Duncan Black, like Adam Smith before him, was trained at, and taught at, the University of Glasgow. Like Smith, Black followed the Enlightenment in appreciating the importance of theory and of its empirical applications. Black sought to apply the ideas of a schedule of preferences and a conception of equilibrium, to politics, as Smith had done in economics. Black believed that his median voter theorem could generalize to a theory of politics, much as Smith’s contributions did for market economics. Black did not complete that generalization, but William Riker did offer a theory of institutional politics, designed to complete Black’s project.

Arthur Pigou’s welfare treatises are exercises in practical ethics. The exercises were founded on the ethical concepts of good and economic welfare with the economist’s national dividend providing the practical instrument for solving economic problems. This paper follows this triad from its origins in Pigou’s earliest writings on ethics and economic policy, into the welfare treatises, and onto his last writings—a period of around fifty years.

This special issue is devoted to original articles that reflect recent progress in one of the most exciting developments in Political Science, the National Science Foundation's (NSF) initiative called Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM). This initiative reflects the ideas and hard work of the Political Science team there, Jim Granato and Frank Scioli, backed up by the contributions of an EITM panel that assembled at NSF in July 2001, some of whose observations we mention below. The challenge set by the EITM program is straightforward: to improve our theoretical work so that it yields more testable hypotheses and to improve our methodological work so that testing is made more effective and informative about theories. It is hard to object to this, but it also turns out to be hard to meet fully. The EITM initiative contains several components designed to close the gap between theoretical derivation and empirical test. This issue represents one component, presenting some of the most innovative work in the discipline on the current research frontier in EITM.

Embedding experiments within surveys has reinvigorated survey research. Several survey experiments are generally embedded within a survey, and analysts treat each of these experiments as self-contained. We investigate whether experiments are self-contained or if earlier treatments affect later experiments, which we call “experimental spillover.” We consider two types of bias that might be introduced by spillover: mean and inference biases. Using a simple procedure, we test for experimental spillover in two data sets: the 1991 Race and Politics Survey and a survey containing several experiments pertaining to foreign policy attitudes. We find some evidence of spillover and suggest solutions to avoid bias.

In this article, we challenge the conclusion that the preferences of members of Congress are best represented as existing in a low-dimensional space. We conduct Monte Carlo simulations altering assumptions regarding the dimensionality and distribution of member preferences and scale the resulting roll call matrices. Our simulations show that party polarization generates misleading evidence in favor of low dimensionality. This suggests that the increasing levels of party polarization in recent Congresses may have produced false evidence in favor of a low-dimensional policy space. However, we show that focusing more narrowly on each party caucus in isolation can help researchers discern the true dimensionality of the policy space in the context of significant party polarization. We re-examine the historical roll call record and find evidence suggesting that the low dimensionality of the contemporary Congress may reflect party polarization rather than changes in the dimensionality of policy conflict.

Duverger’s Law suggests that two parties will dominate under first-past-the-post (FPTP) within an electoral district, but the law does not necessarily establish two-party competition at the national level. United States is unique among FPTP countries in having the only durable and nearly pure, two-party system. Following this observation, we answer two questions. First, what contributes to the same two parties competing in districts all across the country and at different levels of office? Second, why is the US two-party system so durable over time, dominated by the same two parties? That is, “Why two parties?” As an answer, we propose the APP: ambition, the presidency, and policy. The presidency with its national electorate and electoral rules that favor two-party competition establishes two national major parties, which frames the opportunity structure that influences party affiliation decisions of ambitious politicians running for lower offices. Control over the policy agenda helps reinforce the continuation of a particular two-party system in equilibrium by blocking third parties through divergence on the main issue dimension and the suppression of latent issue dimensions that could benefit new parties. The confluence of the three factors explains why the United States is so uniquely a durable two-party system.

The People’s Republic of China’s dramatic transformation has not only benefited its people, but has also led it to become a major player in the world. Here we examine how deeply perceptions of China have penetrated into the public’s perceptions in a wide variety of nations around the world – the US, 11 nations in East Asia, and 22 in Latin America. We ask a series of questions: how much do people know? How do Americans evaluate China? And how do publics in East Asia and Latin America view China’s influence in their nations and around the world? We also examine some of the ways in which perceptions vary, both across nations and within nations, such as by partisanship. In addition, we report the results of an experiment using an advertisement the PRC ran in the US to assess how successful they were in shaping public opinion about China. We conclude that our studies, and those of others, provide a strong baseline for assessing the effect of an emerging superpower on citizens around the world.

