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China has consistently striven toward economic growth at the expense of civil and political rights; however, China faces an impasse as its severe restrictions on civil and political rights threaten to damage its economic growth, a tension that is best illustrated by the environmental movement. With the advent of new technologies, the lack of transparency and public awareness that has allowed corruption to thrive is decreasing. As a result, China is beginning to accept that economic rights may be inextricably linked to environmental rights, and that it must sometimes yield to the latter in order to preserve the former. Specialized environmental courts, created by local courts to manage environmental unrest, are the perfect target for concrete reforms that, if successful, would improve the rule of law in China. Moreover, the centralization of local environmental courts may create the backdoor opportunity that the Central Communist Party needs to pierce local protectionism and advance its sincere interests in both protecting the environment and quelling visible unrest.
MgO thin films were deposited on silicon and sapphire substrates using ion-beam reactive sputtering. Films have been analyzed using x-ray diffraction, transmission electron microscopy, and atomic force microscopy. Highly oriented (100) MgO films have been obtained on Si (100) substrates. The in-plane orientation is predominantly [100]MgO//[100]Si, although a twist of up to ±10° between grains is observed. Epitaxial films of MgO were deposited on four different orientations of sapphire. The MgO film orientation was (111) on c-cut (0001) Al2O3 and exhibited double positioning boundaries in TEM analysis. On r-cut (1102) Al2O3, the MgO appeared to be oriented (730) with tilt and twist of ±2° between the grains. Epitaxial MgO films oriented (110) and (111) were obtained on m-cut (1010) and a-cut (1120) sapphire orientations, respectively. In-plane directions were extracted from TEM analysis on all the samples. Atomic force microscopy revealed fairly smooth MgO films on sapphire, varying from 0.35 nm average roughness for the MgO film on the m-cut substrate to 0.80 nm on the r-cut substrate.
Uniform CoSi2 surface layers 30nm thick have been realized through room temperature implantation of Co+ through a resist or an oxide mask and low temperature (600°C) annealing. TEM studies show that the surface layers are polycrystalline with large, uniformly thick grains. Resistivity values as low as 181µΩ-cm have been obtained. Surface layers of TiSi2 have also been synthesized using a similar process. The ease of formation, the low resistivity and the smooth interfaces of the CoSi2 and TiSi2 surface layers make this technique a promising candidate for contacting source and drain junctions in sub-half-micron CMOS processes.
Coalescence and microstructure of buried CoSi2 layers formed by 100 keV Co+ implantation at 350°C into Si(111) are studied. Doses ranged from 1×1016 to 1.6×l017 cm−2. The critical dose (dc) required to form a continuous layer is found to be the same, 1.1±0.1×l017 cm−2, in both (111) and (001) substrates, despite pronounced differences in precipitate morphology. Three types of precipitates are observed in Si(111) during the mesotaxial process: A–type (fully aligned), B0–type (twinned on the (111) plane parallel to the surface), and B1,2,3–type (twinned on one of the three (111) planes inclined to the surface). The fraction of each varies with both the implantation and annealing conditions. Formation of a continuous, twinned (B0–type), buried layer after 1000°C annealing is shown to be possible for the first time by this synthesis technique in samples implanted at dc.
We have explored the effects of ion beam irradiation on the electrical and structural properties of superconducting thin films of YBa2Cu3O7-δ. Damage created by nuclear energy loss processes degrades the superconducting transitions. In general, the onset temperatures do not vary significantly with ion fluence, but the transition widths broaden until the resistance no longer reaches zero. This behavior is strikingly similar to that observed in granular superconducting films where islands of superconductor are progressively decoupled from each other, destroying the phase coherence. Data from resistance measurements as well as from Rutherford Backscattering and channeling measurements suggest that ion bombardment is not changing the volume fraction of superconducting material substantially.
The 1965 debate between Lo Jui-ch'ing and Lin Piao over the question of priorities in national defence policy, which was prompted by the threatening situation created by the bombing of North Vietnam in February of that year, as well as hints appearing in 1969 during the more critical months of the Sino-Soviet border dispute, suggest that strong differences still exist amongst China's policy-makers as to whether priority should be accorded to quick-fix types of conventional defence or to establishing a sound economic and scientific-technological basis for the long-term development of China's national defence programme. This issue, which usually comes to the surface at a critical juncture in Chinese decision-making or in a crisis situation, is frequently difficult to identify since it may be indirectly expressed in other debates, no less real, regarding the emphasis to be accorded political as against military training, or over the best strategic defence for China. The interlocking nature of these issues cannot be ignored. Moreover, it is usually in the broad context of such debates that hints appear suggesting that China's political and military relationship with the Soviet Union remains a latent source of dissention within the Chinese leadership.
Peking's pronouncements in the Sino-Soviet dispute have left the public with an image of a reckless and bellicose Chinese Communist régime. This image has been reinforced by the Soviet Union, which has exaggerated the Chinese statements and their significance to paint an over-simplified contrast between the supposed Chinese addiction to war and Soviet dedication to peace.
The Chinese Communists, on coming to power, were confronted with a set of strategic problems totally new to them. No longer a mobile force operating from the countryside, they were after 1949 in control of cities, and were rapidly developing a vested interest in industrial complexes, communication centres, and transportation facilities. Although the Korean War awakened them to the importance of modernised, regular forces, the problem of decision-making in the field of military affairs was exacerbated and complicated by the revolution in weaponry and strategic thinking that had occurred outside China in the very period during which the Chinese Communists were gaining and consolidating their power.
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