This essay explores the affinities between Vincenzo Gioberti’s Del primato morale e civile degli italiani (1843) and the constitutional political economy advanced by Adrian Pabst and Roberto Scazzieri in The Constitution of Political Economy: Polity, Society and the Commonweal (2023). Gioberti argued that Italy’s political regeneration required a prior renewal of its moral and civil order, insisting that institutions cannot be legitimate or enduring unless grounded in dispositions, associations and collective vocation. Pabst and Scazzieri similarly reject contractarian and institutionalist accounts of political economy, proposing instead that polity and economy are constituted by interdependencies, proportionality, systemic interests and dispositions. By placing these works in dialogue, the essay highlights convergences in their conception of politics as constitution rather than contract, their emphasis on civil association, their recognition of structural embeddedness and their understanding of persistence and transformation as mutually dependent. At the same time, important divergences are acknowledged: Gioberti’s teleological nationalism and reliance on providential history contrast with the pluralism and secular structural analysis of Pabst and Scazzieri. The comparison suggests that constitutional political economy is best understood as both structural and civil: grounded in coherence, viability and proportionality, but equally dependent on dispositions and collective imagination. In contemporary Europe, where crises of legitimacy, inequality and ecological sustainability prevail, such a civil-structural vision of political economy offers a timely, critical resource for re-thinking the commonweal.

Medieval lex mercatoria refers to the customary commercial law developed by merchants to govern cross-border trade, operating alongside and sometimes independently of territorial legal systems. This paper compares that historical form of autonomous ordering with contemporary blockchain governance. Both create institutional frameworks that facilitate exchange among diverse actors and provide mechanisms that function, to varying degrees, outside traditional state authority. The key difference lies in how rules are generated and enforced: medieval merchant law relied on flexible norms interpreted by merchant courts and other human adjudicators, whereas blockchain systems seek to reduce ambiguity by encoding rules ex ante in smart contracts and automating enforcement. Decentralized decision-making and emerging forms of on-chain adjudication further reimagine dispute resolution without centralized judicial power. The central claim is that both represent polycentric legal orders whose significance ultimately depends on how they interact with, complement, or challenge formal governmental institutions.

Endogenous public health responses include the individual behaviours, community-based organizational responses, and informal rules that resolve economic problems during public health crises. We explore the relevance of endogenous responses in Orthodox Jewish communities during the COVID-19 pandemic. We analyse Orthodox newspapers in New York City and find that (a) rabbis advised their communities on how to stay healthy and observant to their religious beliefs; (b) rabbinical councils and advisory boards provided private, public health guidance; (c) private, Jewish ambulatory services provided religiously sensitive healthcare; (d) Orthodox Jewish schools privately provided public health services; and (e) community members altered religious rules, rituals, and traditions to mitigate the spread of the virus. While these responses did not occur seamlessly or without conflict, the Orthodox community worked diligently to provide public health services to remain healthy while also observing religious traditions. Our paper provides shows how communities develop endogenous public health responses during crises.

Part I of this article reviews major differences in definitions of the transaction concept by leading authors and some of the difficulties involved in its usage. Part II takes steps towards a new approach, starting with the legal notion of a contract. This identifies a narrower and more specific type of transaction, empowered by both legal forces and non-legal or cultural norms or rules. The sharper and more specific concept of contracting cost is derived. Contracting costs are the costs of obtaining, formulating, negotiating, and administering legal contracts. They do not include the costs of the work and other inputs required to fulfil a specific contractual agreement. Legal contracts are historically specific phenomena, applying only to modern societies with developed legal institutions. By making the analysis more specific, we emphasise factors of greater relevance in modern market economies. In addition to legal sanctions, the law engenders other forms of motivation based on what is perceived to be legitimate legal authority.

Prominent scholars have complained of inadequate clarity and agreement on what transactions are, and how their costs are measured. This two-part article explores this topic and suggests an alternative approach. This part examines different meanings of transaction cost used by leading scholars in this area, including John R. Commons, Ronald H. Coase, Oliver E. Williamson, Douglas C. North, Douglas W. Allen, and Yoram Barzel. It reveals prominent usages of the term that differ in several important respects. A sharper approach might focus on legal contracts and exchanges of legal titles, as suggested by Harold Demsetz. That option is explored further in Part II.

Recently, there has been a Renaissance for multi-level selection models to explain the persistence of unselfish behavior in social dilemmas, in which assortative/correlated matching plays an important role. In the current study of a multi-round prisoners’ dilemma experiment, we introduce two correlated matching procedures that match subjects with similar action histories together. We discover significant treatment effects, compared to the control procedure of random matching. Particularly with the weighted history matching procedure we find bifurcations regarding group outcomes. Some groups converge to the all-defection equilibrium even more pronouncedly than the control groups do, while other groups generate much higher rate of cooperation, which is also associated with higher relative reward for a typical cooperative action. All in all, the data show that cooperation does have a much better chance to persist in a correlated/assortative-matching environment, as predicted in the literature.

