The Baltic Pearl is a 205-hectare development project underway southwest of St. Petersburg, Russia, originally financed and designed by a consortium of firms from Shanghai, China. This paper analyzes the discourse surrounding the development of one section of the Baltic Pearl, the commercial multiplex Southern Square, particularly the use of the term “European” as used to signal the project's intended cultural orientation and to exert control over the interaction between Russian planners and Chinese developers. In the negotiation over the form of the multiplex, control over architectural style emerges as leverage for preservation of cultural norms and local autonomy. In further analysis, the situation emerges as an example of Sassen's [(2008) Territory, Authority, Rights. From Medieval to Global Assemblages. Princeton: Princeton University Press] shifting assemblages, that is, a reassembling of global influences in a space invoked as national as well as local.

This is an article on Bolshevik nationalities policy and ethnic engineering, asking who, in fact, decided which populations belonged together as ethnic groups (narodnost') and thus had the right of national self-determination, and how the level of autonomy was determined for each ethnic unit. Scholars have dealt with Russian and Soviet nationalities issues for decades already, but they have turned their attention mainly to the larger nationalities (at the level of SSR, and to a lesser degree the levels of ASSR and autonomous oblast). I argue that the lower levels of national territorial autonomy in the Soviet Union (national okrug, raion, volost', and selsovet) are worthy of greater academic attention, at least from the ethnological point of view. Having this kind of low-level territorial autonomy has often been a question of to be or not to be for the small ethnic groups concerned, and hence the subject is connected with the question of preservation of cultural and linguistic diversity in Russia.

Perhaps mine is a strictly emotional opposition to the apocalyptic mood of our workshop. When everybody is a pessimist, I am tempted to be an optimist and vice-versa. I was an extreme pessimist last year when you all enjoyed perestroika and predicted nice things.

The purpose of this article is twofold: to provide a critical account of the Piteşti experiment and its significance within the history of Romanian Communism and to examine current public disputes relative to memorializing the Piteşi experiment that concern issues of legitimacy, collective memory, and identity construction. The main argument pursued here is that within the recent postcommunist politics of memory, one major prevailing trend is to reincorporate a nationalist ideology within a postcommunist rhetoric. This leads to the conclusion that such mnemonic practices indicate a strong relationship between collective memory and political culture.

With the destruction of the Third Reich and subsequent establishment of two separate and sovereign German states, different perspectives on society and class have resulted in differences in German-Jewish affairs. The Jewish communities in the Federal Republic of Germany, while predicated on the principles of religious corporations, became oriented toward the World Zionist Organization and the State of Israel. Indeed, Jewish life in West Germany soon represented expatriate Israeli existence, and the religious, cultural and political organizations of West-German Jews have become largely extensions of Zionist and Israeli purposes.

The 1997 Russian law on religion recognizes Orthodoxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism as the “traditional religions” of Russia. These religions see themselves as having an important role to play in achieving social stability, and particularly in overcoming religious “extremism” and the perceived threat it poses to society. “Traditional'” religions stand shoulder to shoulder, explaining that the values they champion tend towards the creation and preservation of peace and reconciliation in society, and that, moreover, these are shared values, common to all “traditional'‘ religions. Indeed, the primary criterion for identifying a “traditional'” religion in Russia today may be that it is “noncompetitive” with other religions. The Moscow Patriarchate rejects the idea, for example, that Orthodox Christians should proselytize among Muslims. The fact that each religion sees itself as having possession of the “truth” does not endanger the cooperation, harmony and mutual respect among the traditional religions in Russia at the level of official and institutional interaction. Regarding the controversy over the school textbook, Foundations of Orthodox Culture, which human rights activists accused of constituting pro-Orthodox propaganda, an Orthodox priest and a Muslim chief mufti filed a joint claim against those who initiated the case, and a Protestant leader came out in support of the use of the textbook in the public schools.

Rarely does an ethnic conflict remain wholly confined to its country of origin. Because ethnic groups often have members across international borders, their civil wars can have a strong influence on neighboring countries’ politics, impelling kindred communities to push for their state to intervene in support of imperilled relatives across the border. At the same time, strategic thinkers often find it tempting to destabilize neighboring countries, or to oppose groups acting as proxies for regional rivals. Because of such considerations, intervention in ethnic civil war becomes a political issue for the neighbors, with the emotional stakes often strengthening the hands of nationalists in the neighboring countries.