Much has been made of the ideological connection between the mental world of servitors in Elizabethan Ireland and the origins of early English colonial endeavor in North America. In this vein, the case of Sir Ralph Lane, the first governor of the Roanoke colony and, later, muster-master general of Ireland, would seem to present a historiographically promising test case, one that might not only link Ireland and the Roanoke Colony but also could show, following recent suggestions, how attitudinal, behavioral, and aspirational commonalities existed between early modern English military culture and the ethos of early English colonial endeavor. Lane's record on both sides of the Atlantic, however, rather than painting a picture of the applicability of martial virtue and military discipline at times of crisis, demonstrates instead the stark reality of the impulsive and appetitive culture of the garrison in the Elizabethan period and its corrosive effects. Lane's remarkable capacity for corruption, willful mismanagement, and wily self-defense in an Irish context in fact amplifies and complements troubling tendencies that scholars have recently detected in Lane's famous discourse of his government in what was commonly termed Virginia printed in Hakluyt's Principal Navigations. Lane can indeed serve as an emblem of common features shared by Elizabethan Englishmen drawn to office in Ireland and Elizabethan/Jacobean Englishmen drawn to settle in Virginia, but largely because of his mendacity, venality, and irresponsibility.

The belief in witchcraft and sorcery is a significant cause of intentional homicide in Kenya. Moreover, those who kill people suspected of being witches often employ as a defense for their actions the so-called provocation by witchcraft argument: the homicide was purportedly committed under the influence of belief in witchcraft and sorcery. One major legal difficulty that the Kenyan courts have frequently been invited to resolve is thus the question as to whether the belief in witchcraft and sorcery avails to an accused person the defense of grave provocation and, if so, under what circumstances. Drawing largely on pertinent case law, statutes, and academic literature, the author explores the controversy over provocation by witchcraft. The author first offers an exposition of the concept of witchcraft and sorcery in Africa and critically discusses the evolution of the Kenyan courts’ interpretation of the country’s law on provocation in relation to witchcraft beliefs since the 1930s. The author establishes that under the current Kenyan common law, defenses of heat of passion and sudden provocation may apply in instances where there is no real provocation and that the courts have exceeded the boundaries of the provocation defense without well-grounded reasons. The author cautions that giving the doctrine of provocation such a broad construction and application may increase the already rampant killings of suspected witches in Kenya.

In Gaum and Others v. Van Rensburg NO and Others, the South African High Court held the view that a decision taken by the Synod of the Dutch Reformed Church, which included a condition of a life of celibacy for gays and lesbians in order to be ordained as ministers in the church, along with a prohibition against the solemnizing of same-sex civil unions by ministers in the church, resulted in a violation of the right to equality and that unfair discrimination based on sexual orientation had taken place. Consequently, the finding in Gaum postulated a specific view on the permissible boundaries regarding conduct related to sexual orientation that should apply to a religious association. In this regard, Gaum is of concern when considering that courts in democracies around the world generally refrain from getting involved in matters related to the central doctrines of a religious association. Gaum’s findings are disquieting not only for the effective protection of the right to freedom of religion (in both an individual and associational context) but also for the furtherance of diversity. It is argued in this article that Gaum exceeded its jurisdiction in adjudicating on matters related to conduct regarding sexual orientation, an argument that critically focuses on the concept of equality against the background of the importance of the protection of the autonomy of religious associations.

This article explains how social norms can help to distinguish and understand a range of different kinds of social inequality and social hierarchy. My aim is to show how the literature on social norms can provide crucial resources to relational egalitarianism, which has made social equality and inequality into a central topic of contemporary normative political theorizing. The hope is that a more discriminating and detailed picture of different kinds of social inequality will help relational egalitarians move beyond a discussion of the justice or injustice of social equality as a single general category.