Given the widespread anxiety about popular prosperity it is easy to forget the huge benefits that economic growth has brought humanity. One staggering statistic gives some measure of the immense improvements over the past two centuries. In 1800 the average global life expectancy at birth was about 30 years. By 2000 it was nearly 67 years and rising (Riley 2001, p1) (see Figure 6.1 for increased life expectancy in the US over the past century). In other words the average human lifespan had more than doubled within two centuries.

If the statistics are probed further they become even more remarkable. The huge increase in average lifespan shows that the mass of humanity has benefited from greater prosperity. It is true that some may have benefited more than others – the average life expectancy of the rich is generally higher than that of the poor. But the bulk of the world’s population has benefited to a substantial extent from the rise of mass affluence.

It is also worth noting that the world’s population grew substantially at the same time as life expectancy was surging. Back in 1800 it was about one billion and by 2000 it was roughly six billion. At the time of writing it was heading towards seven billion. This jump in the world’s population, seen as a negative development by so many, is in fact another sign of advance. Not only can the world support many more people than in the past but it can sustain them all at a much higher standard of living. So the increase in humanity’s productive powers has brought enormous benefits to the world.

An ageing population – also often erroneously seen as a burden – is another sign of enormous progress. More than half of everyone born used to die before reaching adulthood (Riley 2001, p2). The pain of parents seeing their children die was a regular occurrence. Today the vast majority of babies grow up to be healthy adults and infant mortality rates are still falling. This success in quelling premature death, itself closely tied to the rise in prosperity, is the key reason why population has risen so fast. It should be a cause for celebration rather than a source of angst.

Growth may not provide all the answers but it is a precondition for successful development rather than simply one among many desirable objectives.

Growth scepticism is a highly conflicted outlook compared with the straightforward viewpoints of deep ecology or unambiguous support for economic progress. If growth scepticism were to be summed up in one phrase it would be “I’m in favour of growth but …”. The sceptics typically add some kind of caveat to their support for growth typically demanding it must be ‘sustainable’, ‘green’ or exhibit the right qualities.

One way to understand this outlook is as a conception of growth with limits. From this perspective growth is a reasonable goal until it runs up against some type of limit. These could be environmental, social or moral. Once these limits are reached the consequences of further growth are seen as damaging. The notion of limits is also implicit in other concepts favoured by growth sceptics including sustainability, overpopulation, overconsumption and the fear of an impending apocalypse. It is primarily in relation to this acceptance of the notion of limits that growth scepticism represents an indirect critique of growth, rather than the direct onslaught represented by deep green ideology.

The cumulative effect of all these supposed limits is to call the objective of growth into question and undermine society’s ability to achieve prosperity. Although growth remains as a formal goal of society it is viewed with intense anxiety. Growth is seen as bringing with it the danger of boom and bust. It is argued that for the benefit of future generations growth must be curbed.

In relation to the poorer countries of the world it is typically conceded that they need at least a moderate form of poverty reduction. The worst excesses of poverty should be curbed. But the idea that the poorer countries should strive to emulate western standards of living, a goal that was commonly supported in the 1950s and 1960s, is viewed as at least unrealistic and probably undesirable. At the same time the richer countries of the world are typically seen as suffering from problems of overdevelopment.

Duncan Green, head of policy at Oxfam GB, gave a classic formulation of the limits to growth in a summary of one of his talks: “if you want to maximise happiness … AND prevent catastrophic global warming, you need to make sure that incomes rise in the poor countries, but are steady or falling in the rich ones ie we need to ration growth – it’s just too precious (and dirty) to waste on the rich countries” (original emphasis) (Green 2009b).

My grandmother always wanted me to be rich but I was never interested. She was born in 1906 in London’s East End to Jewish parents who had recently emigrated from Eastern Europe. For her becoming prosperous meant her family escaping the poverty into which she was born. In the late 1970s and 1980s she identified strongly with Margaret Thatcher, then the UK’s Conservative leader and prime minister, as someone fighting to ensure that the self-made person got their just deserts.

In contrast, from my time at university in the early 1980s onwards I thought of myself as a person of the Left. I shared my grandmother’s sense of betterment but thought it was best achieved by social change rather than individual entrepreneurship. Although I was critical of much of what passed for left-wing politics, I held to the view that social inequality was unjust. I believed that the rich minority somehow exploited the mass of society. And I particularly resented the global division between rich and poor countries that left much of the world’s population, as I saw it, condemned to poverty.

