This article provides an initial (partial) estimate of silver quantities held within China around mid-18th century, utilising archival evidence related to wealth confiscations. Better future estimates for overall Chinese silver holdings could also facilitate more accurate estimation of Chinese silver (legal plus illegal) imports. Similar analyses for other world regions could eventually yield estimates for global silver stock holdings, useful in turn for improving global silver mining and trade flow estimates. Extensive contraband silver mining and silver trade are known to have escaped official recordation, by definition. If methodologies suggested herein prove successful, then parallel non-silver-trade-good estimates could follow. Current exclusive focus upon production and trade flows should be reevaluated in the context of linkages with accumulations of goods (wealth components). Economic history could someday provide a prominent stage for the historical study of wealth holdings, thereby furnishing context for increasing wealth concentrations observable worldwide today.

In a recent issue of the European Review of Economic History (vol. 6, 2002, pp. 23–50), Kevin O'Rourke and Jeffrey Williamson dismiss claims by ‘World historians…[who] argue that globalisation is a phenomenon which stretches back several centuries, or even several millennia’ (p. 23). Rather, O'Rourke and Williamson insist that ‘[g]lobalisation did not begin 5,000 years ago, or even 500 years ago. It began in the early nineteenth century. In that sense, it is a very modern phenomenon’ (p. 47). O'Rourke and Williamson offer an explicit model of world trade that predicts specific outcomes; and they marshal empirical evidence to support their contention that there was no global economy until the early decades of the nineteenth century.

In this article we argue that Ming China had a fundamental impact on the rise and decline of the Spanish Empire. China's demand for silver was of such magnitude that private mining profits in the Spanish Empire remained high until about 1640. The decline of these profits led to abandon production. Spain faced a deepening financial crisis due to the fall of silver's value. The loss of purchasing power from the Crown's American enterprise was inevitable and the state's relentless pressure for increased taxation within Castile and elsewhere was mandatory in order to compensate for lost external purchasing power.

Segün ciertos autores, el capitalismo empezó a adquirir su forma moderna cuando los Estados del «Centro» de Europa occidental establecieron una hegemonía comercial en la economía mundial de los siglos XVI y XVII. El trabajo forzado de la «Periferia» (primordialmente Latinoamérica y Europa oriental) creaba excedentes económicos que eran posteriormente transferidos a Inglaterra, los Países Bajos y el norte de Francia. La labor de los que proponen dicha idea es, por consiguiente, descubrir y explicar la índole de este dilatado proceso. Los defensores más conocidos de esta interpretatión son André Gunder Frank e Immanuel Wallerstein. Frank sostiene que el actual subdesarrollo de los países pobres ha sido efecto del desarrollo económico de la «metropoli» (es decir, el Centro). Wallerstein añade la opinión complementaria de que el moderno desarrollo capitalista es imputable a muchos siglos de extractión del excedente de la Periferia.

Earl J. Hamilton's multiple theses on the price revolution, the decline of Spain, and the birth of capitalism have all placed American silver (and gold) at the forefront. This essay supports Hamilton's emphasis on the impact of New World treasure on the decline of Castile, but from a different angle. Mining profits rather than the quantity of imports supported the empire. When the profits dwindled, as was inevitable, international superiority was begrudgingly surrendered to the emerging powers of the north.