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Discussions of terrorism assume actual or threatened violence, but the term is regularly used to delegitimize rivals' nonviolent actions. Yet do ordinary citizens accept descriptions of nonviolence as terrorism? Using a preregistered survey-experiment in Israel, a salient conflictual context with diverse repertoires of contention, we find that audiences rate adversary nonviolence close to terrorism, consider it illegitimate, and justify its forceful repression. These perceptions vary by the action's threatened harm, its salience, and respondents' ideology. Explicitly labeling nonviolence as terrorism, moreover, particularly sways middle-of-the-road centrists. These relationships replicate in a lower-salience conflict, albeit with milder absolute judgments, indicating generalizability. Hence, popular perceptions of terrorism are more fluid and manipulable than assumed, potentially undermining the positive effects associated with nonviolent campaigns.
This Chapter addresses how unexpected restrictions in municipal laws might frustrate parties’ autonomy by the application of “mandatory laws” that do not constitute fundamental principles of morality and justice. The Chapter analyses the definition of “mandatory law” and concludes that international commercial arbitration tribunals must follow the combined guidance of the ILA Final Report, with its emphasis on identification of “mandatory laws” as lois de police, and Article 9 of Rome I, with its limitation on applying only “overriding” mandatory laws – particularly when the allegedly mandatory laws of a third State are in question.
The Chapter also examines investment treaty disputes, where the application of mandatory laws of third States is less likely to be involved. However, treaty arbitrators are arguably in need of guidance from States and investors – perhaps as a prudential limit to arbitrators’ discretion – in assessing which of the increasing number of human rights provisions should be considered “mandatory law”.ICJ Judge Bruno Simma’s proposal regarding pre-investment “audits” of the law of the host State in relation to human rights is one way to provide such guidance. Absent guidance, uncertainties about the content of “international law” may well create uncertainties about “mandatory law” in investment treaty cases, to the detriment of ongoing public confidence in investor-State dispute resolution.
This article includes translation of a “new” Vision of Daniel as it survived, albeit incomplete. It reflects a “meeting point” between three monotheistic religions in the ninth and tenth centuries CE. A comparative study of the work enables the reconstruction of its missing parts. The Vision may have been composed in the area where al-Muʿtaṣim battled Theophilos in the 830s CE, namely, northern Syria and southeastern Anatolia. An “updated” appendix was added around 1000 CE. Towards the end of the Vision, exact times are replaced with “flexible times,” a moderate expression of the cosmic changes found in similar eschatological works. The two anti-messiahs described, constructed as integrations of Jewish-Christian-Muslim traditions of the apocalyptical devils, reflect the shifting identities of messianic figures, who will reveal themselves once again (Parousia), albeit as demonic antichrists. One of the two is an inversion of the Christian image of Moses/Jesus, whereas the second is Armilus.
Fortification walls and other buildings discovered during renewed excavations at Tel Erani (Tell esh-Sheikh el-Areyni) shed new light on the beginnings of urbanisation in the Southern Levant during the second half of the fourth millennium BC.
The Jewish communities of Egypt and North Africa are arguably the best-documented Jewish communities in the medieval Islamic world (with the possible exception of those of Palestine). The riches of the genizot of Cairo and geonic responsa open unparalleled vistas for the study of Jewish life in these regions and attest to the strong links between them. As explored further below, Egypt and North Africa shared a common orientation toward the Mediterranean and were tied by a vibrant maritime and overland trade. In 969, the dynasty that had ruled over the central Maghrib from the beginning of the century conquered Egypt and subsequently proclaimed this victory by establishing its new capital in it (Cairo, Arabic al-Qāhira, “the victorious”). The transfer of the religious, military, and administrative center of the empire from the Maghrib to Egypt constituted another strong connection between the two regions. The combination of these commercial and political ties brought about a substantial migration and settlement of Maghribī Jews to Egypt, a process that further bonded the regions together and proved decisive in shaping their Jewish communities.
This chapter examines links between European peaceful borders and the occurrence and proliferation of illicit transnational flows. We refer to the European “internal” borders since the implementation of the Schengen Agreement in 1995, the Southeastern European borders (regarding the Western Balkans/former Yugoslavia) since the end of the Bosnian War in 1995, and the borders between the EU and its Western Balkan neighbors. We assess the softening and the complete opening of the internal borders among the twenty-six Schengen countries in contrast to external border control, as related to the occurrence and proliferation of illicit transnational flows. The two major European concerns in the last two decades are illegal migration and transnational crime, including drug trafficking, human trafficking and smuggling, arms trafficking, and terrorism. Harmonization of internal border controls has abolished the logic of jurisdictional arbitrage. Moreover, peaceful borders that are “hard” between the EU and its Southern and Eastern neighbors remain more controlled, though that it is not necessarily an obstacle for the occurrence of illicit transnational flows.
