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We introduce an original dataset of formal political participation for over 2,000 individuals included in the Forbes Billionaires List. We find that billionaire politicians are a surprisingly common phenomenon: Over 11% of the world’s billionaires have held or sought political office. Even compared to other elite groups known for producing politicians from their ranks, this is a high rate of political participation. Moreover, billionaires focus their political ambitions on influential positions, have a strong track record of winning elections, and lean to the right ideologically. We also document substantial cross-national variation: a country’s number of billionaire politicians is not simply a product of its total number of billionaires, but is instead related to regime type. Specifically, billionaires formally enter the political sphere at a much higher rate in autocracies than in democracies. We conclude by discussing the normative implications of our findings and outlining a new research agenda on billionaire politicians.
You know Hollywood, you are likely familiar with India’s Bollywood, and you may have heard of Nigeria’s Nollywood. There is also Chollywood in China, Wellywood in New Zealand, Lollywood in both Pakistan and Liberia, and several more in Africa. Such labeling of regional film industries reveals more than an attempt at a catchy gimmick. The reference to Hollywood in all these cases is clear, but so is the alternative desire to produce films that the Los Angeles-based studios are unable or unlikely to offer. Similar reinvention efforts have rebalancing consequences for the film industry, often beyond what their initiators intended. Each of the many “woods” caters to diverse tastes, some more and some less specific than those of Hollywood’s traditional target viewers. Most importantly, non-Hollywood film production undermines the pretense of control over cultural templates and meanings that move global audiences and even pushes traditionally powerful actors to abandon the assumptions of calculability.
Consider two views of the power of finance. From one perspective finance is in the driver’s seat. The residue of the sector’s control power can easily be glimpsed in the capture of the regulatory and lawmaking processes in the United States by the major players in the financial sector – an achievement made possible by finance’s sheer material resources and by the revolving door that brings regulators out of the government and into the sector (and sends former employees of financial firms back into the regulatory organizations).2 An important byproduct of finance’s highly concentrated political power, in this perspective, was the construction of an incomplete and insufficient regulatory system riddled with loopholes even before the crisis of 2008 – and the production of an even more woefully inadequate regulatory system after the collapse that took the world economy into the biggest crisis in seventy years.
This overview explains antipsychotic-induced hyperprolactinaemia and offers guidance on the management of this common and underestimated problem in general psychiatric practice.
International organizations (IOs) suffuse world politics, but the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stands out as an unusually important IO. My research suggests that IMF lending is systematically biased. Preferential treatment is largely driven by the degree of similarity between beliefs held by IMF officials and key economic policy-makers in the borrowing country. This article describes the IMF's ideational culture as “neoliberal,” and assumes it to be stable during the observation window (1980–2000). The beliefs of top economic policy-makers in borrowing countries, however, vary in terms of their distance from IMF officials' beliefs. When fellow neoliberals control the top economic policy posts the distance between the means of the policy team's beliefs and the IMF narrows; consequently, IMF loans become less onerous, more generous, and less rigorously enforced. I gathered data on the number of conditions and the relative size of loans for 486 programs in the years between 1980 and 2000. I collected data on waivers, which allow countries that have missed binding conditions to continue to access funds, as an indicator for enforcement. I rely on indirect indicators, gleaned from a new data set that contains biographical details of more than 2,000 policy-makers in ninety developing countries, to construct a measure of the proportion of the top policy officials that are fellow neoliberals. The evidence from a battery of statistical tests reveals that as the proportion of neoliberals in the borrowing government increases, IMF deals get comparatively sweeter.
The distinction between uncertainty and risk, originally drawn by Frank Knight and John Maynard Keynes in the 1920s, remains fundamentally important today. In the presence of uncertainty, market actors and economic policy-makers substitute other methods of decision making for rational calculation—specifically, actors' decisions are rooted in social conventions. Drawing from innovations in financial markets and deliberations among top American monetary authorities in the years before the 2008 crisis, we show how economic actors and policy-makers live in worlds of risk and uncertainty. In that world social conventions deserve much greater attention than conventional IPE analyses accords them. Such conventions must be part of our toolkit as we seek to understand the preferences and strategies of economic and political actors.
