This chapter begins with a brief review of the history of virtue science. It went out of favor in psychology for most of the twentieth century, but after renewed interest in philosophy in the latter part of that century, virtue research has burgeoned in psychology in the twenty-first century. The interest in virtue research is partly due to the positive psychology movement, which focuses on human strengths and well-being. Despite its valuable contribution, three elements of positive psychology have continued to plague virtue research as it is atheoretical, conceptualized as a diagnostic scheme, and ambivalent about values and morality. Nevertheless, virtue science is off to a good beginning, boasting scores of empirical studies. Most virtue scientists have left the ill-conceived notion of “diagnosing” virtues behind. These studies remain siloed and noncumulative due to the absence of clear theory in virtue science and a tendency to neglect conceptualizing virtues. Virtue research also remains limited by its ambivalence toward values and morality. To remedy this fragmentation, this chapter proposes the STRIVE-4 Model, with its clear conceptualization of virtues and the dozens of hypotheses that follow from it. This model provides a way to build a unified and cumulative virtue science.

The book concludes with a discussion of the ways that virtue science can influence the discipline of psychology. First, it reiterates that virtue science is off to a good start. The success of virtue science calls the fact–value dichotomy into question because scientifically studying virtues is deeply imbued with value commitments. Virtue science is more interdisciplinary than psychology, and the value of working across disciplinary lines in virtue science recommends greater interdisciplinarity among psychologists. This interdisciplinarity in virtue science has helped to clarify the many philosophical contentions that tend to be ignored by psychologists or just built in as contentious assumptions. The STRIVE-4 Model clarifies how much improved conceptualization can enhance a research area, suggesting that psychology, as a discipline, can benefit from more systematic theory. Virtue science also calls for improved research, especially person-centered research and transcending self-report measures. Finally, virtue science calls for the recognition of the centrality of the aspiration to live well as human beings. Greater attention to this core aim can help psychologists to be much clearer and more direct about their objectives.

This chapter discusses the contextualization of human traits in situations. Most of the research on contextualizing traits has, up to now, been centered on personality traits. Therefore, much of the examination is on how personality traits relate to situations, but it extrapolates those findings to virtues and discusses theory and research related to the contextualization of virtue traits. In the exploration of trait contextualization, the chapter clarifies that current understandings of traits do not take them to be simplistic behavioral tendencies that manifest despite contextual influences. Instead, the contemporary understanding of traits is that they are virtually always influenced by situational factors. It explores direct situational influence on action, the ways individuals influence situations, and three types of person–situation interactions. It then presents practical wisdom as a generally neglected feature of person-situation interactions. The chapter argues that practical wisdom's role in person–situation interactions goes beyond what shows up in personality research by clarifying that some individuals see more opportunities for virtue trait expression in situations than others. Moreover, this practical wisdom underwrites high-quality decision-making. It concludes by discussing how a virtue perspective adds important elements (agency, aspiration, and practical wisdom) to the contextualization of traits.

Empirical virtue researchers have not generally relied on robust virtue theory. Without a unifying theory of virtue, scientific studies have developed without guidance, and the result is a patchwork of relatively disconnected studies of specific virtues based on ad hoc assumptions about those virtues. Therefore, this chapter presents an ecumenical, realistic virtue theory as a conceptual foundation for empirical research in virtue science. It suggests that moral virtues are (1) acquired traits that are (2) manifested in behavior, (3) steered by knowledge, and (4) fully motivated. The virtue theory presented is inspired by philosophic work (primarily Aristotle and Confucius), but it does not engage in the contentious debates active in philosophical approaches to virtue, leaving aside the debates about the nature and importance of ideal human virtue and focusing on the ordinary virtues that are often ascribed to people who are morally good. We also discuss the important role of culture in virtue definition. Finally, we outline the four components of virtue: (1) behavior, (2) cognition, (3) emotion/motivation, and (4) practical wisdom.

The introduction asks the question of why social scientists should study virtues empirically. It offers five reasons: (1) humans are moral animals, (2) moral behavior can be understood as an expression of acquired traits, (3) it is psychologically realistic to think that ordinary humans can acquire and express virtue traits, (4) moral education is valuable, and (5) virtues are often taken to be essential to a good life. The Introduction then addresses three challenges that virtue scientists must face: (1) the absence of empirically oriented virtue theory, (2) the overreliance of simple survey design in psychology, and (3) virtue skeptics. The Introduction concludes with an outline of the chapters of the book and how these chapters comprise the sections of the book.

This chapter considers what role virtue science can play in moral philosophy. The question is, how much can and should virtue science influence what moral philosophers do? It considers three positions: (1) the strong division position that suggests that virtue science is irrelevant to moral philosophy; (2) the strong constraint position that suggests that virtue science constrains moral philosophy; and (3) the view that virtue science can serve as an important domain for catalyzing the practical value of moral philosophy. The chapter outlines each position and provides reasons for it. It also argues that the two strong positions are incompatible with the work that many normative philosophers do. Finally, it argues that the more moderate catalyst position suggests that, for many, but not all, normative ethicists, the results of virtue science can facilitate the practical aims of their work, and that they should attend and contribute to virtue science.

This chapter discusses the field of moral development and explores what this research field can tell us about virtue development, which is a relatively neglected topic in virtue theory. The chapter is primarily about moral development in children, both because there is substantial scientific interest in this population and because virtue development must begin in childhood. Moral development research illuminates three apparently naturally developing preconditions for virtue development: (1) the ability to choose, (2) an interest in collective welfare, and (3) an interest in ethical normativity. Moral development research is also compatible with the STRIVE-4 Model in that it is primarily quantitative. Moral development generally does not focus on traits, with the exception of some research on moral identity, moral emotions, and moral exemplars. The chapter concludes by exploring how virtue science can contribute to moral development research, including an increased emphasis on (1) person-centered research, (2) the contextualizing of development in situations and roles, (3) flourishing, and (4) practical wisdom.

This chapter begins an in-depth discussion of the proposed STRIVE-4 Model. It focuses on the S (scalar) and T (trait) of the model. To demonstrate that virtues can be captured in a scalar manner, It highlights studies that support the reliability and validity of constructs. Virtues such as courage, gratitude, and compassion have all been established as scalar constructs and have been related to a variety of expected well-being outcomes. The chapter further highlights empirical evidence showing that virtues cannot be subsumed by personality research or social desirability, and that informant reports further confirm researchers’ ability to capture scalar virtues. To highlight empirical work on virtues as traits, it discusses the value of intensive longitudinal studies. These studies demonstrate between-person variability and within-person consistency to support the hypothesis that virtues are traits. Finally, the chapter closes by discussing some challenges of virtue assessment, including Aristotle’s assertion of the golden mean and how to understand vice traits. Altogether, the evidence favors assessing virtues as scalar traits. It suggests it is time for researchers to advance virtue science with more sophisticated methods.