Risk regulation has increasingly expanded in European digital policy, yet it is diverging from its roots, especially the precautionary principle. Rather than traditionally focusing on scientific evidence and knowledge, the European approach to risk regulation has been increasingly based on constitutional values such as the protection of fundamental rights and democracy. This article seeks to unravel the logic that has led the Union to move from an approach to risk more based on science to a model which considers constitutional values as parameters to assess and mitigate risks. By focusing on European digital regulation, primarily the GDPR, the DSA and the AI Act, this work underlines how the constitutional rationale of this transformation comes as a response to the intangibility of risks resulting from digital technologies and to imbalances of information and knowledge coming from the concentration of private power in the digital ecosystem. The primary argument is that risk regulation in European digital policy does not seek to rationalise uncertainty through science but to govern epistemological uncertainty through the instruments of constitutionalism, with the goal of addressing the impact of digital technologies on fundamental rights and imbalances of power.

Do voters take into account the deaths of family members and close friends when evaluating the government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic—particularly when that response is problematic or even negligent—as in the case of Mexico under the Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) administration? Using data from the 2021 Mexican Election Study, this research shows that opposition partisans who lost close friends or relatives to COVID-19 are more likely to evaluate the government’s response to the pandemic negatively. In contrast, National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) partisans do not hold accountable their co-partisan government. They are no more likely to evaluate the government’s response negatively, even when they experience the same losses. Experimental evidence further shows that MORENA partisans do not lower their evaluations of government performance after being informed about the country’s high COVID-19 mortality. They are also more likely to underestimate the number of COVID-19 deaths in the country, even after being presented with official mortality figures. These findings underscore how partisanship can cloud accountability, leading some voters to dismiss objective information and to judge government performance primarily through the lens of partisan loyalty. Partisanship can distort the accountability mechanism at the core of retrospective voting even during a major health crisis.

The use of amnesties in transitional justice remains a contentious issue. The fight against impunity at the international level has left little room for the application of amnesties for international crimes and human rights abuses. Nevertheless, amnesty measures continue to be applied in many jurisdictions and the permissibility of conditional amnesties enacted as part of wider processes of reconciliation remains under debate. This paper argues that the judicial discussion of amnesties under international law has followed dynamics of path dependence, where initial decisions adopted in very specific contexts have strongly determined the subsequent treatment of amnesties in completely different situations. The influence of early decisions rejecting blanket amnesties in the aftermath of autocratic regimes in Latin America pulled domestic and international courts towards a general rejection of amnesties. However, in more recent years, transitional justice ideas have influenced the trajectory of the discussion on amnesties, opening courts to the permissibility of conditional and negotiated amnesties accompanied by alternative mechanisms of accountability. Mapping the judicial dialogue on amnesties, this paper shows a cautious shift in the approach to conditional amnesties. This is significant because international courts have mostly engaged with the most problematic amnesties, leaving some uncertainty around the way conditional amnesties enacted as part of complex transitional frameworks will be evaluated. Reading a significant number of decisions from different jurisdictions, this essay aims to shed some light on the way domestic courts have addressed the discussion of amnesties when they are part of wider efforts to bring peace, reconciliation, and democracy.

Military decision-making institutions face new challenges and opportunities from increasing artificial intelligence (AI) integration. Military AI adoption is incentivized by competitive pressures and expanding national security needs; thus, we can expect increased complexity due to AI proliferation. Governing this complexity is urgent but lacks clear precedents. This discussion critically re-examines key concerns that AI integration into resort-to-force decision-making organizations introduces. Beside concerns, this article draws attention to new, positive affordances that AI proliferation may introduce. I then propose a minimal AI governance standard framework, adapting private sector insights to the defence context. I argue that adopting AI governance standards (e.g., based on this framework) can foster an organizational culture of accountability, combining technical know-how with the cultivated judgment needed to navigate contested governance concepts. Finally, I hypothesize some strategic implications of the adoption of AI governance programmes by military institutions.

