History as we know it (I mean historiography, the writing of history) may in a very real sense be said to have been invented by the Greeks, and it was a creation of the fifth century B.c. The earliest historian whose works we possess–indeed, the earliest of all historians in the proper sense–is Herodotus of Halicarnassus, who wrote during the third quarter of the fifth century; and the greatest of all Greek historians, Thucydides the Athenian, wrote in the next generation, roughly in the last thirty years of the fifth century.

According to two recent books, there is no evidence that political pay was given by any Greek city other than Athens; and one of them goes further and asserts positively that, ‘lacking imperial resources, no other city imitated the Athenian pattern.’ Since the book from which the quotation has been made is likely to become a ‘standard work’, it is desirable to make two points clear. First, there is explicit evidence for political pay elsewhere than at Athens: at Rhodes, in the fourth century B.C. and perhaps for some centuries thereafter, and at Iasus in Caria in at any rate the third century B.C. And secondly, no careful reader of Aristotle's Politics can doubt that by at least the 330s B.C. political pay, for attending the courts or the Assembly or both, had been introduced in quite a number of Greek democracies, even if Aristotle mentions specifically only Athens and Rhodes.

I begin with the central fact about Christian origins: that although the earliest surviving Christian documents are in greek and although Christianity spread from city to city in the graeco-roman world, its Founder lived and preached almost entirely outside the area of graeco-roman civilisation proper; the world in which he was active was not at all that of the polis (the city) but the very different world of the chōra (the countryside). This may require some explanation.

This rather miscellaneous category is a fairly straightforward one and need not detain us long. Its distinguishing feature is that the trials comprised in it are not to be thought of as having been transferred to Athens from other cities where they might have been expected to take place, but were from their very nature triable only at Athens and nowhere else. They can be divided up in various ways. One possible method of classification would be to distinguish between trials which were essentially administrative decisions (appeals against assessments of tribute, for example) and those which were criminal prosecutions, whether of individuals or of cities collectively. (In the whole category we are now considering, it must be remembered, there are no cases which we should have called ‘civil’ as opposed to ‘criminal’.

No satisfactory treatment of the whole subject of jurisdiction in the Athenian Empire of the fifth century B.C. yet exists, and in this paper I make no attempt to provide a complete account. My purpose is twofold: to deal in some detail with certain specific problems, and to demonstrate that the most fruitful method of approach to the whole subject—perhaps, indeed, the only one which can reduce it to order–is to divide it up under three particular headings and to treat each of these separately. Only Part I will be included in the present issue of this journal; Parts II and III, with a brief Conclusion, will appear in a later issue.

The ‘Great’ Persecution, of the years 303 to 312/3, requires thorough reconsideration. This paper will discuss certain features of the persecution, and, without attempting to present a complete picture, will suggest some modifications in the received view.