From the onset, one must dispel the idea that addressing gender issues or referring to “women” and “woman” is marginal to larger considerations of civil society and current global dynamics. Double standards with regard to images and treatment of women are indicators of distorted visions of social justice. Without remorse, women are often consigned to a sub-category in the estimation and construction of the social order through which we acquire justice.

What I discuss here are some preliminary ideas about social justice. My vision of social justice is predicated upon two things: my personal experiences of inequities because of race, class and gender; and my search in the Islamic tradition, and more precisely, in the Qur'anic text, for a perspective on civil society which dispels the tendencies towards oppression and social injustice.

Felix S. Cohen, the distinguished synthesizer of American Indian law, prophetically proclaimed more than a generation ago:

Since these words were written the practice of Indian law and of law among Indians has greatly expanded. Indian litigants have made some notable advances and suffered some setbacks. But, as the most recent revisors of the Cohen Handbook point out, “the abiding principles of Indian law have changed little” since Cohen articulated them in 1942. Included among these principles or doctrines are acknowledgement of the federal government's “trust obligation to Indians” and recognition that “Indian tribes and individuals are entitled to be free of invidious discrimination under federal and state laws.” The implications and even the truth of these principles have been extensively debated and litigated. Their relevance for the practice of Indian religions remains hazy. With the passage of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (hereinafter AIRFA) a decade ago, there was some reason to believe that that practice might at last fall under the aegis of the trust responsibility, but the Act has been interpreted by the Courts to add nothing substantial to Indian rights and protections under the religion clauses of the First Amendment, rights and protections enjoyed by all Americans. And the Congress has done nothing since the passage of AIRFA to counter that view.

Echoing the prophet Isaiah, Dr. King dreamed of societal harmony and common understanding. Not only would “the glory of the Lord” be revealed, but “all flesh” would see the truth together. In today's America, this vision seems increasingly distant; some would say increasingly fantastic. From abortion to homosexuality to affirmative action, Americans are deeply divided on fundamental issues of morality and public policy. Combatants in an ongoing culture war, we disagree not only about specific issues, but also about the manner in which these issues should be considered, debated, and resolved. At bottom, we are divided because we disagree about the nature of moral and political truth and about how this truth should properly be determined. Far from seeing the truth together, we see separate truths that emerge from separate ways of thinking.

During the past five years, issues concerning the freedom of religion, and its relationship with the freedom of expression have received an ever higher profile in both the media and in political debate. The purpose of this article is to reflect on the approach taken by the European Court of Human Rights to some of the most significant of these issues. In a short article of this nature it is not possible to examine each of the issues in a comprehensive fashion, but by juxtaposing relatively brief overviews of these cases, some general insights regarding the current mood of the Court and the capacity of the Convention system to engage with ever more pressing issues will emerge. The main challenge appears to be the need to reconcile the Court's emphasis upon neutrality and impartiality, found in its more recent case law concerning state relations with religious associations, with the core value of respect, which has long dominated its approach in other areas. Its failure to address this challenge in an appropriate manner threatens the Court's ability to engage with emerging problems in a satisfactory fashion.

What sort of relation between religion and government does the Constitution of the United States affirm? As anyone even remotely familiar with the subject will know, this question is large as well as enormously complex and invites reflection on a host of subsidiary problems: What are the precise meanings of the religion clauses of the Constitution's first amendment, clauses which proscribe congressional legislation “respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise, thereof”? How broadly is the notion of “religion” to be construed here? Does the implied right of free exercise attach to any commitment or action conscientiously embraced (e.g., conscientious objection to participation in warfare)? Or are we to interpret the guaranteed religious freedom in narrower terms? What precisely is the relationship between the “no establishment” and “free exercise” provisions? Might there not be circumstances in which conditions necessary to ensure genuinely free exercise require the sort of “excessive entanglement” that suggests governmental establishment of religion (e.g., state support for parochial schools)? Or is such a worry founded on mistaken understandings of the “free exercise” and “no establishment” provisions? Are the amendment's anti-establishment restrictions limited to federal legislation or do the restrictions apply also to state governments via “incorporation” provisions of the fourteenth amendment? Is the primary purpose of the religion clauses to protect government from religion or religion from government, and if the latter, does the Constitution then permit governmental support of religion so long as no particular religions are preferred? Would such support destroy a “wall of separation” erected by the first amendment? Or is the idea of a “wall of separation,” in this understanding at least, foreign to the sense of the constitutional text? In what respect is knowing the original intentions of the first amendment's framers or ratifiers relevant to interpreting the meaning of the amendment's provisions? How are these intentions to be discovered? And so forth.

We have entered into these conversations not to prove the correctness of our own traditions, but to enhance our understanding of the religious commitments of our partners in dialogue. To achieve this goal, our first task has been to listen carefully to the experiences and insights of our brothers and sisters in Abrahamic faith. We have noted frequently a commonality in our experiences, but we have not attempted to diminish the significance of real and often profound differences between us.

Through all our conversations we have grown in respect and love for one another. We acknowledge this fruit of productive dialogue as the gracious gift of God the Merciful. Having received this gift freely, we now offer to all persons of good will these reflections on religious freedom in America, with the hope that they may promote religious freedom and enhance ecumenical or interreligious dialogue.

In this statement we address the theme of religious freedom as we have experienced it in this country. We agree that it is more appropriate for us to reflect on our own experience of religious freedom in the context of the American constitutional order. This is not because we seek to avoid a difficult question for interfaith dialogue. On the contrary, we are fully aware that the topic we have chosen may be controversial. Our efforts to reach common accord on these matters reflect our dedication to the principle that we advance mutual under standing of one another by exploring difficult questions with frankness and openness, and by learning from our partners in dialogue.