In the past several decades there has been a growing movement within the Jewish community to improve the self-image and status of women in Halachah (Jewish law). There is no doubt that this movement was largely affected by the women's liberation movement that has been taking place since the beginning of this century. Despite the assertion of many rabbis and scholars that the role of women in traditional Judaism has been noticeably superior to that of other contemporary civilizations, critics frequently point to the many religious activities from which women continue to be excluded. In the past, women were not accepted as witnesses in a trial; did not inherit equally with their male siblings; were not required or expected to perform the daily religious duties assigned to men; and had to sit separately from the males in the congregation. Only recently have Jewish women been ordained as rabbis and relied on as cantors; allowed to serve on congregational boards as presidents of congregations; granted equal access to study, and allowed to perform all mitzvot; counted in a minyan, the quorum needed for a public worship service, and called to the pulpit for aliyot during the Torah service; and able to ignore the formal requirement of providing a get, the bill of divorce, although it can still be requested.

The subject of this essay is the developing work of Thomas Shaffer, the Notre Dame Law School legal ethicist. For over two decades, Shaffer has displayed a remarkable ability to bring to his area of specialization the influences of a rich variety of extra-legal sources. Readers encounter neo-orthodox and narrative theology; biblical studies; the nineteenth century novel of manners and sensibility (especially Trollope); material from film, stage and television; the deviance theory of Kai Erikson; the history and sociology of later immigrant cultures in America; C.P. Snow and C.S. Lewis; Martin Buber's understanding of I-Thou relations; the history of British and American legal-ethical concepts. Yet the very interdisciplinary scope of Shaffer's writing places it at risk. When technically impressive micro-studies carry the day, magistrally broad efforts like his often receive scant attention. To encourage the opposite result—a thorough engagement by legal scholars and ethicists—this analysis is offered.

It is my joy to address this “First Liberty Forum” here in Baltimore. As a signer of the Williamsburg Charter, I was pleased to receive your kind invitation to address the question of religious liberty from the perspective of the Catholic church in the United States.

The most effective way to proceed, I think, is to speak from a foundation of both Catholic principles about religious liberty and Catholic experience in the exercise of religious liberty within the U.S. political and legal system. My remarks, therefore, will cover three themes: first, a Catholic understanding of religious liberty; second, religious liberty and domestic policy; and third, religious liberty in international perspective.

When Mírzá Husayn ‘Ali (1817-92)—the founder of the Bahá’í Faith who was known as Bahá’u’lláh (the “Glory of God”)—died, there was a clear and unambiguous answer about who had the authority to lead his small, but growing, religious community. In his will, Bahá’u’lláh identified his eldest son, ‘Abbás Effendi, known as ‘Abdu'l-Bahá (“Servant of Bahá”) (1844-1921) as his successor and head of the community, as well as the authoritative interpreter of Bahá’u’lláh's writings. When ‘Abdu’l-Bahá assumed the reins of community leadership upon Bahá’u’lláh's death, his claim to authority went largely unchallenged, and he remained in that role until his own death.

While this seeming affirmation of a principle of primogeniture would appear to establish a clear pattern for the future organization and structure of the Bahá’í community, it was only one part of the leadership of the community envisioned by Bahá’u’lláh. Equally unambiguous was Bahá’u’lláh's vision of “houses of justice” existing throughout the world, elected bodies that would serve governance functions. In the Kitáb-i-Aqdas (the “Most Holy Book”), written by Bahá’u’lláh in 1873, he states that “[t]he Lord hath ordained that in every city a House of Justice shall be established,” whose members are to “take counsel together and to have regard for the interests of the servants of God.…” In that same book, Bahá’u’lláh contemplated an international house of justice, in addition to the local houses of justice.

Wolfhart Pannenberg is considered by many to be one of the preeminent living Protestant theologians. Now retired, Pannenberg's active career spanned almost five decades. From 1968 to 1994 he was Professor of Systematic Theology at the University of Munich; previously he taught in Mainz and Wuppertal in Germany. Pannenberg has published prolifically, culminating with his three-volume Systematic Theology. Even in retirement, Pannenberg has continued to publish extensively, producing several volumes over the past decade. He has lectured in the U.S. on numerous occasions, and many of his books and articles have appeared in English translation. In this country, Pannenberg is generally associated with the theology of hope, a now-dated movement that was characterized by an emphasis on eschatology and the proleptic anticipation of the future through the events of history. But that association reflects only a limited aspect of Pannenberg's lengthy career, one since eclipsed by the further development of his thinking and concerns.

The breadth of Pannenberg's interests is vast. In addition to his concentration on the classical themes of theology, he has explored other subjects from a theological perspective, among them sociology, science, nature, anthropology, politics and ethics. Over the course of his career, Pannenberg has repeatedly addressed questions of law and jurisprudence, beginning with essays in the early 1960s and continuing up to a publication that appeared in 2004. For the most part, these writings consist of thematic essays, a form Pannenberg has used extensively for a wide variety of subjects. In addition to these essays, portions of Pannenberg's larger works treat law and jurisprudential themes, though as subsidiary topics. His continuing concern with law reflects his view that law is strongly tied to ethics, an area to which he has devoted more attention after he completed his Systematic Theology. Taken together, Pannenberg's writings on law constitute a coherent and reasonably well-articulated theory of law, though one that has unfortunately received limited attention, and no sustained exposition in English. Nonetheless, because of Pannenberg's prominence, and because of his incisive analysis, his work on law deserves attention in this country as well.

The political rise of the religious right has brought to the fore the question of whether and to what extent religious values and beliefs should be taken into account when developing public policy. Policymakers have increasingly, or perhaps only more overtly, turned to religion for guidance on important public policy matters, such as abortion, stem cell research, and punishment, including the death penalty. Given the decidedly moral flavor of the debate over distributive justice, it is not surprising that many Americans and a growing number of policymakers have begun to look to religion for guidance on the question of how best to allocate tax burdens.

While tax scholars have long debated questions of equity and distributive justice, with one notable exception, they have largely ignored religious arguments. Given the large number of Americans who identify themselves as religious, to say nothing of most politicians, limiting the inquiry into tax equity to secular arguments runs the risk of relegating academic debate to the sidelines, as decision-makers look to the Bible and other religious texts for guidance and support.

Does the First Amendment afford religious organizations special protection when government regulation interferes with their internal activities or affairs? Nearly all scholars would agree that relief is appropriate where government regulation is designed to impede a group's religious mission or otherwise unfairly discriminate against religion, but such cases are rare. The more difficult cases involve neutral, generally applicable laws that are not intended to burden the internal operations of religious groups but, nevertheless, have that effect. Does the First Amendment provide any relief in such situations and, if so, what is the justification for this protection?

In Employment Division v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not excuse individuals from compliance with neutral, generally applicable laws that burden religious practice. Legislatures may choose to grant relief in such situations, but if they choose not to do so, the First Amendment does not require any special accommodations or exemptions. However, Smith did not address protections for religious groups, and, indeed, the Court has never directly addressed the scope of First Amendment protections where neutral government regulation interferes with the internal operations of religious organizations. Scholars who have debated this question have advocated a variety of positions.