Here we have four case studies from North America, Central America, and South America to assess the links between peaceful borders and the occurrence and proliferation of illicit transnational flows. All the borders involved are peaceful with important variation across the cases in terms of historical background and trajectories. First, we study the North American Borders (US-Canada and US-Mexico), especially in the period since the establishment of NAFTA in 1994. Second comes the Northern Triangle of Central America, which includes the borders of Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras since the end of the civil wars in the early 1990s. Third, we turn to the Colombian borders with Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil, with a particular focus on the last twenty years that witnessed the tensions between Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, and the long civil war that involved Colombia and the FARC until 2016. Finally, we analyze the Tri-Border Area of the Southern Cone of South America, which includes the borders of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, especially since the establishment of MERCOSUR in 1991.
In this chapter, we examine what we call the triangle of peace in the Middle East, with reference to the peaceful international borders established upon the completion of peace treaties between Egypt and Israel on March 26, 1979, and between Israel and Jordan on October 26, 1994. In both cases, we show that international peace, especially in the case of Israel-Egypt, has been a permissive condition for the occurrence and proliferation of illicit transnational flows, including transnational crime and terrorism.Yet, we explain the variance between the two cases with reference to the three variables assessed throughout the book: the degree of physical and institutional openness of the peaceful borders; the degree of governance and institutional strength of the bordering states; and the prevalent socioeconomic conditions of the neighboring states. The Egyptian-Israeli case has registered significant instances of transnational crime and terrorism, whereas the Israeli-Jordanian dyad is almost a non-case, except for drugs trafficking. Their variance is explained in geopolitical terms, governance, the presence or absence of buffer zones, and the dominance of the security discourse.
In this introductory chapter, we provide an initial examination of the linkages between peaceful borders and the occurrence and proliferation of illicit transnational flows. We refer to several empirical examples, including the cases of the Northern Triangle in Central America, the Tri-Border Area of the Southern Cone of South America, the Colombian borders, and the Schengen open regime in Europe. In addition, we refer to the existing scholarship by clarifying several key concepts, stemming from five different bodies of literature: international peace, globalization, international borders, governance and “areas of limited statehood,” and the phenomena of transnational criminal organizations and terrorism.
In this chapter, we examine the links between peaceful borders among the Southeast Asian countries and the occurrence and proliferation of illicit transnational flows, especially with regard to drug trafficking, human trafficking and smuggling, and arms trafficking. Southeast Asia is the most stable and peaceful among the Asian regions. Regional peace in the Southeast Asian region, especially after 1991, has contributed to its phenomenal economic growth and development, which, in turn, has led to higher levels of integration. At the same time, expanding economic and infrastructure links around region have also facilitated the occurrence of illicit transnational flows, including transnational organized crime and terrorism. The issue of transnational crime addresses the question of national sovereignty. On the one hand, illicit transnational flows pose a threat to the national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of independent states.On the other hand, effective cooperation in combating transnational crime and terrorism requires a political decision by national governments to surrender some parts and pieces of their sovereignty. In this sense, the Southeast Asian countries have traditionally been strong defenders of the sanctity of national sovereignty and nonintervention.
In this concluding chapter, we delineate theoretical insights drawn from relevant comparisons among the case studies and suggest policy recommendations. Specifically, we reassess the three hypotheses, identify and map relevant patterns from the different case studies across several regions of the world, offer several policy recommendations based on these patterns, and draw some general conclusions. In addition to the observable patterns as related to type of borders, political and institutional arrangements, and political economy, in the perusal of the eleven case studies we identified two additional elements that further explain the reality of peaceful borders and illicit transnational flows: the geopolitical location of regions and subregions, as hubs for transnational illicit flows; and the legacy of civil and intermestic wars. In the last part of the chapter, we suggest several policy recommendations: (1) be aware of the normative dilemmas of human security; (2) increase cooperation and develop effective mechanisms of governance at all the possible levels; and (3) promote and prefer peace rather than war, but be aware of its potential unintended consequences.