Looking back on our heated rows many years ago I can see that something strange has happened. To the extent it is still possible to talk of the ‘Left’ it has given up on the struggle to make the mass of society more prosperous. On the contrary, most self-proclaimed radicals emphasise the need to impose limits on consumption and economic growth. For them, most of the population is addicted to rampant consumerism – it is plagued by ‘affluenza’, ‘luxury fever’ or ‘stuffitis’. Alternatively western policy-makers are said to suffer from a ‘growth fetish’. As a result we are facing a ‘shopocalypse’. To the extent that the critics are concerned about economic development it is restricted to alleviating the suffering of the poorest of the poor. Even then, such concerns are often framed in terms of stopping a descent into criminality or terrorism rather than seeing greater affluence as good in itself. If someone, such as myself, puts the case for popular prosperity we are often condemned as, at best, the dupes of corporate interests.

Characterising growth scepticism as an elite ideology raises as many questions as it answers. Why has the elite lost confidence in its own system? Why has it lost faith in the idea of economic progress? Why does it focus so much on the destabilising elements of the market while downplaying humanity’s ability to resolve problems?

If growth scepticism is also a mainstream perspective it raises the question of how it has permeated society so widely. No doubt most ordinary people want to improve their living standards but there is no concerted challenge to growth sceptic ideas. Why has the Left, which traditionally supported the rise of popular prosperity, itself internalised many green and growth sceptic ideas? Indeed many of the most ardent growth sceptics nowadays see themselves as radical or left wing.

There is no single factor which can answer all these questions. The rise of growth scepticism should be understood in relation to the interaction of several different elements. Some of these exist primarily on the level of politics and ideas while others relate to the changing structure of the economy. In isolation none of these factors would necessarily lead to the rise of a cynical view of growth. But in combination they have had that effect.

The political backdrop to the rise of growth scepticism is the fading of the idea of progress. It is not hard to see why the elite has lost faith in progress since the optimism of the Victorian era. The experience of the first half of the twentieth century in particular shook traditional conservative ideas: two world wars, the Great Depression, the rise of fascism and the Holocaust. These experiences combined to put the Right on the defensive.

But the Left too has become increasingly pessimistic. Despite the worst excesses of capitalism it has failed in its original goal of replacing the market with a different social system. With the end of the Cold War in 1989 it found itself even more marginalised. As a result of these defeats it has adopted many of the anti-human and anti-progress ideas of the elite it once despised.

Other factors have compounded social pessimism. The emergence of the ‘risk society’ has left the elite with a more anxious mindset than ever. Slowing economic growth in the West along with deindustrialisation have also contributed.

This chapter examines all these factors in more detail.

Growth scepticism is in many respects the opposite to what most of its supporters assume it to be. They typically see it as humane, egalitarian, radical, respectful of the environment and scornful of the obsession with consumption in western societies. But it is inhumane, elitist, conservative, misanthropic and more preoccupied with consumption than anything else.

If our great grandparents were alive today they would be astonished by our lack of gratitude. Many of the benefits of living in an affluent society, of which they could only dream, have been achieved by their descendents. We enjoy affluence, not only in terms of wealth itself but everything it has brought, including technology, mobility, advanced medical care and widespread access to education and culture. Yet we seem to take such achievements for granted or, even worse, deride them.

Of course saying that we have achieved a lot does not mean the world is perfect. Far from it. We still have a long way to go. Even the developed world has problems of scarcity. Many people in it remain relatively poor. We also need more prosperity to enable us to tackle future challenges such as paying for the pensions and health needs of ageing populations as well as responding to climate change.

In developing countries, which still constitute the vast majority of the world’s population, there is even more to do. Although in most cases their living standards have trended upwards there is still much to be done before they become developed. At a minimum they should have access to the same level of resources and technology that rich countries enjoy. There is no shortage of resources in an absolute sense to stop them achieving this objective. The most immediate problem is that much of the world has given up on the prospects of development in the sense of economic transformation. Poverty reduction is seen as the best that we can realistically hope for.

Solutions: rehabilitate progress

If our horizons are so low at present how can such an ambitious goal – the end of scarcity on a global basis – be achieved? There are certainly lessons to be learnt from the past. The key insights of Enlightenment thinkers, such as the link between material advance and social progress, should be rehabilitated. In that sense we should be doing our utmost to defend the legacy of the Enlightenment.

The above passage from America’s Declaration of Independence is perhaps the most famous quote ever written in relation to happiness. For many of today’s advocates of happiness as a key goal for individuals and public policy it proves that subjective well-being has long been a humanist goal. This is certainly the approach that Richard Layard, one of the UK’s foremost happiness advocates, takes: “The authors of the American Declaration of Independence had the right idea. This means that public policy should be judged by how it increases human happiness and reduces human misery” (Layard 2005b, pp224-5).

Layard goes on to argue that the Declaration supports his contention that happiness is clearly the supreme goal for humanity: “Happiness is that ultimate goal because, unlike all other goals, it is self-evidently good. If we are asked why happiness matters, we can give no further, external reason. It just obviously does matter” (Layard 2005b, p113).

