This paper presents survey measurements carried out during the 39th Polish Antarctic Expedition to the Henryk Arctowski Polish Antarctic Station in March 2015. The measurements were used to create a map on a 1:500 scale and for 3D modelling of the station buildings and vicinity. The paper also presents the geodetic control network established around the station. We discuss the issue of creating a digital elevation model for the station and its surroundings. The elevation models were generated using terrestrial laser scanning data integrated with Global Navigation Satellite System real time kinematic and tacheometric surveying. The accuracy of these models was estimated using height differences in relation to survey data. The mean height difference was 0.03 m and root mean square error was 0.05 m. Furthermore, an analysis of changes to the coastline was conducted using archival cartographic materials to assess the threat of Admiralty Bay to the station buildings. The results are important for continued scientific activity and safety at Arctowski Station, and may be useful for future research on King George Island.

I argue that the use of a social discount rate to assess the consequences of climate policy is unhelpful and misleading. I consider two lines of justification for discounting: (i) ethical arguments for a ‘pure rate of time preference’ and (ii) economic arguments that take time as a proxy for economic growth and the diminishing marginal utility of consumption. In both cases I conclude that, given the long time horizons, distinctive uncertainties, and particular costs and benefits at stake in the climate context, discount rates are at best a poor proxy for the normative considerations they are meant to represent.

This article develops a legal and theological critique of the Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder decision that dismantled portions of the Voting Rights Act. Defending the Voting Rights Act in light of four basic features of voting rights—access, participation, empowerment, and expression of conscience—I refute the Shelby decision in terms of its oversimplified notions of discrimination and its overly narrow construal of federalism as state sovereignty and equality. I draw upon Catholic social teaching's subsidiarity and Johannes Althusius's federalism to defend the individual and communal dimensions of voting rights. I examine post-Shelby developments, including voter-identification laws, and I argue that such laws are unfounded and have deleterious effects. I conclude by offering modest recommendations for a post-Shelby world, including continued roles for Congress and the Department of Justice, the use of intermediary organizations, and the rescinding of felon disenfranchisement laws.

The liberal principle of reciprocity requires that states maintain neutrality with respect to their citizens’ competing comprehensive worldviews (both religious and secular) while officially justifying the law and while adjudicating under it. But the very possibility of such liberal neutrality has come under attack in a post-Enlightenment world in which even foundational arguments for the principle of reciprocity itself are no longer taken for granted. This article offers a pragmatist path to the resolution of this liberal dilemma. It recommends a “default and challenge” model for legal justification and legitimation that is rooted in social-linguistic practice. By rooting justification and legitimation in practice, it is argued liberal neutrality can be preserved without need for appeals to controversial foundational commitments at any level of public political justification. The article closes with a fictional case study concerning abortion to show how politicians and courts can apply this method to preserve liberal neutrality while addressing even the most controversial issues.

Theories of fragmentation and constitutionalisation have long been presented as antagonistic accounts of the global legal order. Fragmentation theorists posit a non-hierarchical order explained in terms of the relationships between general and specialised areas of international law. Constitutionalisation’s adherents, by contrast, identify the global legal order’s ongoing transformation from horizontal and consent-based roots towards a hierarchal structure grounded upon fundamental principles. The proliferation of international tribunals has long been recognised as a factor muddying the picture of constitutionalisation and pointing towards fragmentation within international law. We argue, however, that this proliferation enhances the global order’s potential for constitutionalisation. The current state of fragmentation within the uncodified global order is comparable to long periods when the UK’s uncodified constitution exhibited the hallmarks of fragmented development. We bridge these supposedly rival explanations for the development of legal orders by re-evaluating the role played by competing courts in the UK’s constitutionalisation process, reassessing developments familiar to common-law historians through the prism of fragmentation theory. The UK example indicates that fragmentation is not, of itself, an insurmountable obstacle to constitutionalisation within the global order and may even mark a stage within this process. We employ lessons derived from this comparison to evaluate current flashpoints in relations between international tribunals, including the European Court of Justice’s Opinion 2/13 which has for now stymied the EU’s efforts to accede to the European Convention on Human Rights.

A striking feature of the Eastern Orthodox liturgies is how much movement and touching occurs during their performance. For example, when participants in these liturgies enter into a church building, they do not simply look at the icons; they typically venerate them by kissing them. Call events such as these scripted movement-touching sequences. The question I pursue in this article is why movement-touching sequences play such prominent roles in the performance of the Eastern liturgies. The answer I offer is that the performance of these actions has religious worth. I then consider two models that attempt to explain why the performance of scripted movement-touching sequences has religious worth. After exploring and rejecting what I call the instrumentalist model, I develop what I term the authorization-appropriation model of the composition of the church's liturgies. According to this model, the religious worth of scripted bodily liturgical action lies (in part) in the fact that God has both authorized the composition of and appropriated the liturgical scripts that prescribe the performance of such actions.