Obstetricians most commonly encounter shock in the form of hemorrhage, but it is important to realize that shock can be classified in several types, and correction of the physiological derangement can correct the dysoxia at the tissue level before shock becomes irreversible. Etiologically shock is classified into the following types: hypovolemic shock (i.e. hemorrhage in coagulopathy), cardiogenic shock (myocardial dysfunction in the systemic inflammatory response syndrome and with toxins associated with septicemia), distributive shock (through activation of the systemic inflammatory response system), and obstructive shock (septic embolism). Therapy for cardiogenic shock requires restoration of adequate coronary perfusion in order to minimize further myocardial depression and necrosis. Anaphylactic and anaphylactoid reactions are clinically indistinguishable. The goals of management of anaphylaxis are interrupting contact with the responsible drug, modulating the effects of the released mediators, and preventing further mediator production and release.
To describe the identification, management, and clinical characteristics of hospitalized patients with influenza-like illness (ILI) during the peak period of activity of the 2009 pandemic strain of influenza A virus subtype H1N1 (2009 H1N1).
Design.
Retrospective review of electronic medical records.
Patients and Setting.
Hospitalized patients who presented to the emergency department during the period October 18 through November 14, 2009, at 4 hospitals in Cook County, Illinois, with the capacity to perform real-time reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain reaction testing for influenza.
Methods.
Vital signs and notes recorded within 1 calendar day after emergency department arrival were reviewed for signs and symptoms consistent with ILI. Cases of ILI were classified as recognized by healthcare providers if an influenza test was performed or if influenza was mentioned as a possible diagnosis in the physician notes. Logistic regression was used to determine the patient attributes and symptoms that were associated with ILI recognition and with influenza infection.
Results.
We identified 460 ILI case patients, of whom 412 (90%) had ILI recognized by healthcare providers, 389 (85%) were placed under airborne or droplet isolation precautions, and 243 (53%) were treated with antiviral medication. Of 401 ILI case patients tested for influenza, 91 (23%) had a positive result. Fourteen (3%) ILI case patients and none of the case patients who tested positive for influenza had sore throat in the absence of cough.
Conclusions.
Healthcare providers identified a high proportion of hospitalized ILI case patients. Further improvements in disease detection can be made through the use of advanced electronic health records and efficient diagnostic tests. Future studies should evaluate the inclusion of sore throat in the ILI case definition.
The dogwhelk Nucella lapillus experienced localized extinction in the 1980s and 1990s due to the use of tributyltin (TBT) antifoulants, causing imposex in females. The aim of this study was to establish the extent of the return of the species across the mainland coast of central southern England as TBT use has been progressively restricted, and to quantify the extent of imposex impact on the populations present. We surveyed from Poole to Selsey where isolated populations had become extinct, and the Isle of Wight where some populations had persisted. We found evidence that since TBT restrictions, recolonization and colonization by N. lapillus has been rapid. By 2007–2008, of the eleven surveyed mainland sites, seven were colonized, although indications of reduced imposex impacts were mixed. Distribution had also extended on the Isle of Wight and populations were larger with less imposex impact in sites with long term populations. The lack of continuous suitable habitat blocks and the hydrodynamic complexity of the region, leads us to hypothesize that recovery has been facilitated by man-made structures which may be acting as ‘stepping stones’. Populations that have become established on engineered structures such as sea walls, breakwaters and rock groynes demonstrate accelerated recovery in the region as TBT in the environment has generally declined. Sites with suitable substrates and food sources near to ports were either not recolonized or had small populations with imposex evident. For species with a short pelagic larval stage or with direct development, population connectivity between patches of harder substrata along hydrodynamically complex coastlines may be greater than previously thought.