse effects for possible treatment or prophylaxis”.1 The panel concluded that there would be an ethical imperative to provide such unregistered interventions if specific criteria could be met. This paper evaluates the WHO conclusion and argues that although it may be reasonable to provide unregistered interventions considering the circumstance, there is no clear ethical imperative to do so.

The consequences of using publicly available social media applications specifically for healthcare purposes are largely unaddressed in current research. Where they are addressed, the focus is primarily on issues of privacy and data protection. We therefore use a case study of the first live Twitter heart operation in the Netherlands, in combination with recent literature on social media from other academic fields, to identify a wide range of ethical issues related to using social media for health-related purposes. Although this case reflects an innovative approach to public education and patient centeredness, it also illustrates the need for institutions to weigh the various aspects of use and to develop a plan to deal with these on a per case basis. Given the continual development of technologies, researchers may not yet be able to oversee and anticipate all of the potential implications. Further development of a research agenda on this topic, the promotion of guidelines and policies, and the publication of case studies that reveal the granularity of individual situations will therefore help raise awareness and assist physicians and institutions in using social media to support existing care services.

The suggestion that deliberative democratic approaches would suit the management of bioethical policymaking in democratic pluralistic societies has triggered what has been called the “deliberative turn” in health policy and bioethics. Most of the empirical work in this area has focused on the allocation of healthcare resources and priority setting at the local or national level. The variety of the more or less articulated theoretical efforts behind such initiatives is remarkable and has been accompanied, to date, by an overall lack of method specificity. We propose a set of methodological requirements for online deliberative procedures for bioethics. We provide a theoretical motivation for these requirements. In particular, we discuss and adapt an “epistocratic” proposal and argue that, regardless of its merits as a general political theory, a more refined version of its normative claims can generate a useful framework for the design of bioethical forums that combine maximal inclusiveness with informed and reasonable deliberation.

This article assesses the African American dancer and intellectual Katherine Dunham’s vision and legacy for a performative history of the Black Atlantic by examining two of her early choreographic works, L’Agya and Little Black Sambo. From little-known archival materials and her published writings, I reconstruct the genesis of these works in her fieldwork in the French Caribbean as well as in the phantasm of the Plantation. Through the emotional relationships between Africa, “Africa,” and African diasporic expressive life that emerge, I excavate a hidden history for the modern subject as formed through not only the displacements generated by colonialism and slavery, but also unexpected new regimes of pleasure that were their historical consequences. The resulting imaginative and kinetic expressions that conflate colonial and postcolonial temporalities enable me to posit the limits and possibilities of “trans(post)colonial collaborations” within Dunham’s repertoire as well as for the horizon of the present.

I raise several concerns with Earp and colleagues' analysis of enhancement through neurochemical modulation of love as a key issue in contemporary neuroethics. These include: (i) strengthening their deflation of medicalization concerns by showing how the objection that love should be left outside of the scope of medicine would directly undermine the goal of medicine; (ii) developing stronger analysis of the social and political concerns relevant to neurochemical modulation of love, by exploring and suggesting possible counters to ways in which 'wellbeing' may be used as a tool of oppression; (iii) providing reasons to support a broad need for ecological investigation of, and indeed ecological education concerning, neurotechnology; (iv) suggesting ways in which philosophy, and the humanities more broadly, remain directly relevant to responding effectively to issues in contemporary neuroethics.

Cet article porte sur la variation syntaxique entre qu’est-ce (que) et pourquoi dans les questions rhétoriques conflictuelles (QRC). Le corpus utilisé est constitué de 38 films du cinéma de banlieue afin d’observer cette variation chez les locuteurs du français multiculturel, garants d’un langage très expressif. Il s’avère que la structure /kesk/ est une structure très emphatique, directe et plus menaçante que sa variante en pourquoi, qui elle, est ambiguë entre une demande d’information traditionnelle et une QRC. Cette structure, /kesk/, utilisée sans distinction d’âge et favorisée par les locuteurs masculins du corpus, se révèle être un outil communicatif très puissant et présent dans le français parlé dès 1668 chez Molière.

According to human enhancement advocates, it is morally permissible (and sometimes obligatory) to use biomedical means to modulate or select certain biological traits in order to increase people’s welfare, even when there is no pathology to be treated or prevented. Some authors have recently proposed to extend the use of biomedical means to modulate lust, attraction, and attachment. I focus on some conceptual implications of this proposal, particularly with regard to bioconservatives’ understanding of the notions of therapy and enhancement I first explain what makes the proposal of medicalizing love interesting and unique, compared to the other forms of bioenhancement usually advocated. I then discuss how the medicalization of love bears on the more general debate on human enhancement, particularly with regard to the key notion of “normality” that is commonly used to define the therapy–enhancement distinction. This analysis suggests that the medicalization of love, in virtue of its peculiarity, requires bioconservatives to reconsider their way of understanding and applying the notions of “therapy” and “enhancement.” More in particular, I show that, because a non-arbitrary and value-free notion of “therapy” cannot be applied to the case of love, bioconservatives have the burden of either providing some new criterion that could be used for drawing a line between permissible and impermissible medicalization, or demonstrating that under no circumstances—including the cases in which love is already acknowledged to require medical intervention—can love fall within the domain of medicine.

Two court cases that involve selling prescription data for pharmaceutical marketing affect biomedical informatics, patient and clinician privacy, and regulation. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. et al. in the United States and R v. Department of Health, Ex Parte Source Informatics Ltd. in the United Kingdom concern privacy and health data protection, data de-identification and reidentification, drug detailing (marketing), commercial benefit from the required disclosure of personal information, clinician privacy and the duty of confidentiality, beneficial and unsavory uses of health data, regulating health technologies, and considering data as speech. Individuals should, at the very least, be aware of how data about them are collected and used. Taking account of how those data are used is needed so societal norms and law evolve ethically as new technologies affect health data privacy and protection.

This is a critique of Earp, Sandberg and Savulescu’s argument in support of a possible future neuromodulation of love and love-related relationships. I argue that, contrary to what is suggested by Earp, Sandberg and Savulescu, we do have good reason to be concerned about that possibility as well as about the medicalization of love that its pursuit would bring about.

Would a “medicalization” of love be a “good” or “bad” form of medicalization? In discussing this question, Earp, Sandberg, and Savulescu primarily focus on the potential positive and negative consequences of turning love into a medical issue. But it can also be asked whether there is something intrinsically regrettable about medicalizing love. It is argued here that the medicalization of love can be seen as an “evaluative category mistake”: it treats a core human value (love) as if it were mainly a means to other ends (viz. physical health and hedonic well-being). It is also argued that Earp et al’s closing argument (that a scientific perspective on love actually adds more value to love) can be seen as involving another evaluative category mistake: it treats an object of desire and practical interest (namely, love) as if it mainly were an object of scientific contemplation and theoretical interest. It is concluded that, to relate love to health and well-being in a more satisfying way, we should construe the latter two in broader ways, whereby love is itself a component or element of human flourishing.

Questions have been raised regarding participants’ safety and comfort when participating in e-health education programs. Although researchers have begun to explore this issue in the United States, little research has been conducted in low- and middle-income countries, where Internet and social media use is rapidly growing. This article reports on a quantitative study with Peruvian men who have sex with men who had previously participated in the Harnessing Online Peer Education (HOPE) program, a Facebook-based HIV education program. The survey assessed participants’ ethics-relevant perspectives during recruitment, consent, intervention, and follow-up.