This paper derives career lessons for economists by examining the unusual career of Brian J. Loasby in terms of Loasby’s own key ideas. Loasby’s early career ran into difficulties after he chose to become a postgraduate for lifestyle rather than career reasons, with his insufficiently ambitious reference standards resulting in unduly narrow search for both options and new connections. His eventual success came because of a path-dependent process whereby he developed an organizing framework that was conducive to finding problems and making intellectual connections. It was a process in which making personal connections also had a key role, though some intellectual connections that he earlier failed to make resulted from trusting other people. In the market for contributions to knowledge, his way of branding and positioning his work in relation to management decision-making and the growth of knowledge gave it a wider appeal than would have been the case if he had aligned himself with a particular school of thought or ‘heterodox economics’ in general.

Taking inspiration from the work of Douglass North, much institutional research attempts a distinction between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ institutions. North often associated ‘formal institutions’ with rules enforced through a legal system. It is suggested here that this lead should be followed and refined. In which case ‘legal system’ and ‘law’ require definitions. An alternative claim, that ‘formal’ basically means ‘written down’, is arguably less useful. Stressing the importance of clear definitions in this area, this paper considers a case where slight modifications yield strikingly different results. Some options concerning the meanings of ‘culture’ and their relation to institutions are briefly noted. Changes in, and interactions between, ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ institutions are considered, with illustrative examples. Contrary to some authors, informal institutions can sometimes change rapidly, in some cases in response to state legislation.

This article is part of an internationally coordinated themed collection on ‘labour conflict, forms of organisation, and class’ exploring important questions. How can we explain the interplay of capital, the state, and the international order, in defining the persistence of labour conflict in changing historical and political-economic contexts? How have the economic, social, and technological transformations precipitated by the recent pandemic shaped the expression of work-related conflict? As part of a response to these main questions, the author and contributors of this collection conceptualise labour conflict and collective action in broader class analysis and examine the combined effect of state policies, migration, and digital innovation on contemporary labour politics. This article, drawing on insights from Marxist-oriented interdisciplinary approaches and feminist theories, seeks to suggest approaches to future studies on class, labour conflict, and workers’ organisation.

Institutions matter for postdisaster recovery. Conversely, natural disasters can also alter a society's institutions. Using the synthetic control method, this study examines the effects that Hurricane Katrina (2005) had on the formal and informal institutions in Louisiana. As measures of formal institutions, we employ two economic freedom scores corresponding to government employment (GE) (as a share of total employment at the state-level) and property tax (PT). These measures serve as proxies for the level of governmental interference into the economy and the protection of private property rights respectively. To assess the impact on informal institutions, we use state-level social capital data. We find that Hurricane Katrina had lasting impacts on Louisiana's formal institutions. In the post-Katrina period, we find that actual Louisiana had persistently higher economic freedom scores for both GE and PT than the synthetic Louisiana that did not experience the hurricane. These findings imply that the hurricane led to a reduction in both PTs and GE, which indicates a decrease in the relative size of the public sector as a share of the state's economy. On the other hand, we find no impact on our chosen measure of informal institution.

Geoff Harcourt was a renowned economist and political activist who made a significant contribution to public policy, particularly in his home country of Australia. As a leading contributor to post-Keynesian theory, he believed a capitalist economy would not create full employment without significant policy intervention. On the labour market, he devised an approach to wage bargaining that integrated fairness with productivity growth in the context of Australia’s unique institutions of conciliation and arbitration. On tariff protection, he was agnostic, preferring a more proactive industry policy grounded in post-Keynesian principles and drawing on his early work on accounting theory and practice. His economic advice to the Australian Labor Party (ALP) Committee of Inquiry in 1979 refocused policy debate around the role of incomes policy, which became the centrepiece of the Hawke-Keating Government’s Accord with the trade union movement.

This essay analyses the relationship of two ‘Great Transformations’: the first from socialism to capitalism, more specifically in Eastern Europe in the 1990s, and the second from regulated to unregulated capitalism in the global economy since the 1980s, with respect to their common origins, elements and social results. Applying Karl Polanyi’s double-movement concept, it is concluded that these two, in essence neoliberal, transformations have led to societies being deeply divided economically, socially and culturally. Moreover, the self-protection of transformation losers is generating adverse political outcomes on a global scale. For both reasons, the outcomes of neoliberal transformations are jeopardising also the viability of the European Union, which was initially built on the basis of a regulated capitalism. The future of the global economy and also of the European Union depends on how the conflicts between the deepening of unregulated globalisation, national sovereignty and democratic politics can be solved.

The rise of wages in China would seem to indicate that the demographic dividend has reached its end. A more refined approach reveals, however, that the situation of Chinese workers has not really improved: even though real wages are rising, the share of wages in the nation’s wealth has not kept pace. The reason for this is China’s position within global value chains, where the employment relationship is not solely governed by the employer–employee power relationship, but by contractual relations established between ‘lead firms’ and subcontractors. This situation echoes labour institutional economist JR Commons’ concept of ‘competitive menace’ and analyses of the structural imbalance of power in the employer/employee relationship. We argue that despite the Chinese government’s desire for industrial upgrading and its intention to develop internal labour markets, Chinese labour institutions have shown significant resistance to change making it hard to envisage any shift towards a Fordist regime of capital accumulation based on a virtuous cycle of mass production and mass consumption.

