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Chapter 3 explains our research methods, data collection and ethics. In this chapter, we focus on how we have addressed the typical challenges of interpreter bias in studying online offensive language. To mitigate these issues, we ground our study in naturally occurring data flagged as offensive by the targets themselves. We also introduce the reader to the world of social media content creators and discuss who the targets in our study are, and provide some demographic information about them. We discuss the use of Sketch Engine as a tool to address our primary objective of exploring the formal, lexical, semantic and discursive strategies involved in the construction of offensive language. We also discuss Wmatrix5, a corpus tool used to explore the semantic dimensions of offensive language. In addition, we explain how quantitative analysis was combined with thematic and linguistic-pragmatic approaches to examine how frequency and context shape offensive meanings. Chapter 3 further outlines our ethical considerations, including the responsible handling of data and the protection of participant anonymity, throughout the research process.
The Conclusion formulates the ethical role that I attribute to multi-scalar poetics in the context of an accelerating ecological crisis. I argue that narrative fiction can enable response-ability towards multiple scales of life and scale-bound perspectives. I expand the concept of scalar irony, which I defend here as an eco-political mode of attention that fiction enables for the reader. Returning to the question of analogy, I argue against the temptation to hierarchise non-analogical tropes above analogical ones, and propose that literature’s power lies in its capacity to turn all tropes into sites of epistemic and ethical negotiation.
Chapter 4 discusses the ethical potential of fictional trans-scalar encounters. Richard Powers’s The Overstory (2018) and Alexis Wright’s The Swan Book (2013) confront human characters with unfamiliar scales of existence: the slow time of trees, the multitudinous identity of forest or flock, the accelerating time of climate change, and the geographical patterns of collective migration. Both novels highlight disjunctions between scales as a key obstacle to environmental response-ability, by contrasting a sacrificed location with globalisation’s discourse of prosperity. These stories also highlight the fractures between individual and species-scale behaviour, and the difficulty of relating to the self as species. These fault lines lead me to ask whether allegorical narrative might in itself constitute a hindrance to trans-scalar ethics by smoothing out disjunctions and scale effects. I suggest that metalepsis acts as a counterweight to allegory in these novels. By construing trans-scalar encounters as frame-breaking events, metalepsis opens up the possibility of ethical relation.
The Introduction observes that a significant strand of twenty-first-century fiction is attempting to connect the human to other-than-human scales. I suggest that this fiction performs epistemic and ethical work because it foregrounds relations of biological and ecological interdependence. I situate my study in the context of scale theory and outline the eco-political and symbiopolitical stakes of scalar rhetoric. I then highlight the different ways in which multi-scalar poetics stimulate ontological and ethical questioning, produce new conceptions of self, agency, and environment, and ultimately enable ecological response-ability. Scale-switching, I argue, is not only a significant writing practice but a necessary reading methodology. I then introduce the three main devices analysed in the book: critical synecdoche, ontological metalepsis, and scalar irony.
Ethics, for Emerson, begins in perceiving the “wonderful congruity which subsists between man and the world” such that ethics, in thinking and in living, is a matter of being “allied to all.” In this view, the “infinitude of the private man” – often yoked to the concept of “self-reliance” – names a metaphysical and ontological fact at the heart of Emerson’s ethics: human existence within a web of interconnections. This chapter draws widely from Emerson’s oeuvre to show how he unites “severe science with a poetic vision,” seeing and seeking to express how “Our life is consentaneous and far-related.” His work teaches us to see kinships between ethics, aesthetics, religion, science, and politics, and to consider ethics a practice of observing the intimacies in which we exist and in which the ethical question “How shall I live?” begins living in us.
Edited by
Katherine Warburton, California Department of State Hospitals, University of California, Davis, USA,Stephen M. Stahl, University of California, Riverside, USA
Balancing autonomy and beneficence remains an ongoing challenge in the ethical treatment of patients with schizophrenia and other psychiatric disorders of thought. Psychiatric advance directives (PADs) offer one mechanism through which individuals can guide their own care, but unlike medical advance directives, they are not widely utilized in the United States. They are also highly limited by state law in the scope of their legal authority. This article explores the evidentiary basis for PADs as well as the legal and ethical issues that arise in the use of PADsin individuals with schizophrenia, arguing that providers’ fears of complete opt-out from care by patients are likely unfounded and that PADs offer a powerful tool through which individuals with schizophrenia can ensure meaningful consideration of their own values and goals.
