The Dyos Prize has been awarded annually since 1992 for the best article submitted to the Urban History Journal in each calendar year. The articles are judged by the journal editors and two independent adjudicators. The prize is named after H.J. Dyos (1921–78) to commemorate his innovative contribution to the development of the field of urban history. To reflect the catholicity and interdisciplinarity which Dyos encouraged, no temporal, geographical or thematic restrictions exist, except that the paper must make a significant contribution to the study of urban history. The prize consists of a cash sum and the publication of the paper in Urban History.

The landmark 2015 decision by the Hague District Court in Urgenda v. The Netherlands represents the first time a national court has expressly used the international environmental law (IEL) principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities (CBDRs) of the climate regime as a complementary tool to interpret the scope of a state’s climate obligations under domestic law. This article highlights that despite the marked engagement of national courts with IEL in recent decades (including engaging with principles such as sustainable development, polluter pays, intergenerational equity, and precaution), until this decision CBDRs had remained outside the purview of environmental law jurisprudence at the national level. The article examines how the Hague Court used CBDRs to help address two common barriers to climate liability: causation and the ‘political question’ doctrine. The article argues that the Court was able to find normative content in a core element of the climate-related CBDRs: the ‘leadership’ role of developed countries in climate action. This core element has remained remarkably consensual throughout the contested history of CBDRs in the climate regime – a history that has gained a new chapter with the signature of the Paris Agreement in December 2015. The article concludes that Urgenda v. The Netherlands may serve as a starting point for a more productive and extensive use of CBDRs in climate litigation, provided litigants make more explicit use of the persuasive authority of the principle.

The Paris Agreement has struck a careful balance between the need for ambitious and effective climate action and for fair effort sharing among parties based on differentiation. This article provides an overview of the negotiation history of differentiation and analyzes the ‘dynamic differentiation’ as built into the architecture of the Agreement. While being set against the normative background of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Paris Agreement adopts a more diversified way of differential treatment among parties, approaching it in three complementary ways: firstly, on a principled basis, reflecting common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), in the light of different national circumstances; secondly, in the content of its articles, in particular on mitigation, finance and transparency; and thirdly, on the basis of the principles of progression and highest possible ambition, which represent new and dynamic aspects of differentiation. The authors argue that ‘highest possible ambition’ is reflective of a duty of care that states now need to exercise. It implies a due diligence standard, which requires each government to act in proportion to the risk at stake and to take all appropriate and adequate climate measures according to its responsibility and its best capabilities. By expecting parties to apply this standard at each successive preparation of nationally determined contributions (NDCs), and to progress beyond previous ones, the Paris Agreement has set up reiterative processes, an ‘international normative pull’ and a collective learning environment. This, in turn, creates a reflexive approach to parties’ determination of effort, promoting the evolution of voluntary cooperative behaviour.

This article offers a socio-legal analysis of the role played by the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) in the development, diffusion, and implementation of jurisdictional REDD+ activities throughout the developing world. It employs a qualitative research method known as process tracing to uncover whether and, if so, to what extent and how actors have used CBDR to support the emergence and effectiveness of the transnational legal process for REDD+. The article argues that the transnational legal process for REDD+ reflects a conception of CBDR in which developing country governments may take on voluntary commitments to reduce their carbon emissions, with the multilateral, bilateral, and private sources of financial support and technical assistance provided by developed countries, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and corporations. This creative conception and application of CBDR has fostered the construction and diffusion of legal norms for REDD+ because it has influenced the interests, ideas, and identities of public and private actors in the North and South. However, the early challenges associated with the implementation of REDD+ reveal a worrying gap between the financial pledges made by developed countries and the costs associated with the full implementation of REDD+, as well as contradictions in the very way in which the responsibilities of various countries have been defined in the context of REDD+. The analysis has important implications for the transnational governance of REDD+, as well as for scholarship on the role of differentiation in the pursuit of effective and equitable climate change solutions.

Many multilateral environmental agreements have adopted differentiated rules for different countries, based on the recognition of the ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDRs) of states. By establishing two rigid groups of countries with and without emissions reduction obligations, the intergovernmental climate regime represents the most extreme case of such differentiation. The regime has struggled to overcome this rigidity and the resulting political deadlock between developing and developed countries. Transnational climate governance (TCG) initiatives have emerged as an alternative to provide mitigation, adaptation or finance outside the multilateral process. By drawing on synergies between public and private actors, it is hoped that they overcome the paralysis of the intergovernmental process. Yet, they take place in the same world of unequal peers, with different levels of capacity and responsibility for climate change. This article investigates the extent to which such TCG initiatives reflect the CBDR principle. Do different types of initiative – involving different types of actor or with different climate-related goals – address differentiation in distinct ways? Does taking account of CBDRs affect the membership of transnational initiatives? This article explores these questions empirically by analyzing a sample of TCG initiatives in terms of how they include differential treatment of states and non-state members. It concludes that TCG initiatives address differentiation in a pragmatic way. Most frequently, they either offer participants flexibility in how to implement their commitments, or provide support to members from developing countries. Such support is, so far, still insufficient to address the limited involvement of developing country actors.

Since their inception, climate change negotiations have stalled because of the scope of parties’ mitigation responsibilities under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The concept of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) became a core principle of the framework to ensure consensus on a global climate policy in 1992 and to promote differentiation. By letting each country assess its current responsibilities and capacities for climate mitigation through their nationally determined contributions (NDCs), the Paris Agreement has built on the principle of CBDR-RC and promoted self-differentiation. As the concept evolved, the role of emerging economies has been a particular focus of discussions. Academia is still grappling with the revised meaning of CBDR-RC and the newly introduced NDCs. This article contributes to the discussion by analyzing the role of emerging economies in climate governance through the lens of regional responsibility. In particular, it discusses how cooperation can be a more effective way to ensure differentiation, especially by distinguishing emerging economies from other developing countries with fewer capacities. The article uses the Amazon rainforest as a case study, discussing Brazil’s role within the region. Building on lessons from regional schemes that have successfully promoted climate mitigation, the article looks at the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization (ACTO) as an avenue for enhanced cooperation at the regional level.

Most books by or about Antonio Gramsci reproduce on their covers the same studio photograph dating from the early 1920s. It is a head and shoulders portrait showing Gramsci with longish hair, dark coat buttoned at the neck, unsmiling and looking into the camera through wire-rimmed glasses. This was also the image of him most commonly displayed in Communist Party branches all over Italy from the late 1940s to 1991. Yet if we compare it with other extant photographs of Gramsci, as well as with those of other revolutionary leaders adopted as iconic in the communist movement, we can see it differs from the former and resembles the latter in several ways. The most striking difference is the erasure of any sign of Gramsci’s bodily impairment: the curvature of the spine and short stature resulting from the spinal tuberculosis he had as a child. The article examines the history of this photograph and the way it became adopted as the approved image of Gramsci and considers what was at stake in removing from official memory a condition of disability that was central to his own personal and political identity.