This address asks how we got to today’s politics in America; a politics of polarized political parties engaged in close political competition in a system of checks and balances. The result has often been divided control of government and an apparent inability to address major political problems. This address develops the historical foundation for these characteristics. Historically, the Founding period set the stage of separated powers and the first party system. America developed a market economy, a middle class, and a mass-based set of parties in the Antebellum period. Through the Progressive era, nation-wide reforms led to a more democratic but increasingly candidate-centered politics in the North, and the establishment of Jim Crow politics in the South. The post-War period saw the full development of candidate-centered elections. While the breakup of Jim Crow due to the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts in the mid-1960s ended Jim Crow and made possible a competitive party system in the South, the later was delayed until the full implementation of the Republican’s “southern strategy” in 1980 and beyond. This set in motion the partisan polarization of today, to combine with separated powers to create what many refer to as the “current” political “dysfunction.”

This paper treats the theory of identification presented in Haavelmo's classic work, The Probability Approach in Econometrics. This was the first identification theory for stochastic models to be developed in econometrics. The paper presents a detailed commentary on Haavelmo's analysis. It also examines the development of Haavelmo's theory from Frisch's analysis of multicollinearity and also the relationship between Haavelmo's analysis and later work on identification.

The current method for selecting presidential nominees by the twomajor parties went into place mostly in 1972 and certainly by 1976,after Buckely v. Valeo. It was the naturalculmination of reform efforts over the history of the republic inthat, while prior reforms consistently invoked greater openness anddemocratic governance as rationales for their adoption, this methodactually empowered voters as the central figures in determining whowould be nominated (see Aldrich 1987). This fact became fully evident almost at once.The selection via primaries of senator George McGovern in 1972 andgovernor Jimmy Carter in 1976 as the Democratic presidentialnominees arguably not only would not have happened, they would nothave even come close to winning nomination without successful appealto the voting public.

Torrens [in 1815] clearly preceded Ricardo [in 1817] in publishing a fairly satisfactory formulation of the doctrine [of comparative costs]. It is unquestionable, however that Ricardo is entitled to the credit for first giving due emphasis to the doctrine, for first placing it an appropriate setting, and for obtaining general acceptance for it by economists.

The Israeli election for Prime Minister in 1999 featured five candidates. Three, including a major, centrally located candidate, Yitzhak Mordechai, withdrew from competition during the two days before the voting. Mordechai withdrew in large measure in reaction to the strategic decisions of voters, that is, some voters who favored him deserted his candidacy as his poll standings declined. We use surveys conducted during the 1999 campaign to estimate models of strategic voting behavior based on the multicandidate calculus of voting. We find that strategic voting in the Israeli, majority-with-runoff electoral system closely resembled the level and nature of strategic voting found in the more nearly pure plurality systems for which the statistical models were originally developed. The result is support for the reasoning Mordechai provided for his decision, illustrating the interlocking nature of strategic decisions between candidates and voters.

David Mayhew's two wonderful essays that constitute Congress: The Electoral Connection have withstood the test of time admirably well. My thoughts will be organized around two quotations taken from his book, because they reflect the two most remarkable aspects of the book's success: its impact on scholarship over its first quarter-century, and its durable portrait that suggest it will continue to resonate—perhaps with amendment—over the coming years and decades.

One-half century ago, V. O. Key, Jr., published his masterpiece, Southern Politics in State and Nation. Key's analysis of the failure of democracy in the South must count as one of the great achievements of our discipline. His explanation is rich and complex. Certainly the anti-liberal basis of society in the mid-twentieth-century South was crucial—“Whatever phase of the southern political process one seeks to understand, sooner or later the trail of inquiry leads to the Negro,” he wrote (1984[1949], 5). But it was not only that the South was an illiberal society, what really mattered was that the South was also non-democratic.