In his ‘The Countefactual Argument Against Abortion’ (2023) Ryan Kulesa argues that it is prima facie wrong to kill a ‘counterfactual person’. Some early foetuses, though still lacking consciousness, are counterfactual persons. Hence, it is prima facie wrong to kill (abort) these foetuses. Kulesa’s aim is to reconcile apparently conflicting intuitions about abortion and related acts, e.g., the failure to rescue frozen foetuses in abortion rescue cases, which philosophers writing about abortion find it hard to reconcile. I argue that he does not succeed because his argument does not establish that the mere fact that an entity is a counterfactual person is a sufficient condition of the prima face wrongness of killing it. More generally, Kulesa does not establish that the concept of counterfactual personhood is of utility in the debates he is concerned with at all.

This article, which relies on underutilized archival collections as well as oral histories, is one of the first comprehensive examinations of the feminist struggle to decriminalize abortion during Brazil’s transition to democracy during the 1980s. We discuss how the consolidation of the antiabortion Christian right and its proximity to several political parties, including ones on the left, coupled with the politically moderate tone of the transition from dictatorship to democracy, constrained the space in which Brazilian feminists could make radical demands of the state. Moreover, we contend that although the creation of the state-funded feminist organ Conselho Nacional dos Direitos da Mulher in 1985 brought important visibility to feminist issues and inserted the movement’s agenda squarely within the government apparatus, it also fragmented feminists, threatened co-optation by the state, and ultimately compelled abortion rights activists to prioritize the more palatable strategy of expanding access to therapeutic abortions, which were already permitted by law. In addition to divergences in political strategy, feminists struggled to create multiracial and multiclass coalitions during this period, when many Black feminists and working-class women were organizing around other concerns. As a result, feminists were not able to fundamentally alter public opinion about the political importance of abortion, and their efforts to enshrine the termination of pregnancy as a human right in the 1988 Constitution were unsuccessful.

What does it mean to be a citizen? To be equal in birth and stature as others born in the same land? How does law answer these questions and are the answers satisfying? Have the goalposts of citizenship shifted such that old, exlusionary notions of citizenship based on wealth, race, and sex now dangerously infect our society? These questions and this Essay are derived from the 2025 Presidential Address given at the Law and Society annual meeting.

In their article Objective Standards of Medical Judgment: A Myth of Abortion Law, Graber et al. explore the different legal standards for evaluating if a physician properly offered abortion care under a medical exception to states’ abortion restrictions. While this piece focuses tightly on the use of legal standards to limit access to abortion care, it should be understood in the broader context of a legal and political environment that is increasingly shifting the locus of medical decision-making power from the medical profession to state actors. We agree with Graber et al. that physicians should use their voices to speak out and educate the community on the medical decision-making process. But we are concerned that some state and legal actors are intentionally looking to improperly encroach upon the practice of medicine.

After performing an abortion in 1973, Dr. Kenneth Edelin was indicted and convicted of manslaughter. Dr. Edelin’s conviction was reversed 50 years ago. However, the conflict between the medical and legal systems, the use of abortion prosecution to control patients and providers, and the framing of a fetus as a person feel just as relevant to today’s abortion landscape.

Judith Jarvis Thomson, in ‘A Defense of Abortion’, uses ingenious analogies and thought experiments to defend her conclusion that there are cases in which abortion is morally permissible: (1) the foetus is a threat to the mother’s life, (2) the foetus is a product of rape, and (3) where efforts have been made to prevent pregnancy via contraception. Whilst Thomson is right that abortion should be morally permissible in some cases, she is unsuccessful in defending such a conclusion. In this article, I argue that abortion should be morally permissible in cases (1) and (2) as external circumstances (medical conditions or wrongdoers) have intervened and overruled the rational will of the woman. However, abortion should not be morally permissible in case (3) as there is no such factor in the case of failed birth control (assuming that all goes normally and according to plan).

Post-Dobbs v. Jackson, abortion regulation is left entirely to the states. Laws that restrict access to abortion generally allow for exceptions when determined necessary for the life or safety of the pregnant patient. Some states, e.g., Ohio, use a “subjective” legal standard when determining whether an abortion is medically necessary. Other states, e.g., Texas, rely on an “objective” legal standard, whereby the necessity of an abortion is not determined by any particular physician’s judgments, but rather by the judgment of a hypothetical “reasonable physician.” Though objective legal standards are widespread in American jurisprudence, they are a poor fit for clinical judgments about the medical necessity of abortion. On the contemporary model of clinical decision-making, medical judgment is irremediably subjective. In addition to being responsive to patient values and medical evidence, medical judgment is, and should be, informed by physician values. Because Texas abortion regulations rely on an objective standard of judgment that fails to correspond to a medically meaningful category, they fail to provide adequate guidance to physicians regarding the circumstances under which abortion is legally protected.

