This chapter first discusses to what extent we can find attitudes in historical contexts. Whereas explicit attitudes can be culled from metalinguistic texts, implicit attitudes may be reconstructed on the basis of variation in language use, for example, in the use of pronouns versus full noun phrases. Such discursive patterns are signs of indexicality, which can be seen as the linguistic form of more intangible language ideologies. The chapter then introduces main concepts from language ideological theory, such as erasure and iconisation. Distinguishing between language myths and language ideologies, we discuss a range of examples, such as the myth of polite language and the standard language ideology. A number of case studies, including purism in the German metalinguistic tradition, linguistic debates about antiquity and ethnicity in Early Modern Spain, and the establishment of Luxembourgish as a national language, are used to further illustrate key concepts and approaches.

Traditional language histories have often focused narrowly on formal printed texts, produced by educated elite men from urban social elites, largely neglecting the everyday language practices of ordinary people. This chapter introduces the perspective of language history from below, where we shift our focus to these often-overlooked voices, in order to arrive at a fuller and more complete understanding of historical language variation and change. We discuss the challenges faced by investigations of the everyday language of ordinary people, including difficulties in determining actual authorship and interpreting texts produced through delegated writing. Based on case studies and examples from a range of different historical and linguistic contexts, we show how examining ego-documents such as private letters and diaries from lower social ranks can reveal valuable insights and complement and at times even correct our existing view of language histories.

This chapter explains the rule against hearsay and its exceptions. First, it sets out what hearsay is and some of the common law cases that contributed to its development. It then explains how hearsay is defined under the Act. This chapter then proceeds to explain the various uses for which evidence may be adduced and the different exceptions available under the Act. It is important to note that facts in issue and facts relevant to facts in issue are critical to understanding the purposes behind tendering hearsay evidence.

Hearsay evidence relies not on direct witness testimony but on another witness’s statement about a ‘previous representation’. The person who makes the out-of-court assertion is called the ‘declarant’ or maker of the statement. The rationale for developing the rule against hearsay at common law was that these out-of-court previous representations were usually made by a person whose evidence was not available to be tested. The main concern at common law was whether such evidence was reliable. The witness giving the hearsay evidence could be cross-examined about what they perceived, but the credibility of the maker of the statement could not be tested.

Changes in social structure often lead to mobility and migration. Urbanisation is one important outcome of mobility and migration. Mobility, migration and urbanisation lead to dialect contact, that is, between speakers of mutually intelligible varieties. This chapter first introduces general concepts such as diffusion and supralocalisation, and then moves on to discuss sociolinguistic models developed for the analysis of dialect contact, including the theories of koineisation and new-dialect formation, based on principles such as accommodation and salience. Case studies are taken from medieval Spain, Early Modern New Mexico and twentieth-century Norway. The chapter also addresses the role of new speakers in contact situations, based on an example from sixteenth-century Tuscany, and ends with a short discussion of sociolinguistic typology.

Different texts have different characteristics. In this chapter, we first explore the concepts of register, genre and style, which are, in the tradition of Biber, linked to communicative functions and situational characteristics. The co-occurrence of register features and dimensions are introduced as the linguistic indicators of communicative functions. A particularly useful approach to register centres around keyness, which we demonstrate with historical Portuguese data. We then introduce discourse traditions as a historical-linguistic concept closely related to genre and register. We use French literary examples to explain stylistic differences and the link with the Labovian distinction between indicators, markers and stereotypes. This leads to a discussion of indexicality and indexical fields more generally, for which we draw on ancient Greek plays. The chapter continues the discussion of the literary representation of language variation on the basis of English texts comprising dialect, and explains the important concept of enregisterment.

This chapter discusses the various rights (‘privileges and immunities’) that allow a party to resist compulsory demands for information, both in and out of court. Privileges have a long history in the common law, with some departure from traditional privilege rules arising in statutory formulations. Privilege is a ‘bar to compulsory process for the obtaining of evidence rather than a rule of inadmissibility’. However, a successful claim of privilege will result in the exclusion of evidence, derogating from the general principle that all relevant evidence should be admitted.

The common law’s stance on privilege and the consequent restriction on access to evidence are reflected to a large extent in the Uniform evidence Acts. Nonetheless, the categories of privilege have expanded under the legislation and, inevitably, anomalies have arisen between the two branches.

