This article explores the development of language and education policies in the Republic of Tatarstan, a constituent of the Russian Federation, in the context of continued decline in minorities’ political nationalism between 2000 and the 2010s. The new “model of Tatarstan” relies on a close partnership with Moscow reaffirmed by an exclusive treaty on the division of powers. However, this formality does not eliminate Tatars’ cultural contention for recognition and autonomy. The case of Tatarstan speaks to both the potential and the constraints of autonomous territories that are incapable of satisfying the needs of co-nationals living beyond their administrative borders. Language policies and education practices have become a relatively autonomous area for claim-making in defense of Tatar culture as well as bilingualism and multicultural education in the region. This study reveals the interrelationship between the two components, Tatar ethno-culturalism and “pluri-culturalism,” and the encouragement of the region's diversity in the public domain of Tatarstan. Valuable in itself, the latter in a wider context appears to be a necessary condition for protecting minority groups in multinational Russia. Thus while promoting the interests of the “titular” nationality — ethnic Tatars — Tatarstan also serves the advancement of multicultural values in present-day Russia.

The public international law doctrine of command responsibility, like many firmly accepted rules in law, is more clearly stated than consistently applied. Intended to establish a base level of order and responsibility for sustained violence endemic to the inherently ugly nature of war, even state militaries of fully mature Western democracies demonstrate difficulty appreciating its importance and applying its law.

This paper explores the idea of “recuperative memory” with respect to the process of coming to terms with the past after the fall of the Romanian Communist regime in 1989. Its method is to examine the mechanisms used by recuperative memory in order to re-appropriate the past and emphasize the inherently mediated and multifaceted nature of this process. Using various examples from oral testimonies, autobiographical writings, literary works, and cinema, the paper argues that the role of recuperative memory is not only to facilitate the process of coming to terms with the past, but also to offer the material necessary to sustain a viable politics of memory. This entails providing a platform for the intergenerational transmission of memory and knowledge for those who did not live under the Communist regime, filling in this way the intergenerational gap, despite the lack of political class engagement.

The protection of Imperial Russian territorial integrity was, when the peace conference convened in Paris, one of the firmest and least ambivalent elements of Woodrow Wilson's Russian policy.1 The Russia to which he applied this policy was in fact an empire, including nationality groups incorporated, often forceably, during the 17th and 18th centuries. Many of these ethnic nationalities — and especially those with which Wilson and his fellow peacemakers were familiar — were concentrated along the borders of European Russia. Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine were perhaps the best known of the ethnic nationalities, each with defined geographic areas, which had formed part of imperial Russia. Such nationality centers, many of which had long established administrative borders which changed little as a result of the peace conference, are the Russian borderlands to which this paper refers.

The Provisional Government, which held power from March to November 1917, had little effect on Lithuania. This was not due to the Russian government's attempt to carry on the war in the midst of internal rebellion and general chaos, but rather to Lithuania's having been overrun by the German army, which occupied the country for the entire period. Nevertheless, this period provides a glimpse into the forces at work, which were to effect profoundly Lithuania to the present. The Lithuanians were trying to establish an independent state of their own against the wishes of the Poles, Russians, and Germans, and in order to understand the situation properly, it is necessary to go back much further in history.

Over the last twenty years, the theoretical perspectives of Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner have played a large role in discussions of the origins and development of nationalism. In each of their conceptions is not only the now famous and widely agreed upon notion that “nationalism engenders nations,” and that nations “imagine” themselves into existence, but also that such development is inherently connected with underlying economic developments associated with the rise of capitalism and industrialization. For each of these theorists, communication plays a central role, a defining function, in the rise of nationalism.

Since its conception in 1898 the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has had to contend with the nationality question. The Party has had to formulate programs and make organizational and functional decisions pertaining to national rights. It has had to dwell on political aspects of the issue and adopt resolutions touching on the social, economic, and cultural problems of non-Russian nations in the Russian Empire and the Soviet State. What were these resolutions and what effect, if any, did ideological considerations, domestic power struggles, situational factors, and personal styles of the party leaders have on the resolutions?