I aim to make progress on the following question: When is it morally wrong to risk harming another being? I will pay special attention to the use of the roundworm Caenorhabditis elegans (C. elegans), but my points are relevant to other situations and beings. I focus on the motive or purpose for exposing a being to risk of harm. I argue that it is morally wrong to potentially harm a being for the sake of others’ positive well-being or for a purported good such as knowledge (that is, knowledge for its own sake). The practical ramifications include that there is a moral hurdle of justification for potentially harming another being, and the justification cannot be others’ positive well-being or a good such as knowledge. Essentially, if the use of a being can be morally justified, it needs to be justified based on reducing enough ill-being or unpleasantness. One should recognise the creation and use of beings as a moral issue and view any warranted potential harm as a regrettable lesser evil. If feasible, it is desirable to use alternative methods that carry less risk and do not involve potentially sentient beings.
Psychiatry emphasises leadership development, but neglects the equally universal and essential role of followership. Although most clinicians spend more time as followers than leaders, literature overwhelmingly favours leadership. Drawing on healthcare, socio-religious traditions and management science, the authors reframe followership as an active, values-driven role grounded in trust, motivation and moral courage rather than passive compliance. This editorial argues that effective followership is active, ethical and courageous. Nurturing good followers in mental health services is essential for good patient care, organisational integrity and sustainable leadership. Cultivating active followership strengthens safeguarding, transparency and organisational legitimacy. The editorial calls for psychiatry and mental health services to explicitly teach and value followership alongside leadership, promoting shared vision, psychological safety and accountable decision-making to improve patient care and professional culture.
Although we value Guyer’s particular reading of British Idealist works, we nonetheless consider that his largely textualist-focused approach narrows both the scope and ultimate comprehension of Idealist ethics, particularly in relation to Kant. We consider that Guyer’s analysis misses the depth of their moral understanding. Such Idealist argumentation embodies a rich blending of historical, sociological, political, and evolutionary theory, which was employed consistently in their ethical reflections. To miss this contextual point can make many of their writings almost unintelligible. Thus, we consider it of central importance to understand British Idealist moral philosophy within this much broader philosophical frame.
While Emerson's place in American literary history has remained secure, the New Cambridge Companion to Ralph Waldo Emerson draws on a wealth of recent Emerson scholarship which has highlighted his contemporary relevance for questions of philosophy and politics, ecology and science, poetics and aesthetics, or identity and race, and connects these to the key formal and interpretive issues at stake in understanding his work. The volume's contributors engage the full breadth of Emerson's writing, developing novel approaches to canonical works like Nature, the essays 'Self-Reliance' 'Experience,' or to his poetry and journals, and bringing critical attention to his lectures and to the long-overlooked texts of his later period. This New Cambridge Companion to Ralph Waldo Emerson thus both bears witness to the new Emersons that have emerged in the past decades, and draws a new circle in Emerson's reception.
We always treat fluent language as a marker of intelligence and trustworthiness, often independent of factual accuracy. Large language models (LLMs) exploit this bias by producing confident, human-like texts that are perceived as intelligent and trustworthy, even when they lack accurate contextual understanding or are factually incorrect. This creates particular risks in mental healthcare, where communication, trust and context are central, and where errors are difficult to detect but highly consequential. This article examines how linguistic fluency shapes judgement, how LLMs amplify these effects and why their use in mental healthcare poses ethical and clinical dangers. It argues for strict limits on deployment, restricting LLMs to supervised, assistive tasks rather than clinical judgement.
There is a widespread perception among academics, doctors and patients that the common law can effectively drive the development and incorporation of patients’ autonomy-based rights into medical practice. However, there is reason to doubt that this is correct.
We present a critical analysis of this view, prompted by themes that emerged from interviews with n=31 lawyers and n=24 doctors as part of a larger interdisciplinary study. We focus on the limitations of case law in driving autonomy-respecting clinical practice. Part I examines how the development and impact of decided cases is dominated by practical and economic considerations. It also considers the lack of understanding of case law among clinicians and the extent to which this limits its ability to drive change. Part II sets out our reasons for treating these limitations as a cause for concern. In Part III, we conclude by considering different levers for supporting case law in creating or confirming autonomy-respecting norms in medical practice, suggesting ways in which these might be developed further.
