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Upon the revelation of corporate misconduct by firms in their portfolios, institutional investors experience a significant discount in the market value of their portfolios, excluding misconduct firms, creating a short-term spillover that averages $92.7 billion losses per year. We examine an expansive set of channels under which this spillover to nontarget firms can occur, and find that it reflects the loss of the embedded value of monitoring by a common institutional owner, enforcement wave activity, and industry peer and business relationships. Institutional investors also experience a significant abnormal outflow of funds in the year following the misconduct event.
Reduction of seed-bank persistence is an important goal for weed management systems. Recent interest in more biological-based weed management strategies has led to closer examination of the role of soil microorganisms. Incidences of seed decay with certain weed species occur in the laboratory; however, their persistence in soil indicates the presence of yet-unknown factors in natural systems that regulate biological mechanisms of seed antagonism by soil microorganisms. A fundamental understanding of interactions between seeds and microorganisms will have important implications for future weed management systems targeting seed banks. Laboratory studies demonstrate susceptibility to seed decay among weed species, ranging from high (velvetleaf) to very low (giant ragweed). Microscopic examinations revealed dense microbial assemblages formed whenever seeds were exposed to soil microorganisms, regardless of whether the outcome was decay. Microbial communities associated with seeds of four weed species (woolly cupgrass, jimsonweed, Pennsylvania smartweed, and velvetleaf) were distinct from one another. The influence of seeds on microbial growth is hypothesized to be due to nutritional and surface-attachment opportunities. Data from velvetleaf seeds suggests that diverse assemblages of bacteria can mediate decay, whereas fungal associations may be more limited and specific to weed species. Though microbial decay of seeds presents clear opportunities for weed biocontrol, limited success is met when introducing exogenous microorganisms to natural systems. Alternatively, a conservation approach that promotes the function of indigenous natural enemies through habitat or cultural management may be more promising. A comprehensive ecological understanding of the system is needed to identify methods that enhance the activities of microorganisms. Herein, we provide a synthesis of the relevant literature available on seed microbiology; we describe some of the major challenges and opportunities encountered when studying the in situ relationships between seeds and microorganisms, and present examples from studies by the ARS Invasive Weed Management Unit.
Paramphistomoids are ubiquitous and widespread digeneans that infect a diverse range of definitive hosts, being particularly speciose in ruminants. We collected adult worms from cattle, goats and sheep from slaughterhouses, and cercariae from freshwater snails from ten localities in Central and West Kenya. We sequenced cox1 (690 bp) and internal transcribed region 2 (ITS2) (385 bp) genes from a small piece of 79 different adult worms and stained and mounted the remaining worm bodies for comparisons with available descriptions. We also sequenced cox1 and ITS2 from 41 cercariae/rediae samples collected from four different genera of planorbid snails. Combining morphological observations, host use information, genetic distance values and phylogenetic methods, we delineated 16 distinct clades of paramphistomoids. For four of the 16 clades, sequences from adult worms and cercariae/rediae matched, providing an independent assessment for their life cycles. Much work is yet to be done to resolve fully the relationships among paramphistomoids, but some correspondence between sequence- and anatomically based classifications were noted. Paramphistomoids of domestic ruminants provide one of the most abundant sources of parasitic flatworm biomass, and because of the predilection of several species use Bulinus and Biomphalaria snail hosts, have interesting linkages with the biology of animal and human schistosomes to in Africa.
In this paper, we examine how stock option usage affects total corporate payout. Using fixed-effects panel data estimators on various samples of ExecuComp firms from 1993 to 2005, we find the higher the executive stock options, the lower the total payout, ceteris paribus. We also find some evidence that firms increase payouts through repurchases in order to offset earnings per share dilution that occurs due to usage of executive and non-executive stock options. However, incentives from not having dividend protection for options appear to dominate those from antidilution, resulting in lower total payout for firms with higher options usage.
We examine the penalties imposed on the 585 firms targeted by SEC enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation from 1978–2002, which we track through November 15, 2005. The penalties imposed on firms through the legal system average only $23.5 million per firm. The penalties imposed by the market, in contrast, are huge. Our point estimate of the reputational penalty—which we define as the expected loss in the present value of future cash flows due to lower sales and higher contracting and financing costs—is over 7.5 times the sum of all penalties imposed through the legal and regulatory system. For each dollar that a firm misleadingly inflates its market value, on average, it loses this dollar when its misconduct is revealed, plus an additional $3.08. Of this additional loss, $0.36 is due to expected legal penalties and $2.71 is due to lost reputation. In firms that survive the enforcement process, lost reputation is even greater at $3.83. In the cross section, the reputation loss is positively related to measures of the firm's reliance on implicit contracts. This evidence belies a widespread belief that financial misrepresentation is disciplined lightly. To the contrary, reputation losses impose substantial penalties for cooking the books.
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