This new chapter deals with two important women authors who wrote in the vernacular. They developed a rich, deeply Christocentric spirituality. Hadewijch’s spirituality and theology are especially rich. Her views on Christ, love and desire, the Trinity and detachment are discussed in some detail.

It is one of the aims of this book to challenge traditional comparative law and promote alternative approaches. Yet, to start with, it is useful to discuss the ‘comparative legal method’ of traditional comparative law in some detail. For this reason, Section A of this chapter outlines how, according to traditional comparatists, a comparative legal analysis should be conducted. Section B focuses on two of the most important concepts on which this method is based: functionalism and universalism. A critical analysis follows in Section C, and Section D concludes. Examples will be provided throughout this chapter, in particular from topics of private law as these feature most prominently in this approach to comparative law.

Many psychologists trace their heritage to Wundt. As we have seen, Wundt is often given credit for the very founding of psychology. But Wundt’s laboratory at Leipzig was not without German rivals, and Wundt was not without German critics. These competing approaches to the “new psychology” of the nineteenth century were also experimental but differed from the approach of Wundt in the topics they emphasized. In their psychophysics, Ernst Weber and Gustav Fechner made precise measurements of sensation; these scholars actually preceded and influenced Wundt. Hermann Ebbinghaus studied memory under carefully controlled laboratory conditions; and Carl Stumpf and Oswald Külpe investigated mental acts including problem-solving and attention. In this chapter, we consider the work of these five scholars in detail. As you will see, the German pioneers of psychology extend far beyond Wundt himself.

There are two ways of understanding the title of this chapter: it can either mean ‘comparative law’ and development, or it can refer to comparative ‘law and development’. Both variants are addressed in the following. In the sense of ‘comparative law’ and development, the chapter considers how insights drawn from comparative law can assist development policy. This reflects the aim of traditional comparative law to provide policy recommendations while also responding to the criticism that traditional comparative law is largely uninterested in the countries of the developing world.

In order to understand the key questions and issues surrounding BHR, a basic understanding of human rights more generally is necessary. Since BHR is an interdisciplinary field, it is important to gain an understanding both of the legal and non-legal dimensions of human rights. This chapter first provides a brief introduction to the philosophy of human rights and some of the key discussions that derive from this. Among them are the disputes between universalism and relativism and between foundationalist and non-foundationalist accounts of human rights. The chapter then takes a look at the main human rights bodies that institutionalize human rights in the international and regional context, paying particular attention to the United Nations’ human rights system. Finally, the chapter provides a brief introduction to international human rights law, outlining some of its key principles and instruments.

In addition to the UN Guiding Principles on BHR, there are several other international soft-law standards and initiatives that shape the BHR landscape. This chapter introduces three more general international standards, namely the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the UN Global Compact and the ISO 26000 standard. All feature a strong human rights component. They are important because of the impact they have had in shaping the human rights practices of business and the BHR field more generally. For each of the three standards, their human rights-related content is outlined, followed by some reflections on how the standards are enforced and a summary of major criticism they have faced. In the context of the OECD Guidelines, the chapter will address the role and potential of the so-called National Contact Points as possible remedy mechanisms in human rights disputes. In addition, the last subchapter of this section takes a more general look at the role and significance of multistakeholder initiatives, which have become an important element of the larger governance landscape in BHR.

This chapter assesses international law-based possibilities to hold corporations accountable for their human rights impacts.The negotiations by the UN Human Rights Council on a binding international treaty on BHR is the most significant development in this regard. This chapter takes a detailed look at the idea and prospect of such a binding legal framework. Before doing so, some other potential accountability mechanisms in the realm of international law are assessed – namely, international investment law and international arbitration. The chapter takes a thorough look at international investment agreements and bilateral investment treaties and how these instruments could be improved to account for human rights. It also explores arbitration as an instrument to deal with BHR disputes. Finally, it briefly touches on the idea of a world court of human rights.

The division between civil and common law countries discussed in Chapter 3 is a major building block for mapping the world’s legal systems. In addition, a number of further categories have been suggested. Section A of this chapter discusses why scholars attempt to classify the world’s legal systems at all. Section B provides examples of how precisely this has been done in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The critical analysis of Section C challenges the usefulness of these classifications for comparative law, and Section D concludes.

Most psychologists would agree that psychology as an experimental science begins with Wilhelm Wundt’s establishment of the world’s first psychological research laboratory at the University of Leipzig in 1879. In 1979, the centennial of the Leipzig laboratory’s founding was recognized in the United States, Canada, England, France, Germany, Brazil, and Japan. The American Psychological Association issued a special minting of a gold medal bearing Wundt’s portrait on the obverse and proclaiming “a century of science” on the reverse. A safe prediction is that in 2029, the 150th anniversary of that founding will be widely recognized and celebrated by psychologists throughout the world. Who then was Wundt and how did he come to establish that laboratory? In photographs a bearded, distinguished-looking Wilhelm Wundt gazes calmly through wire-rimmed glasses. He seems the very model of a nineteenth-century German “Herr Professor.” Wundt is usually identified as the “founder of psychology” or the “world’s first true psychologist.” It is appropriate that Wundt is the first psychologist we will consider.

The aim of this chapter is to map how other comparative fields have produced a remarkable amount of research that should be of interest to comparative lawyers. It should also be noted, however, that the present account of ‘implicit comparative law’ is highly condensed and selective. Thus, while this chapter can provide a critical introduction into these areas of research, it is clear that it may well be possible to write entire books about many of its themes.

In his research conducted before, during, and after the Russian Revolution of 1917, Pavlov established the paradigms of classical (respondent) conditioning and reported results that are basic to an understanding of learning. Pavlov had wide research interests. He was an important influence on the historical development of psychology. In the United States, Watson too was involved in a revolution but in his case a revolution within psychology. While his career in psychology was relatively short, Watson’s behaviorist revolution was a major influence on the development of psychology, especially in the United States. How did the conditioned reflex model provide behaviorism with an alternative way of explaining human action? Why did it displace earlier schools of psychology (structuralism and functionalism), and cause psychologists to abandon (at least temporarily) explanations of behavior that were based in descriptions of conscious experiences? In this chapter we consider that transition.