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Chapter 5 returns to discussions of the law at the federal level. It reconstructs debates over defunding the law in Congress and in the federal agencies, arguing that the Children’s Bureau leadership learned from their trouble administering Sheppard-Towner programs through the states. Giving states ultimate authority over programming had meant that each state director documented their Sheppard-Towner work differently – if they did so at all. When it came time to renew federal appropriations in Congress, the Bureau staff found itself unable to create and present national statistics on the workings of state programs. Children’s Bureau leaders recognized that they would have to take more control over state-level accounting in subsequent legislation if they hoped to maintain their claim to expertise through accurate reporting. In the meantime, without reliable national data, the Bureau had little ability to defend its use of federal dollars when conservatives swept Washington in the 1926 election and the law came under attack. A few years later, in a political climate much more friendly to federal intervention, the Bureau staff was able to implement the oversight they learned they needed in their administration of Title V of the Social Security Act.
Chapter 2 documents the politics of passing the Sheppard-Towner Act through Congress and the concessions the Children’s Bureau made in order to do so. These concessions had significant implications for how the law was administered at the federal and state levels. Dodging legal and political challenges to their administrative authority, the Children’s Bureau agents ceded significant control to the states and therefore struggled to oversee state programming – and critically state documentation. Within this dynamic, the Children’s Bureau and state directors alike showed a great deal of ambivalence about federal oversight in state programming. By focusing on the administrative tensions characterizing Sheppard-Towner’s implementation, this chapter demonstrates the contingent process of state-building in the early twentieth century – much of which was done with voluntary labor. In the process, it exposes what the promise of Sheppard-Towner programs meant to ordinary mothers and public health workers across the nation and describes the disappointment some felt at the limits of what the law could offer.
In multilevel governance systems, member states work together to address cross-border problems, yet people still lack a clear understanding of how and why their policies differ or converge. Existing research offers many explanations but often treats them separately or overstates the EU's independent influence. This Element brings these perspectives together in a single framework of policy dynamics. It distinguishes policy areas shaped mainly by EU institutions or member states, or by their interaction. It introduces an actor-centered typology of policy dynamics – stable patterns of actors, incentives, and mechanisms that shape policy over time. The Element shows that these dynamics matter only when governments, interest groups, and NGOs have the incentives, capacity, and leverage to build coalitions and pursue goals. The policy dynamics framework helps learners identify likely causal mechanisms and supports clearer comparison, explanation, and teaching of EU policymaking. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.
Though coverage denials and delays impose on physicians and patients (especially marginalized patients) substantial administrative burden, the persistence of this practice is inevitable. Drawing on interviews with patients and former health insurance executives, this chapter reflects on harms caused by prior authorization and offers a menu of state and federal solutions to expand access to care, while also reflecting on how the 2024 election results impact their likelihood. A growing complication is major insurers’ increasing reliance on AI tools to process prior authorizations and claims in seconds. Though many states have sought to lessen prior authorization burden in targeted ways, this reach is limited because the Employee Retirement Income Security Act preempts state policies that “relate to” much of employer-sponsored health insurance. Despite some appetite for reform in Congress, legislative efforts have stalled. The 2024 election results signal a likely acceleration of America’s reliance on privatization (especially Medicare Advantage), so it is especially important to understand the impact of these managed care practices and ways to mitigate their burdens.
In federal systems where multiple orders of government share authority, do citizens care about which order makes a policy? To investigate whether citizens place importance on the order of government and whether if they do, this reflects principled preferences or implicit assumptions about policy performance, we conducted a vignette experiment in Germany. The design of the study disentangles the effects of policy adoption and financing from the expected effectiveness of a policy and its impact on regional differences. Our findings show that citizens are largely indifferent regarding the order of government that adopts a policy, but they show a modest preference for financing by the federal government. These results suggest that previously observed preferences for federal policy-making in other studies may reflect citizens’ implicit assumptions about policy performance rather than principled support for centralization.
It was a turning point in the history of European integration and a unique moment for the first President of the European Commission, Walter Hallstein. On 16 June 1965 in the afternoon, Hallstein appeared before the European Parliament (EP) to express his strong support for the constitutional interpretation of European law launched by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the new Van Gend en Loos (1963) and Costa v ENEL (1964) judgments. Here the ECJ had controversially assumed the competence to define the relationship between European law and national constitutional orders. By doing so the ECJ sidestepped the respective constitutional clauses of the member states on how to receive international (and European) law. Primary legal norms from the founding treaties, when clear and unambiguous, would have direct effect inside the legal order of the member states as well as primacy vis-à-vis national legislation, whether precedent or antecedent. This was a remarkable breakthrough for a constitutional interpretation of European law.