In Latin America, it is recognised that social movements have a relevant role in changing social policies on abortion and marriage; however, little is known about the operating conditions accounting for the causal implication. Resorting to a qualitative comparative analysis of 24 Mexican policies, this research explores the conditions taken from moral policy literature. Drawing on extensive data, it argues three causal patterns, where influential movements are a necessary but no sufficient, (1) influential movements require a context full of “legal opportunities”—favourable legal precedents and Court intervention; (2) if they only find favourable legal precedents, conservative actors influence must be scarce, and (3) in cases where the Congress is conservative, the Court intervention, and the minimum conservative influence are required for movements to achieve legal changes on abortion and marriage. The novelty of this article consists of a new model that explains the conditions that play a relevant role in analysing abortion and equal marriage policy changes; in addition, valuable inputs are included for the benefit of the interested parties.

While abortion has been a contentious and salient political issue in the United States for decades, the debate around abortion has evolved in terms of the rhetorical frames employed by advocates on both sides. Using vignettes of statements made by hypothetical lawmakers, we evaluate responsiveness to some of these emergent frames. Specifically, we evaluate “pro-woman” framing employed by pro-life advocates, which positions abortion restrictions as being in the interests of women. The experiment also manipulates to whom the frame is attributed in two ways, the gender and the partisanship of the lawmaker. This 2 × 2 × 2 experiment explores the intersection of how abortion restrictions are framed, including the roles gender and partisanship in the persuasiveness of the frames. We find that voters are more receptive to the pro-woman frame compared to the classic fetal rights framing. Importantly, this holds even among supporters of abortion rights, casting substantial light on persuadable groups.

While scholarship on feminist foreign policy continues to proliferate, the impact of anti-feminist objectives on foreign policy requires attention. In this article, I critically examine the intersection of abortion politics and U.S. foreign policy, arguing that American foreign policy has long been shaped by an anti-feminist practice. The U.S. has systematically restricted access to abortion abroad for over 50 years through legislation and executive actions. Applying quantitative and qualitative research methods, I trace the history of abortion-related foreign policy from 1973 to 2022, analyze all congressional foreign policy bills referencing abortion, and draw on interviews with legislative staff and issue advocates from the 115th Congress (2017-18) to highlight how anti-abortion advocacy shapes U.S. foreign policy decisions. These findings suggest that while feminist mobilization has constrained anti-abortion efforts domestically in the US, foreign policy remained a key battleground where anti-feminist actors have historically been more successful. This case underscores the importance of analyzing domestic policy dynamics to understand the broader implications of feminist and anti-feminist agendas in international relations.

Women’s reproductive autonomy matters for gender equality, but abortion laws rarely pass without limitations and restrictions on access. Legislative abortion reform also triggers conservative resistance, forcing feminists to develop new strategies to protect rights. While scholars often study abortion laws’ adoption and implementation separately, we identify patterns in feminists’ decisions during adoption, on the one hand, and conservative actors’ responses and feminists’ strategies during implementation, on the other. We propose an analytic framework that maps different decisions during adoption onto different strategies during implementation. During adoption, we distinguish between acceptable conditions and strategic sacrifices. During implementation, the latter allows feminists to play offense while the former forces feminists into playing defense. We develop this framework through in-depth primary research in Chile and Uruguay alongside evidence from three additional Global South cases. Our framework helps scholars and policy makers alike to anticipate how decisions during adoption affect actors’ behavior during implementation.

Dignity has been a notoriously elusive concept to philosophers. Nevertheless, in the realms of politics, law, and policymaking, appeals to dignity are frequent, and do not always align with the understandings most commonly endorsed by the philosophical literature. This paper considers how “dignity” is frequently appealed to in ethical arguments about the permissibility of abortion, and argues that the judicial decisions related to reproductive and LGBTQ+ rights over the past 30 years in the United States offer deep insights into the nature of “dignity” that philosophers and other theorists ought to pay attention to. These insights not only have profound implications for our understanding of the nature of “dignity,” but also for ethical analysis more broadly.

In this article we trace a biography of vacuum aspiration in Spain between the 1960s and 1980s. Analysing the local but transnationally connected history of vacuum aspiration during late Francoism and the democratic transition, we argue that this technology was since the mid-1960s reincarnated in mainstream medical discourse as vacuum curettage, presented as a major medical innovation in diagnosis and therapy. While abortion activists working at the end of the 1970s emphasized the group and political components of a technique they called the ‘Karman method’, doctors performing illegal abortions within the family planning network defined vacuum aspiration in terms of safety and medical innovation. As we demonstrate, this technique embodied meanings that at times overlapped, at others conflicted, contingent on whether aspirations were linked to medical innovation, pro-abortion activism, or social justice.