While consonant acquisition clearly requires mastery of different articulatory configurations (segments), sub-segmental features and suprasegmental contexts influence both order of acquisition and mismatch (error) patterns (Bérubé, Bernhardt, Stemberger & Ciocca, 2020). Constraints-based nonlinear phonology provides a comprehensive framework for investigating the impact of sub- and suprasegmental impacts on acquisition (Bernhardt & Stemberger, 1998). The current study adopted such a framework in order to investigate these questions for Granada Spanish. Single-word samples of monolingual preschoolers in Granada (29 typically developing; 30 with protracted phonological development) were transcribed by native Spanish speakers in consultation with an international team. Beta regression analyses showed significant effects of age, developmental group, and word structure variables (word length, stress, position of consonants and syllables within the word); salience, markedness and/or frequency across the phonological hierarchy accounted for many patterns. The study further demonstrates the impacts of sub- and suprasegmental constraints of the phonological system on consonant acquisition.

Developmental origins of health and disease research have cemented relationships between the early-life environment and later risk of non-communicable diseases (NCDs). However, there is limited translation of this knowledge in developing-economy nations, such as the Cook Islands, that carry exceptionally high NCD burdens. Considering the evidence, Cook Islands leaders identified a need for increased community awareness of the importance of early-life nutrition. Using a community-based participatory research approach, this study aimed to engage Cook Islands community representatives in the co-construction of a contextually relevant early-life nutrition resource. A booklet distributed to mothers in Australia and New Zealand was used as a starting point. Ten semi-structured focus groups (n = 60) explored views regarding the existing resource and options for contextual adaptation. Three core themes were identified: knowledge of the importance of early-life nutrition, recognition of the need for an early-life nutrition resource and the importance of resources being context specific. A draft booklet was created based on these discussions. Participants were invited to give feedback via a second round of focus groups. This confirmed that the voice of the community was represented in the draft booklet. Suggestions for additional material not included in the original resource were also identified. We report on the process and outcomes of the co-construction with community representatives of a resource that has the potential to be used to stimulate community-level discussion about the importance of early-life nutrition. It is crucial that communities have an active voice in research and in making decisions about interventions for their population.

This article updates Karen May’s earlier 2012 hypothesis (Could Captain Scott have been saved? Revisiting Scott’s last expedition). In this revised hypothesis, Cecil Meares, not Surgeon E. L. Atkinson, originated the unsubstantiated statement that “Strict injunctions had been given by Scott that the dogs should not be risked in any way.” This hypothesis incorporates new information uncovered since 2012, specifically Meares’ misrepresentations during the Terra Nova expedition; Atkinson’s 1911 journal entries; Atkinson’s 1919 allegation that Meares had “disobeyed orders”; and Tryggve Gran’s “The Race for the South Pole between Scott and Amundsen”, a 1945/post-1945 document that appears to have been Roland Huntford’s source for anecdotes in Huntford’s 1979 Scott–Amundsen biography. The article gives a proposed chronology for how Meares’ early misrepresentations and Gran’s later misunderstandings influenced the decisions, and later presentations, of the Terra Nova expedition.

OBJECTIVES/SPECIFIC AIMS: The clinical and translational research workforce is in jeopardy due to investigator attrition and competing demands upon researchers. Resilience and wisdom are measurable traits that can be acquired. The aim of this study was to examine a pilot curricular intervention promoting resilience and wisdom formation in early-career translational researchers. METHODS/STUDY POPULATION: We conducted a prospective, mixed-methods evaluation of a curricular intervention promoting the development of wisdom and resilience among junior faculty in a career development program. Six 90 minute sessions were delivered between September 2017 and January 2018. Pre- and post- resilience and wisdom were measured using the Connor Davidson Resilience Scale and 3D-Wisdom Scale. Individual semi-structured interviews were conducted before and after the intervention RESULTS/ANTICIPATED RESULTS: Five scholars participated. Median resilience and wisdom scores revealed moderate levels of each trait; pre- and post-scores were not significantly different. Four themes emerged from the analysis of interview transcripts: 1. “Success” broadly defined; 2. Adversity threatens success; 3. Community breeds resilience; and 4. Wisdom formation parallels growth towards independence. DISCUSSION/SIGNIFICANCE OF IMPACT: An intervention aimed at developing capacities of resilience and wisdom is feasibly delivered to early career researchers. The relationship between these capacities and the sustainability of a research career warrants additional study.

I am writing in response to Professor Chris Turney's recent research article Why didn't they ask Evans?, published in Polar Record on 28 September 2017. The article took as its focus Scott's second-in-command, Lieutenant E.R.G.R ‘Teddy’ Evans, and alleged that Evans failed to deliver Captain Scott's ‘updated orders’ to base in February 1912. This is an error that needs to be corrected.