Probably the most significant development in law relating to privilege is the appearance of compulsory production of information arising under legislation linked to the examination powers of certain government authorities.

This chapter explains the sections of the Act and the principles of common law concerning identification evidence. The Act addresses identification evidence in Part 3.9 (ss 113–16), which only applies in criminal proceedings. Identification evidence is evidence used to prove the identity of a defendant in a criminal proceeding, as part of the case against that person. For example, there may be no dispute that a crime occurred, but the defence position at trial is that the defendant was not the offender. The prosecution will have to prove with identification evidence that the defendant was the same person as the offender.

There are three main forms of identification evidence: visual, picture and voice identification. Visual and picture identification are dealt with in detail in the Act, but voice identification is not, despite falling within the scope of ‘identification evidence’ as defined in the Act’s Dictionary. Also not dealt with as identification evidence in the Act is evidence used to establish the identity of someone other than a criminal defendant (e.g. a victim), any party in a civil proceeding or an object.

This chapter discusses standardisation as a major factor in sociolinguistic history. After a brief dicussion of basic concepts such as diglossia, Ausbau, Abstand and diaglossia, we introduce the Haugen model, including the key concepts of selection, codification, elaboration and acceptance. We go on to argue that the later introduced concept of implementation is crucial in analyses of the interaction of norms and language use in the language community. Focusing on this interaction, and based on case studies from English and Dutch, three scenarios are distinguished: prescriptive influence, prescriptive delay and concurrent prescriptivism. The chapter ends by situating the interaction of norms and usage into the wider framework of the total linguistic fact as developed by Silverstein.

The final chapter of this text provides extended questions designed to test students understanding and knowledge of evidence law as a whole. Each question combines multiple elements of the Uniform Evidence Act (1995) to ensure students understand how sections work together.

This chapter focuses on the exclusionary powers of the trial judge. Two forms of exclusion are examined: discretionary, where the trial judge has a choice whether to exclude the evidence; and mandatory, where the trial judge is required to do so. The discretions under the Act play a more significant role than the discretions at common law in determining the admissibility of evidence. This may be because the Act adopts the logical relevance test. However, despite evidence being admissible and relevant, the trial judge has the discretion to exclude the evidence. Further, many exclusionary rules of evidence at common law (discussed in the earlier chapters) are relaxed and the Act adopts a more flexible approach to the admissibility of evidence.

This chapter first considers the discretionary and mandatory exclusions regulated by pt 3.11 (ss 135–9) of the Act. The concepts of ‘probative value’ and ‘unfair prejudice’ govern the exercise of the discretions. The chapter then considers how the provisions on corroboration and unreliability under pts 4.4 and 4.5 (ss 164–165B) have altered the common law and how their operation may affect the weight of evidence.

This chapter discusses the provisions of the Act that address character evidence. The term ‘character evidence’ is not defined in the legislation, so some recourse to the common law is required. However, pt 3.8 of the Act provides a simple mechanism allowing evidence of character to be adduced in criminal proceedings, as follows. (1) Exclusionary rules that would prevent a defendant from adducing evidence of good character (the hearsay, opinion, tendency and credibility rules) do not apply. (2) If the defendant adduces evidence of good character (whether by giving evidence or through the testimony of another witness) then the prosecution, or another defendant, can respond with evidence of bad character (because the same exclusionary rules also do not apply).

This chapter also deals with the interaction of character and credibility evidence, and concludes with a discussion of evidentiary and procedural rules relating to character evidence about complainants and victims, addressed mainly in legislation outside the Act.

This chapter is about the admissibility of evidence in court as opposed to the adducing of evidence in court. This difference is significant. Even if the potential admission of evidence satisfies procedural requirements, the court may exclude it on the basis that it falls within one or more of the exclusionary rules of evidence, and not within an exception to those rules.

The fundamental rule in evidence law is that evidence that is relevant is admissible, unless it is excluded by one of the rules of exclusion. Where the evidence is irrelevant, it is inadmissible, and there are no rules of inclusion. Therefore, relevance is the first hurdle in considering whether an item of evidence is to be admitted in court.

To be admissible, evidence must be relevant to a fact in issue. In other words, the item of evidence must be able to affect the assessment of the probability that the fact in issue exists. Facts in issue are determined by reference to the substantive law. The material or principal facts, often referred to as the ‘ultimate issues’, ‘essential allegations’ or ‘material allegations’, are what must be proven.