In June 1990, following the example set by Boris Yeltsin and the Russian Republic, the Supreme Soviet in Chişinău declared Moldova sovereign. Henceforth, Moldovans would recognize only those laws approved by their own parliament and maintain relations with the other republics only within “an association of sovereign states.” Formal independence came a year later, on 27 August 1991, following the failure of the Moscow coup that sought to unseat Mikhail Gorbachev and preserve the Soviet Union. In the heady times that followed, Moldovans debated basic questions of political organization and, inevitably, the difficult issue of Moldova's relationship with neighboring Romania.

Panelists

Professor John Hazard, School of Law, Columbia University

One of the most important characteristics of the newly independent republic of Kazakstan is the multinational nature of its population. In addition to the members of the titular Kazak nationality, numerous Slavic, Turkic, and other peoples have made, or have been forced to make, Kazakstan their home. Most of these peoples, with the exception of the Kazaks, could be characterized as diasporas. However, the Uighurs, a Turkic Muslim people living in Kazakstan, are not a standard example of a diaspora. Unlike many of Kazakstan's diasporic communities, such as the Russians, Koreans, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and Germans, who can rely on outside support from recognized nation states to protect their rights, the Uighurs are a stateless people whose claims to sovereignty are not internationally recognized. Furthermore, unlike other stateless diasporas in Kazakstan, such as the Tatars, the Chechens, and the Mesketian TurksM whose homelands are clearly located outside of Kazakstan, the Uighurs’ “homeland” in China's Xinjiang province borders on the former Soviet republic, which raises the question of whether or not many Uighurs are indigenous to the territory of Kazakstan.

This paper posits that a great deal of cross-national variation in clientelistic investment strategies can be explained through an examination of the different forms of risk faced by the political elite of different types of regimes. It also maintains that demand from clients/potential clients is, by itself, insufficient to explain the level or scope of clientelistic investments. The argument is advanced through an examination of the linkages (and non-linkages) between patrons/potential patrons and clients/potential clients amongst the ethnic Uzbek populations of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In Kyrgyzstan, a semi-authoritarian state, electoral risk predominates; however, the character of electoral risk in Kyrgyzstan provides Uzbek members of the political elite with an incentive to diversify their clientelistic investments. Consequently, many engage in direct exchanges with their constituents while simultaneously investing in private, cultural organizations that serve party-like functions. Alternatively, in contemporary Tajikistan, best described as an authoritarian state, electoral risk has been replaced with the risk of expulsion from the presidential clientelistic network. As a result, members of the Tajikistani political elite have a disincentive to publicly invest in constituent clients as this investment may increase the risk of expulsion.

This essay brings attention to the recent discursive turn in Russian politics that is reflected in the Kremlin's turn to issues of traditional values and morality. Expressed in Russia's domestic and foreign policies, this new “morality politics” is dated by the Pussy Riot trial in 2012 that the Kremlin used to advance its new discursive frame in the public sphere. Although not entirely new in its orientation, this new stage of “morality politics” differs from the earlier policy initiatives in its intensity, scope and political significance for the regime. The moralizing stance taken by the regime is accompanied by a divide and rule political tactic, whereby the establishment has tried to marginalize the protesters from the rest of the Russian public that the regime is attempting to reconsolidate based on traditional, conservative values. The essay interprets this recent morality turn as a strategy selected by the Kremlin to restore the regime's legitimacy that has been shaken by the protests of 2011–2012 and looks at the social and political consequences of the selected strategy.

The Soviet absorption of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania during World War II caused hundreds of thousands of Baltic immigrants to come to the West, where they established strong, viable ethnic communities, often in league with groups that had left the region earlier. At first, Baltic publishing and publications centered almost exclusively on nationalistic themes that decried the loss of Baltic independence and attacked the Soviet Union for its role in this matter. In time, however, serious scholarship began to replace some of the passionate outpourings, and a strong, academic field of Baltic scholarship emerged in the West that dealt with all aspects of Baltic history, politics, culture, language, and other matters, regardless of its political or nationalistic implications. Over the past sixteen years, these efforts have produced a new body of Baltic publishing that has revived a strong interest in Baltic studies and has insured that regardless of the continued Soviet-domination of the region, the study of the culture and history of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania will remain a set fixture in Western scholarship on Eastern Europe.

The determination with which Communism has attacked religious institutions and theology has resulted in considerable loss of power for the Church in virtually all of the satellite countries. There appears to be one notable exception to this phenomenon, namely, the Polish Church.

The so-called “national,” or ethnopolitical questions, whose existence has long been denied in Russia, is a significant issue in the Udmurt Republic. The Soviet propaganda machine long advanced the theme of friendship among all the peoples of the multinational USSR until glasnost', when this notion began to be questioned by society. In the minority areas ethnic questions finally emerged at the end of the 1980s and since then have occupied a prominent place in the mass media, in Udmurtia and elsewhere. This article highlights the polemic character of the debate on ethnic issues in Udmurtia, which is located in the Volga-Urals region, against a background of the particular local historical and demographic factors.

With the end of the Cold War, the Great Game in Central Asia has heated up once again. Once more, Central Asia has become a place for international rivalry. But this time the Great Game is not between Britain and Russia. In this second half of the Great Game, Turkey, Russia, Iran, India, China, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and even Israel are all vying for influence. China, the key player, however, is left out of the game in most accounts and is overlooked as a Central Asian power. Moreover, it is forgotten that China won the first half of the Great Game, at least as far as Xinjiang is concerned. It is my contention that China will catch everyone by surprise once again and win the second half of the Great Game in Central Asia; the Uighurs of Xinjiang will play a predominant role in this victory.