Gungunyane, paramount chief of the Shangana of Gazaland, 1884–95, was a very shrewd diplomat. A study of his diplomacy with Europeans suggests that his major goal was Shangana independence of action. From the beginning of his reign, Gungunyane was pressured to give concessions in both economic and political spheres. His capital was on the edge of the Rhodesian plateau until mid-1889, when the chief moved a large portion of his people as well as his capital southward to the Limpopo valley, Mozambique. This significant dislocation influenced later negotiations with Portugal. Although the chief was a strong personality, he was subject to pressures from his immediate—and in this case, warlike—African advisors. In negotiations with the British South Africa Company, the Mozambique Company and the Portuguese government, the African leader enjoyed the benefits of a fearful military reputation, a wide-reaching espionage system, and conflicts between British and Portuguese concession-seekers. A master of playing both ends against the middle to maintain his freedom of movement, Gungunyane found, nevertheless, that his diplomatic programme was undermined by Portuguese superiority in the use of firearms, disunity among the Shangana and their tributaries, and growing social disintegration caused by alcoholism, emigration, and European encroachment. His final military defeat by Portuguese forces in 1895 was not a true index of his talent as an African diplomat.

High-dielectric constant (high-κ) oxide growth on hexagonal-GaN (on sapphire) is examined for potential use in enhancement-mode metal oxide semiconductor field effect transistor (MOSFET). Enhancement-mode MOSFET devices (ns > 4×1013 cm−2) offer significant performance advantages, such as greater efficiency and scalability, as compared to heterojunction field effect transistor (HFET) devices for use in high power and high frequency GaN-based devices. High leakage current and current collapse at high drive conditions suggests that the use of a high-κ insulating layer is principle for enhancement-mode MOSFET development. In this work, rare earth oxides (Sc, La, etc.) are explored due to their ideal combination of permittivity and high band gap energy. However, a substantial lattice mismatch (9-21%) between the rare earth oxides and the GaN substrate results in mid-gap defect state densities and growth dislocations. The epitaxial growth of the rare earth oxides by molecular beam epitaxy (MBE) on native oxide passivated-GaN is examined in an effort to minimize these growth related defects and other growth-related limitations. Growth of the oxide on GaN is characterized analytically by RHEED, XRD, and XPS. Preliminary MOS electrical analysis of a 50 Å La2O3 on GaN shows superior leakage performance as compared to significantly thicker Si3N4 dielectric.

I would like to thank the Subcommittee for inviting me to testify before it on the subject of Angola.

In this presentation I shall make six major points. Briefly, and in summary, they are the following: one, the historical record in Angola, both remote and recent, suggests that there are deep roots to the current political fragmentation and conflict in that country and that, even under good conditions, political unity and stable government will be difficult to establish. Two, the Alvor Agreement, signed on January 15, 1975, between Portugal and the three major Angolan nationalist parties is, on paper, a masterful piece of diplomacy and compromise; its provisions should be studied and enforced.

Since Waldemar Nielsen published his generous, unheeded and ultimately wrong prediction, much has happened in southern Africa and in the United States. In southern Africa, with the exception of the situation in Portuguese-speaking Africa, little has changed and American policy has remained largely as Nielsen then described it. Since the April 25, 1974 coup in Lisbon which overthrew the New State dictatorship, remarkable changes have begun to occur in Portugal and in her African territories: Portugal has granted independence to Guinea-Bissau (September 12), and has pledged independence to Angola and to Mozambique at an undetermined future date and in a manner as yet to be clearly explicated. But American policy toward Portugal and toward the territories it still controls in southern Africa maintains extreme caution. Our policy has remained rather passive, unimaginative, in want of innovation and, it seems, replete with compromises. In short, present American policy here appears to lack any clear conceptual basis or purpose.

War and military institutions have played a crucial part in the history of Angola. Colonial wars, auxiliary armies, expeditions, and soldiergovernors fill the pages of this history, and it is no exaggeration to recall that military expenses have, except for some years during 1930–58, represented the major item in annual budgets since the sixteenth century, when the Portuguese began to conquer the Luanda hinterland. The character and role of the armed forces in Angola, however, have undergone changes: especially since 1961, new developments promise possibly important influences on future events in that territory, events which may not follow traditional patterns in history.