This chapter argues that such an approach is ahistorical. Despite the common use of the word ‘happiness’ there are fundamental differences between the Enlightenment approach to happiness, as embodied in the Declaration of Independence, and the outlook of today’s growth sceptics. This chapter outlines the approach of the contemporary happiness movement before revealing its shortcomings. Most fundamentally it argues that the emphasis on happiness as the key goal for humanity is undesirable and conservative.

The happiness movement’s case: a central goal

To many people the central claim of the ‘happiness movement’ - the term used in this chapter for those who maintain that happiness should be a central goal of humanity – is unimpeachable. Sometimes they use alternative terms such as eudaimonia, flourishing, life satisfaction, subjective well-being or even just well-being. But whichever word they use they typically argue that personal contentment, rather than the accumulation of wealth, should be the over-riding goal for individuals and society.

It is certainly true that the developed world enjoys more abundance than earlier generations could imagine. It is also clear that many people feel dissatisfied with their lot and many are arguably obsessed with the acquisition of consumer goods.

Beware! The discussion of equality is one of the trickiest in economics and politics. Almost everyone claims to believe in some form of equality. Most of those who see themselves as conservatives would probably say they support equality of opportunity – even though that can be argued to lead to huge gaps between rich and poor. In contrast, those who define themselves as on the Left would generally bridle at the huge inequalities of wealth and income that characterise the contemporary world.

In broad terms there are two ways in which the contemporary discussion of inequality calls the benefits of growth into question. First, many of the participants in a largely statistical debate about income and wealth argue that economic growth widens inequalities. Typically they conclude that economic restraint is the solution, often arguing that those living in relatively rich countries should be prepared to make sacrifices. Such critics generally see the scope for raising the incomes of the poor as limited. Second, inequality can be redefined in terms of basic capabilities such as access to adequate nutrition, participation in society and self-respect. Poverty is then redefined as capability deprivation while moving towards equality of capabilities is seen as a desirable goal. In policy terms the conclusion drawn is that therapeutic governance is needed: intervention by the authorities in the personal lives of the poor to promote their well-being. Neither version of the critique of inequality sees economic transformation – poor countries becoming rich – as a realistic goal.

Several propositions are commonly made by growth sceptics in relation to the statistical debate about equality. First, living standards for a substantial section of the world’s population were declining even before the global economic crisis hit in 2008. Second, the gap between rich and poor has widened since the 1970s. Most experts would agree that international inequalities have widened enormously since about 1800 with the ‘Great Divergence’ that followed the onset of the Industrial Revolution; the debate focuses on what has happened in more recent decades. Finally, it is commonly argued that inequalities need to be narrowed. This latter claim often coincides with a demand that development should be seen in supposedly broader terms such as ‘human development’ rather than focusing on growth. The two statistical claims are essentially about the facts of poverty and inequality which can involve detailed debate.

Here is the good news. Over the medium and longer term the approximately seven billion inhabitants of the earth are living longer, healthier and more prosperous lives than at any time in history. We are, on average, living to an older age than ever before while infant mortality is down. It has become mercifully rare, at least in the developed world, for parents to suffer the pain of seeing their children die before them. In addition, the average age for the onset of chronic disease is up while many diseases have been totally eradicated or at least their onset delayed. Overall working hours are down over the long term while the type of work we do, involving less physical exertion, is less exhausting. We are better educated and the long-term trend is for us to have far more leisure time than in the past. We are also more mobile and connected thanks to technology such as cars, planes and mobile phones.

None of this could have happened without concerted global economic growth since the early nineteenth century. The resulting rise in prosperity has enabled the resources for the quality of life to rise considerably. Not only do we have far more material possessions – which is a good thing in itself – but mass affluence is closely linked to other forms of progress. It has provided a foundation for enormous advances in science, technology and medicine. It has allowed for vast improvement in the physical infrastructure including spectacular bridges, canals and skyscrapers. Connections to a clean water supply, sewerage systems and an electricity supply are taken for granted. The average supermarket provides a range and quality of food that earlier generations, who typically lived on the edge of starvation, would have found hard even to dream of. The benefits of culture, from museums and galleries to books and music, are widely available rather than the preserve of a tiny elite.

Of course the world is far from perfect. There are still massive social inequalities. The gap between the rich countries and the poorest ones remains enormous and even within the developed world there is a clear divide. But even among the poorest section of society things are getting better. For example, infant mortality in developing countries fell from 180 per thousand live births in 1950 to 60 per thousand live births at the turn of the century (Krueger 2006).