This study examines if prime minister's parties are punished or rewarded by voters to a lesser extent in candidate‐centred electoral systems compared to party‐centred systems. Candidate‐centred systems allow the voters greater choice in determining the fate of individual candidates at the district level and create incentives for candidates to cultivate a personal vote rather than pursuing a party vote. Voters in these systems are more likely to focus on individual candidates than on parties, thus fostering individual accountability at the expense of collective (party) accountability. Cross‐sectional time‐series data for 23 OECD countries between 1961 and 2014 were analysed. Two indices of intraparty efficiency (the Farrell–McAllister Index and the Shugart Index) were used to capture the candidate‐centredness of electoral systems. The analysis of aggregate‐level data with almost 300 observations showed that incumbent parties tend to win or lose fewer votes in candidate‐centred electoral systems. This effect has become stronger over time. Candidate‐centredness has a weak moderating impact on the state of the economy on the degree of public sanctioning of government parties.

Despite some prominent critics, deliberative democrats tend to be optimistic about the potential of deliberative mini‐publics. However, the problem with current practices is that mini‐publics are typically used by officials on an ad hoc basis and that their policy impacts remain vague. Mini‐publics seem especially hard to integrate into representative decision making. There are a number of reasons for this, especially prevailing ideas of representation and accountability as well as the contestatory character of representative politics. This article argues that deliberative mini‐publics should be regarded as one possible way of improving the epistemic quality of representative decision making and explores different institutional designs through which deliberative mini‐publics could be better integrated into representative institutions. The article considers arrangements which institutionalise the use of mini‐publics; involve representatives in deliberations; motivate public interactions between mini‐publics and representatives; and provide opportunities to ex post scrutiny or suspensive veto powers for mini‐publics. The article analyses prospects and problems of these measures, and considers their applicability in different contexts of representative politics.

Although federal arrangements adopt a multiplicity of forms across and within federations, this article suggests that some models of power division are better than others at enhancing clarity of responsibility and electoral accountability. This conclusion is the result of exploring responsibility attribution and economic voting in a state where decentralisation arrangements vary across regions: the Spanish State of Autonomies. Using electoral surveys and aggregated economic data for the 1982–2012 period, the empirical analysis shows that regional economic voting is most pronounced in regions where decentralisation design concentrated authority and resources at one level of government, whereas it is inexistent in regions where devolution followed a more intertwined model of power distribution. The implication of the empirical findings is that the specific design of intergovernmental arrangements is crucial to make electoral accountability work in federations.

Voters in rural and peripheral areas have increasingly turned away from mainstream parties and towards right‐wing populist parties. This paper tests the extent to which political decisions with adverse local effects—such as school and hospital closures—can explain this electoral shift. I theorize that political decisions such as these substantiate a perception of a disconnect between “ordinary” people and the politicians in power in day‐to‐day experiences. Using data on 315 school closures and 30 hospital closures in Denmark from 2005 to 2019 in a generalized difference‐in‐differences design, I find that mayors lose about 1.6 percentage points of the valid votes in areas where they close a school. Furthermore, I find that right‐wing populist parties increase their support in both local and national elections when a local school or hospital is closed. These findings provide insight into the electoral consequences of political decisions with adverse local effects and thus contribute to our understanding of the rise of right‐wing populism.

The EU has become increasingly responsible for the state of national economies over the last decades. Meanwhile, many observers have claimed that this increased responsibility has not translated into more accountability. In this article, we revisit this literature and analyse vote‐popularity functions before and after accession because it provides a situation when the EU is an incumbent and when it is not. Using Eurobarometer surveys from 2001 to 2011, which were carried out in the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, we first show that individuals do not hold the EU accountable for macroeconomic performances before accession, but that they do after accession. Using European Election Studies surveys, we also indicate that the incumbent European Peoples’ Party is held accountable for the state of the economy in countries that are ruled by the EU, but not in countries that have just become EU members.

Citizens' ability to hold corrupt politicians accountable is a key feature of democratic political systems. Particularly in the European Union (EU), such accountability mechanisms are often argued to malfunction due to the EU's complicated and opaque institutional structure, which could compromise voters' basic abilities to detect political malpractice in Brussels. Putting EU voters' attentiveness to the test, we provide quasi‐experimental evidence of the causal effect of a recent corruption scandal in the European Parliament. Leveraging an ‘Unexpected Event during Survey Design’ identification strategy in France and Germany, we document a sizeable negative effect of the so‐called Qatargate scandal on public trust in the European Parliament. This provides causal evidence on the presence of attentiveness to EU politics within these electorates. Given the EU's complex institutional structure, we derive two alternative implications from this finding.