We argue that clinical negligence litigation is important as a guide to clinical practice and a means of enforcing autonomy-based patient rights but that it cannot be relied upon to drive changes in practice. Both professional guidance and legislation can augment case law but, for them to be effective, proper communication between doctors and legislators, courts, lawyers and insurance organizations is essential.
Mental health advance directives are one mechanism to enable individuals to have a voice in their treatment at a time when most legislative systems would consider them to lack the capacity to make informed choices. This honours their will and preferences while at the same time recognising the difficulties of the legislative framework. In this review we consider the use of such advance directives in New Zealand, in the form of a specialised advance agreement known as a mental health advance preference statement (MAPS). By evaluating their development and considering their ethics and cultural components we offer insights into one approach to the creation and implementation of MAPS for other jurisdictions.
Rydenfelt begins by considering how some classical pragmatists approached the question of the relationship between human beings and the natural environment. With that background in place, Rydenfelt proceeds to argue that pragmatism provides a unique perspective on questions within contemporary environmental philosophy and ethics. Influenced by idealism but rejecting its invidious distinction between humans and nonhumans, appropriating the worldview of post-Darwinian science but refusing to see philosophy as just another one of the special sciences, pragmatism makes room for a distinct approach to philosophical questions about the environment. One of the most important of those questions is that of the value of nature, and environmental pragmatism understands the pursuit of such normative questions as empirical and experimental, thus attempting to connect normative theory with social practice. Still, it offers no quick and easy solutions but instead recognizes that the pursuit of philosophical questions about nature, like philosophical inquiry generally, and like scientific inquiry even more generally, is a long-term endeavor.
Drawing from both the medieval Scholastic philosophical-theological tradition and Aristotelian virtue ethics, Thomas Aquinas offers a comprehensive and nuanced account of the virtuous life – one that suggests fruitful relationships not only with contemporary philosophical and theological discussions but also with recent empirical work. In this short chapter, I sketch the big picture using an Aristotelian, four-causes approach. Section 1 mainly addresses the final cause or telos of virtue: ultimately, perfect happiness in eternal life – although a good earthly life affords “a certain participation” in happiness. Section 2 considers virtue’s quasi-material causes: reason and the appetites, including the intellectual appetite or will. Section 3 focuses on the formal causes (modes) of virtue in general and of the cardinal and theological virtues in particular, as well as the relationships between various virtues in the larger structure of Thomistic virtue ethics – including the possibility of a unity of the virtues. And Section 4 discusses proposed efficient causes of such virtues, drawing on the various ways in which virtues are developed and related to each other in the Thomistic picture. Throughout, I consider connections between Aquinas’s account of the virtuous life and contemporary work in ethics, psychology, and education.
This chapter addresses one of the most important areas of philosophy – ethics – and uses it to examine aspects of the role of the law in education. Of all the areas of philosophy, more has probably been written about ethics, and over a longer period, than any other. In addition, all cultures are structured around a fundamental ethical system: the law. However, irrespective of their importance, both subjects are currently notable for their lowly status within the teacher education curriculum.
In social entrepreneurship research, social businesses have increasingly been cited as a proper conduit to solutions for pressing social problems to transform societies into better places. As a result, the ethics of social entrepreneurship is often assumed but not explicitly explained. In this article, we reflect on this view and offer an alternative to enrich the comprehension of ethics in this area. We draw on Ricoeur’s notion of the economy of the gift, which stresses the generosity that we put in our relationships with others to evaluate the ethicality of our actions. This approach brings fresh insights to judge the ethics in the social entrepreneurship field with an integrative approach that goes beyond what is considered to serve a social mission or adopting a social governance but considering the ethics of actions in the immediacy and singularity of each relationship and situation.
We conducted an exploratory cross-sectional analysis of ethical principles and practices in forty-one published research papers with empirical data on HIV prevalence, incidence, or risk factors in humanitarian settings. We identified ten key concepts pertinent to ethical principles and applications, and presented recommendations to inform future HIV prevention research.
Despite being a rare phenomenon, children who kill galvanise extraordinary amounts of conversation about why they did it, how to deal with them and how to prevent recurrences. The debate quickly becomes polarised and occasionally politicised, often without nuanced consideration of the benefits and costs of proceeding in one direction or another. A scientific approach would begin with the question: ‘what do we actually want the outcomes to be?’, which might assist in relinquishing the less helpful desire for natural justice or revenge and move towards a more evidence-informed and inclusive approach to children who have committed very serious crimes.