To understand the fundamental ambivalence of growth scepticism it helps to contrast it against more straightforward views. Although growth scepticism has become the orthodoxy it is certainly not the only conception of economic progress. On one pole are the staunch advocates of economic growth. Such people, including myself, see growth as a pre-condition for solving many of society’s key problems. On the opposite pole are what I call the deep greens. By this I mean the outlook, upheld by a small minority of growth’s critics, which is explicitly and unambiguously anti-growth. It includes hard core environmentalists as well as supporters of degrowth, steady state economics and post-development. In addition, some mainstream thinkers occasionally lapse into deep green formulations – in what I refer to as ‘outbursts’. This chapter examines explicitly positive and negative views of growth in turn. The next chapter then examines the views of the more ambivalent critics who can be classified as growth sceptics.

Growth and the idea of progress

Support for growth as an integral part of broader social progress characterised the Enlightenment and its followers. The importance was probably first recognised during the late eighteenth century in Britain and France. Enlightenment was characterised by the belief that through the application of reason and science it was possible for humanity to move society forward. Rising prosperity was closely tied to this belief. Adam Smith (1723-90), a prominent representative of the Enlightenment in Scotland, was one of the early advocates of this view. Although the intense optimism of the late eighteenth century did not last, the prevailing outlook until the 1970s was one of widespread support for growth.

However, anyone who examines the work of the classical economic writers is likely to be struck by the absence of economic growth as an explicit concept: for example, neither Adam Smith nor David Ricardo (1772-1823) use the term in their key works. It would be easy for the casual reader to conclude – although a mistake – that they were uninterested in the subject.

Contemporary followers of economics are so used to concepts such as gross domestic product (GDP), and corresponding statistics, that they are not attuned to the language used in the discussions from an earlier era. It is hardly surprising that Smith or Ricardo do not mention GDP since the concept did not emerge until the 1920s and 1930s (Collins 2000, p32).

One of the main charges against economic growth is that it necessarily damages the environment. Environmentalists frequently argue that increased affluence must harm the natural world. In their view it means the depletion of natural resources, an increase in pollution. A rising population is said to compound such problems.

An alternative version of the same nightmare is that even if environmental problems are not immediately apparent they are likely to emerge in the future. The discussion of climate change is perhaps the clearest example of what could be called the precautionary attack on growth. The aim of this chapter is to rebut all these charges.

To an extent such criticisms can be countered by the facts. The evidence shows the environment has improved since the onset of the Industrial Revolution as humanity has become more prosperous and more numerous. Richer societies are generally less polluted and more healthy than poor ones. The potential threats to the environment, such as the dangers posed by climate change, also tend to be over-stated. Even where serious problems exist, the capacity of humanity to find solutions is generally underestimated.

But the facts alone, while important, are not enough to counter the environmentalist worldview. One of the characteristic features of environmentalism is that it is remarkably impervious to factual refutation. If a particular argument is shown to be wrong, advocates of environmentalism typically modify the terms of debate. For this reason it is also necessary to critically examine the environmentalist conception of the relationship between humanity and nature. At the root of the problem, it will be argued, is the environmentalist view of humans as part of the natural world. Some go even further to argue that the trend for humanity to increase its control over nature is essentially evil. Either way both confuse transient limits that might exist at a particular time – such as the level of agricultural productivity or the amount of oil reserves currently available – with eternal natural limits.

Growth scepticism takes such an ambivalent view of economic growth because it is subject to contradictory forces. On the one hand, there are fundamental economic and political imperatives behind the support for economic growth in market-based economies. On the other hand, there are deep-seated reasons why growth is being called into question in contemporary society. The more fundamental reasons for today’s anxiety about growth are explored in the next chapter. This section confines itself to examining why, from a political perspective, it is difficult to launch a direct onslaught on growth.

From an economic perspective market economies are based on the need for economic growth. In capitalist societies such expansion primarily takes the form of a drive for profits. Companies stand or fall in a competitive battle with their peers. Countries become more prosperous and more influential depending on the dynamism of their economies in aggregate.

When economic growth stalls or even goes into reverse, as it did in 2008-09, it can cause enormous dislocation. Many firms can go out of business and the integrity of the whole economic system can be called into question. There is also the potential for social dislocation with unemployment rising and living standards stagnating.

The possibility of unrest points to the political imperative behind the need for economic growth. Democracies depend in large part for their legitimacy on their ability to provide rising living standards. Although politicians occasionally call for austerity at times of economic crisis they are usually reluctant to do so and cautious about framing their arguments. Sustained cuts in living standards are normally only accepted in times of war or enforced at the expense of curbing political freedoms.

So, even from a political perspective alone, it is difficult to launch direct attacks on economic growth and prosperity in democratic societies. Few individuals are likely to accept the argument put forward by hard core environmentalist thinkers such as Jared Diamond and John Gray that humans were literally better off in the Stone Age. Instead the call is made for society to re-evaluate its understanding of growth. This notion was promoted as far back as 1972 at the UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm: “The concept of ‘no growth’ could not be a viable policy for any society, but it was necessary to rethink the traditional concepts of the basic purposes of growth” (UNEP 1972).