In The Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi problematised the commodity status of labour. He described it as ‘fictitious’ and asserted the human aspect of labour necessitates ‘protection’. In bringing Polanyi’s mature works to bear on these claims, this article uses the ‘fictitious commodity’ concept to highlight the tension in neoclassical theory between concrete reality and its idealist construction of the economy. This contradiction directly challenges the veracity of the self-regulating market. The article develops two related themes. The first is Polanyi’s critique of the neoclassical conception of ‘the economy’ as an ideal (market) construct which gave rise to the notion that labour could be regulated by the forces of supply and demand. The second is the lack of logic in the notion of a ‘self regulating’ market and Polanyi’s appreciation of the concrete tendencies of capitalist economies to develop institutional arrangements that ensure the economy is always, and necessarily, more than ‘the market’.

Despite agreement on many points, including our shared insistence that ‘corporation’ and ‘firm’ are different concepts, Jean-Philippe Robé still maintains that they are mutually exclusive: no corporation is a firm, and no firm is a corporation. In contrast, we follow standard nomenclature when we point out that all (business) corporations are firms, but some firms are not corporations. We show here that this is a standard practice among lawyers writing in leading law journals and note that Robé seems to have abandoned the task of defining the firm.

This article argues that it is a waste of time seeking to treat populists as examples of homo economicus when seeking to persuade them that the conspiracy theories to which they subscribe are big lies. But it does not follow that homo economicus is worthless in this context. He has a role in explaining the evolution of the social norms whose violation is the root cause of the rise of populist movements. Such an approach requires a willingness to entertain both proximate and ultimate explanations of human behaviour simultaneously.

In the 1970s, Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues found that neighborhood policing works better than metropolitan policing. Though Ostrom articulated design principles for self-governance, the early studies of neighborhood policing did not. In this paper, we articulate the design principles for self-governing policing, which we term Ostrom-Compliant Policing. We then apply this framework to an understudied case: policing on American Indian reservations. Policing in Indian country generally falls into one of three categories – federal policing (by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Federal Bureau of Investigation), state policing (by municipal and state police departments), and tribal policing (by tribal police departments) – that vary in the degree of centralization. Our main contribution is to show that tribal policing as it is practiced in the United States, which claims to be self-governing, is not Ostrom-Compliant. Thus, our approach offers insight into why high crime remains an ongoing challenge in much of Indian country even when tribes have primary control over policing outcomes. This does not mean centralization is better, or that self-governance of policing does not work. Rather, our research suggests that a greater tribal autonomy over-policing and meta-political changes to federal rules governing criminal jurisdictions is necessary to implement Ostromian policing.

Institutional economists have analyzed permissionless blockchains as a novel institutional building block for voluntary economic exchange and distributed governance, with their unique protocol features such as automated contract execution, high levels of network and process transparency, and uniquely distributed governance. But such institutional analysis needs to be complemented by polycentric analysis of how blockchains change. We characterize such change as resulting from internal sources and external sources. Internal sources include constitutional (protocol) design and collective-choice processes for updating protocols, which help coordinate network participants and users. External sources include competitive pressure from other cryptocurrency networks. By studying two leading networks, Bitcoin and Ethereum, we illustrate how conceptualizing blockchains as competing and constitutional polycentric enterprises clarifies their processes of change.

This is a review of Joel Mokyr's fascinating book entitled A Culture of Growth. The work is summarized, noting its focus on Darwin-style evolutionary explanations of cultural change. But Mokyr's emphasis on cultural entrepreneurs and positive feedbacks in the procreation of ideas is insufficient to explain the origins of modern economic growth. Too much explanatory weight is placed on too few extraordinary people. It is argued that Mokyr's analysis should be extended, to bring the evolution of institutions, as well as the evolution of culture, into the picture at an additional level. The role of inter-state rivalry and exogenous shocks has also to be underlined. This kind of analysis can be developed within the framework of generalized Darwinism, which Mokyr himself adopts. This is a major and highly stimulating book.

In his recent book on Property, Power and Politics, Jean-Philippe Robé makes a strong case for the need to understand the legal foundations of modern capitalism. He also insists that it is important to distinguish between firms and corporations. We agree. But Robé criticizes our definition of firms in terms of legally recognized capacities on the grounds that it does not take the distinction seriously enough. He argues that firms are not legally recognized as such, as the law only knows corporations. This argument, which is capable of different interpretations, leads to the bizarre result that corporations are not firms. Using etymological and other evidence, we show that firms are treated as legally constituted business entities in both common parlance and legal discourse. The way the law defines firms and corporations, while the product of a discourse which is in many ways distinct from everyday language, has such profound implications for the way firms operate in practice that no institutional theory of the firm worthy of the name can afford to ignore it.