Alp makes some factual corrections regarding the ‘second obfuscation’ and ‘third obfuscation’ identified in the article. Regarding the ‘second obfuscation’, Alp is correct that the man-haulers (of the 3 X.S. supplies) had not yet returned from base on 17 January 1912, and would not return until 23 January. However, Alp's objection does not exonerate Meares. On 31 January 1912, expedition member Apsley Cherry-Garrard recorded that Meares supposedly had considered departing on the ‘second journey’, but had been assured by the man-haulers that there was already ‘plenty for all parties’ with ‘what they had left at 1 Ton’. The key date was 17 January 1912, when Meares still had time to either leave (for the ‘second journey’, a projected two-week depot run) or remain at base. Meares’ inaction on that date therefore cannot be excused by reassurance from the man-haulers on what they ‘had left’ at One Ton, as on 17 January the man-haulers had not yet returned to base to deliver such reassurance.

The middle Wisconsinan Gilman Canyon Formation at the Buzzard's Roost type locality in southwestern Nebraska was investigated to document the stratigraphy and to reconstruct the environmental and climate record. The Gilman Canyon Formation was subdivided into three loess units and three soils, with radiocarbon ages constraining it between about 40 ka and 25 ka. Stable carbon isotope ratios, magnetic susceptibility, and carbon content were used to define and characterize soils within both the Gilman Canyon Formation and underlying Illinoian Loveland Loess. At the height of soil development within the Gilman Canyon Formation, climate was supporting C4-dominated grassland, with July temperatures equal to or exceeding those of today. Soil-forming intervals within the Loveland Loess, including the Sangamon Soil, also exhibited relative increases in C4 biomass. Climate, as recorded in the Gilman Canyon Formation, is corroborated by regional proxy data. The formation accumulated during MIS 3, and concurrent soil formation coincided with a summer insolation maximum.

In this article the author isolates an anecdote from Roland Huntford's account of the Scott and Amundsen expeditions’ meeting on 4 February 1911 at Framheim, the Norwegian base in the Bay of Whales. In this anecdote, Lieutenant Victor Campbell allegedly told Roald Amundsen that a British motor sledge was ‘already on terra firma’, which consequently led Amundsen to worry that a British motor-sledge had already travelled across the Great Ice Barrier to reach the Beardmore Glacier. The author demonstrates the primary evidence that indicates that this anecdote is unrealistic: Amundsen's journal further indicates that he did not consider Scott's vehicles a threat. This ‘terra firma’ myth has skewed our modern understanding of events, ascribing to Amundsen an erroneous motivation (a supposed fear of the British motor sledges) to explain and excuse his too-early start for the south pole in September 1911, which was an error that nearly led to a Norwegian death (that of Lieutenant Kristian Prestrud). In reality, fear of Scott's motor sledges was not the reason for Amundsen's ‘false start’. This article concludes with a discussion on the hazards of attributing ‘hidden motivations’ to historical figures without citation of primary evidence, and recommends that Huntford include clearly-cited references and endnotes for the next edition of his joint biography of Scott and Amundsen, in keeping with modern standards of scholarship.

Captain Robert Falcon Scott has been attacked in recent decades because his Terra Nova expedition (1910–1913) had to rely on substandard Siberian ponies. Certain commentators have argued that this was Scott's fault, but the available evidence indicates that blame should rest with the buyer Cecil Meares. Additionally, archive evidence indicates that Scott specifically requested Captain Lawrence Oates to travel to Siberia to assist Meares in 1910, and that Oates refused Scott's request.

An opinion piece by Ben Macintyre entitled ‘Sorry, Scott fans: noble death is so last century’ appeared in The Times (London) on 20 September 2013. In this, Macintyre argued not only that Ernest Shackleton should be explicitly contrasted against his contemporary and rival Robert Falcon Scott, but that Shackleton should be found superior to Scott in virtually every way. It was a dispiriting piece, strongly suggesting that that the media's understanding of Scott has not greatly advanced since the savage, cod-psychological and often unsubstantiated attacks upon Scott's character and reputation in the 1970s–1990s. Sadly, all too often polar history is reduced to a zero-sum game where praise for Shackleton is directly proportional to insults directed at Scott.

This is a follow-up to the article ‘Could Captain Scott have been saved? Revisiting Scott's last expedition’, published in this journal in January 2012. Additional research in the expedition's primary documents reveals that there was a clear opportunity for One Ton depot to have been re-stocked with dog food in January 1912, preparatory to the final relief journey to meet the polar party that February, and that the dog driver Cecil Meares failed to follow Scott's relevant orders. The consequences will be examined in this article. All distances are given in geographical miles.

In his book Scott and Amundsen (1979) Roland Huntford described Captain Robert Falcon Scott R.N. as ‘not well thought of in the Service’ and ‘an obscure, rather dull torpedo lieutenant with mediocre prospects’. A myth has subsequently arisen that Scott was forced into Antarctic exploration as his only route to naval promotion. In reality, Scott was an extremely able officer held in high regard by his naval contemporaries; he was on course for promotion to flag rank (rear-admiral and above) had he not taken up polar exploration; and his primary motivation for polar work was financial support for his family. In addition to a chronological account of Scott's career, this article will present his Admirals’ reports in full.