Former President Carter's Presidential Proclamation ordering the resumption of registration for a possible draft provoked once again a question that has recurred throughout the history of the American republic: what right, if any, do persons conscientiously unable to participate in a military enterprise hav to be exempted from laws that would otherwise requir them to do so?

The question, at its profoundest level, touches on difficult issues of political and legal philosophy. On the one hand, war is the ultima ratio regnum. The presumption is that a nation will not mobilize its people for military effort unless vital interests are at stake and that the people are bound to support that effort with their energies and lives.

In 2006, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) made a notable departure from historical precedent when it replaced the Population Register Law of 1972. The 1972 law, in Article 43, required that the national registry records on all households in Turkey contain the religion of all family members unless, under Article 46, an individual or family went to court to make a revision in these records. This was the legal basis of the inclusion of religious information on Turkish identity cards, issued in accordance with the information in family registers. Article 35 of The Population Services Law of 2006 now provides: “Requests about the religious information in household registers shall be approved, modified, left blank or deleted, in accordance with the written application of the concerned person.”

We shall argue, in this paper that Article 35 of the Population Services Law of 2006 is unconstitutional just like Article 43 of the Population Register Law of 1972 was, and that information about individuals' religions should be deleted from both the national register and individuals' identity (ID) cards. The inclusion of religious information in the identity cards of citizens or resident aliens, who apply for Turkish citizenship, violates the religious liberty in Turkey, particularly under a “neutrality” conception of that right. We shall review the jurisprudence of the Turkish Constitutional Court concerning ID cards in the light of the negative and positive aspects of religious liberty, focus on the different meanings of neutrality such as “formal neutrality,” “substantive neutrality,” “aim neutrality,” “justification neutrality” and “consequences neutrality.” Before we evaluate this practice under neutrality theory, however, it would be appropriate to begin with a historical narrative about the origin of religious notations on Turkish identity cards, and explain the content and the meaning of the new law.

In both political science and ethics, interpreters of the meaning of war have learned to use typologies to separate one mode of evaluation from another. As a result of this diversity in moral evaluations of war, authors have partly talked past each other, with all good faith accusing each another of confused categories. There has not been an agreed upon definitional base-line for just war theories “out there,” which would permit just war theorists to judge other theories and communicate with each other.

I propose to define more carefully the operative terms and kinds of argument used in just war theory, to assist communication on these topics. If we fail to clarify the variety of meanings and arguments, the result is imprecision and confusion. Our need is for a more precise understanding of the diversity of the modes of moral reasoning on just war. By surveying recent developments and usage in the field, this article will make it possible for just war scholars to engage each other using a more adequate, more nuanced set of types. While these types are not identical with current dominant usage, they are reconcilable with its main lines and more useful as instruments of interpretation than the simpler systems.

Expressive punishment is popular at the voting booth and in academic journals. Yet concerns remain about expressive punishment's pathological tendencies.

The work of René Girard explains the popularity of expressive punishment and diagnoses its pathology. Girard's analysis of violence, including the lawful violence categorized as punishment, is religious, anthropological, and literary. He posits that the mimetic and conflictual nature of human desire creates crises of undifferentiated violence that are resolved by “sacred violence.” Violence becomes sacred when it regenerates lost meaning, binds the community, and provides a temporary peace. Archaic religion, with its prohibitions, rituals, and myths, was a social mechanism for pragmatically managing that violence. Viewing the legal system as the heir to that tradition, that is, viewing law as our modern social technology of violence, illuminates the practice of expressive punishment.

Before turning to Girard's thought, I will survey some legal scholarship to develop a broad outline of the nature of expressive punishment. Then I will make an inductive argument, following Girard, that expressive punishment is a morally problematic mechanism for both controlling and dispensing sacred violence. Finally, I will explore some implications of that argument.

Ezekiel's lament emphasizes that oppression in general, and especially oppression of the needy and the distressed, is always an extremely immoral and illegal act. In the Bible, “oppression” describes the unilateral taking of another person's property or depriving her of her rights. Yet, sometimes even an apparently voluntary agreement might be oppressive. Preventing oppression, therefore, has became one of the declared aims of contractual doctrine, as in the well-known American doctrine of unconscionability.

Unconscionability and oppression are broad concepts that describe a wide-ranging array of cases and situations. Not surprisingly, therefore, despite the formidable and complex body of legal writing on the unconscionability doctrine, a great deal of ambiguity remains as to its theoretical basis, as well as its practical content.

In this article I seek to enrich the modern Western discussion by analyzing Jewish law doctrine which addresses the issue of oppressive exploitative contracts, an approach which is both unique and to date largely neglected by scholars in the area. This Jewish law doctrine developed in response to a specific kind of oppressive contract, in which a semi-monopolistic party exploits the distress of a needy party in order to demand an above-market price (hereinafter referred to as oppressive-exploitative contracts).

Art. 1. The Aims of the Law.—This law guarantees the rights of citizens to determine and express their attitude toward religion, to hold corresponding convictions and to profess a religion and perform religious rites without hindrance, as well as social justice, equality and the protection of citizens' rights and interests regardless of their attitude toward religion, and it regulates relations connected with the activity of religious organizations.

Art. 2. Legislation on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations.—Legislation on freedom of conscience and religious organizations consists of this law, which establishes basic guarantees of freedom of conscience in accordance with the USSR Constitution, and of USSR and Union- and autonomous-republic laws issued in accordance with it.

Art. 3. The Right to Freedom of Conscience.—In accordance with the right to freedom of conscience, every citizen independently determines his attitude toward religion and has the right, individually or in conjunction with others, to profess any religion or not to profess any, and to express and disseminate convictions associated with his attitude toward religion.

Parents or persons acting in their place have the right, by mutual consent, to raise their children in accordance with their own attitude toward religion.