The impact of H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law on modern legal thinking is undisputed. But does it reflect the reality of the way British institutions work? In Concept, Hart argued, amongst other things, that one of two ‘minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system’ was that ‘its rules of recognition specifying the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials’. In this paper, we begin the process of testing that statement empirically. Specifically, we ask whether non-judicial UK officials have a uniform view of what the rules of recognition, change and adjudication are, and whether they uniformly take an internal point of view towards them (i.e. whether they accept the rules and do not merely obey them). By way of a pilot study, thirty non-judicial UK officials were interviewed. Those officials comprised currently serving and retired senior civil servants, senior military officials, chief constables and local authority chief executives. The findings of the pilot study are presented in this paper. They allow us to deduce that Hart's statement might well be an inaccurate and incomplete description of the modern British constitution, and to comment on the implications of that conclusion.

Having been found ‘vehemently suspected of heresy’ by the Holy Office in 1633, at the time of his death (1642) Galileo's remains were laid to rest in the tiny vestry of a lateral chapel of the Santa Croce Basilica, Florence. Throughout his life, Vincenzo Viviani, Galileo's last disciple, struggled to have his master's name rehabilitated and his banned works reprinted, as well as a proper funeral monument erected. He did not live to see all this come true, but his efforts triggered a mechanism that eventually led to the fulfilment of his wishes. A key element of his project was the transformation of the facade of his palace into a private (but publicly rendered) tribute to Galileo, with two long inscriptions celebrating Galileo's achievements and calling Florence's attention to the need to pay a proper tribute to him. Shortly afterwards, he revised the text and circulated it in print. This article presents the first critical edition and annotated translation of Viviani's original manuscript, long thought to be lost, and describes its role in Viviani's lifelong struggle for Galileo's intellectual legacy, as well as its impact on future historiography.

In the midsummer of 1872 a lighthouse apparatus was installed in the Clock Tower of the House of Commons. The installation served the practical function of communicating at a distance when the House was sitting, but also provided a highly visible symbolic indication of the importance of lighthouse technology to national concerns. Further, the installation served as an experimental space in which rival technological designs, with corresponding visions for the lighthouse system, could compete in public. This article considers nineteenth-century lighthouse technology as a case study in the power and political significance of display. Manufacturers of lighthouse lenses, such as the firm of Chance Brothers, sought to manage interpretations of the lights through the framing of exhibitions and demonstrations; so too did scientific authorities, including Michael Faraday and John Tyndall, both of whom served in the role of scientific adviser to Trinity House, the body responsible for lighthouse management. Particularly notable in this process was the significance of urban, metropolitan display environments in shaping the development of the marine lighthouse system around the nation's periphery.

In this article I challenge Kantian constructivism both as an interpretation of Kant's own philosophical commitments and on its own merits as a moral theory, and argue in favour of a moral realist interpretation of Kant. I do so by focusing on Kant's own religious views and the question of whether a Kantian moral theory can be religiously neutral. I show that constructivist readings have severe problems on both fronts, while realist readings of Kant do not. This provides strong evidence that realist forms of Kantian ethics are preferable both as readings of Kant and as approaches to moral theory.

Requests, offers, invitations, complaints, and greetings are some of the many action types routinely invoked in the description and analysis of interaction. But what is the ontological status of, for instance, a request? In what follows I propose that action is conduct under a description. Thus, for the most part, interaction is organized independently of any action description or categorization of conduct into discrete action types. Instead, participants in interaction draw on the details of the situation in which they find themselves in order to produce conduct that others will recognize and to which they are able to respond in fitted ways. ‘Action’ still plays a key role in the organization of interaction, however, because accountability attaches not to raw conduct but only to conduct under some particular, action-formulating description. (Action, interaction, description, conversation analysis, Anscombe)*

In contemporary Turkey, a growing interest in Ottoman history represents a change in both the official state discourse and popular culture. This nostalgia appropriates, reinterprets, decontextualizes, and juxtaposes formerly distinct symbols, ideas, objects, and histories in unprecedented ways. In this paper, we distinguish between state-led neo-Ottomanism and popular cultural Ottomania, focusing on the ways in which people in Turkey are interpellated by these two different yet interrelated discourses, depending on their social positions. As the boundary between highbrow and popular culture erodes, popular cultural representations come to reinterpret and rehabilitate the Ottoman past while also inventing new insecurities centering on historical “truth.” Utilizing in-depth interviews, we show that individuals juxtapose the popular television series Muhteşem Yüzyıl (The Magnificent Century) with what they deem “proper” history, in the process rendering popular culture a “false” version. We also identify four particular interpretive clusters among the consumers of Ottomania: for some, the Ottoman Empire was the epitome of tolerance, where different groups lived peacefully; for others, the imperial past represents Turkish and/or Islamic identities; and finally, critics see the empire as a burden on contemporary Turkey.