This chapter examines the origins of the Home Rule movement during the 1870s focusing on Isaac Butt’s pioneering vision of federalism as a constitutional solution to Ireland’s governance. The analysis reveals how Butt’s Irish Federalism (1870) proposed a radical reimagining of the United Kingdom’s structure,creating national parliaments for local affairs while maintaining an imperial parliament for common concerns. The chapter explores the intellectual foundations of this federalist model, showing how it emerged from earlier debates about representation while attempting to reconcile Irish autonomy with the Union. Butt’s federalist framework was fundamentally unionist in intent, seeking to perfect rather than dissolve the imperial connection. However, as the chapter traces, this nuanced constitutional position became obscured as the Home Rule idea was adopted by more radical voices who reinterpreted it along separatist lines. The chapter illuminates this pivotal transitional period when the constitutional experimentation of federlaism gave way to the more rigid nationalist/unionist binaries that would dominate Irish politics by the 1880s.
This formative period of EU law witnessed an intense struggle over the emergence of a constitutional practice. While the supranational institutions, including the European Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament, as well as EU law academics helped to develop and promote the constitutional practice, member state governments and judiciaries were generally reluctant to embrace it. The struggle resulted in an uneasy stalemate in which the constitutional practice was allowed to influence the doctrines, shape and functioning of the European legal order that now underpins the EU, but a majority of member state governments rejected European constitutionalism as the legitimating principle of the new EU formed on basis of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). The struggle and eventual stalemate over the constitutional practice traced in this book accounts for the fragile and partial system of rule of law that exists in the EU today.
The EU is more than a traditional international organisation such as the UN, because it has its own budget, currency, and directly applicable law. Yet it is not a state, for it lacks a police force, army, and criminal justice system. Its member states conserve a right of veto for all major decisions. It is therefore illuminating to explore the EU’s unique political and institutional features in order to understand how it has played such a large role in organising European capitalism, and to determine its compatibility with the three forms of capitalist governance (liberty, solidarity and community). The European Union’s dominant role in regulating capitalism emerged quite late, after the failure of numerous alternatives in both European and international organisations. As Brexit has shown, it is perfectly possible for the Union to shrivel, potentially due to nationalistic pressures. The European institutional system, while being easier to combine with the liberty aspect of capitalism, is also conducive to solidarity and community. The role of European institutions was to facilitate the combination of various national forms of solidarity and community capitalism in Europe.
Moving beyond binary nationalist and unionist narratives of nineteenth-century Irish history, this study instead explores political thought through ideological battles over government. Drawing on neglected pamphlets, political tracts and polemic newspapers, Colin Reid reveals how Irish protagonists - unionists and anti-unionists, Catholic Emancipationists, Repealers, Tories, Fenians, and federalists - clashed over the meaning of representation, sovereignty and the British connection. Reid traces how competing constitutional visions, rather than national allegiances, drove Ireland's political evolution. From the bitter Union debates to the birth of Home Rule, it recovers forgotten arguments about parliamentary reform, the 'Irish question' in imperial context and the fraught experience of a small nation within a multinational polity. With fresh insights into figures such as Daniel O'Connell, Isaac Butt and lesser-known polemicists, this study redefines Irish political thought as a dynamic struggle for representative government. This title is also available as open access on Cambridge Core.
This chapter describes how the book contributes to the understanding of lawmaking under authoritarianism by specifying the conditions under which legislatures perform their lawmaking function within authoritarian regimes, showing the mechanisms through which legislatures operate and influence the contents of policies, and helping to elucidate the ways in which legislatures may be consequential both to policymaking and politics, thus extending the scope conditions of power-sharing accounts of lawmaking to any type of autocracy. It also suggests how the theory and methods employed may be used to study the role of business and bureacracies in authoritarian regimes, and to recast the approaches to federalism and policymaking under dictatorship, and to the role of legislature in regime transitions.
The global rise of deliberative democratic innovations, particularly minipublics such as citizens’ assemblies and deliberative polls, has been marked by uneven adoption across advanced democracies. While some countries have integrated these mechanisms into their democratic frameworks, others remain hesitant, raising questions about the institutional conditions that facilitate or hinder their adoption. This study employs qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to examine how configurations of three key institutional dimensions – consensus democracy, federalism, and direct democracy – shape the adoption of minipublics. Our findings reveal that minipublics are more likely to be adopted in majoritarian systems with strong federalism and limited direct democracy, where they address participatory gaps. Conversely, systems combining high consensus democracy and extensive direct democratic mechanisms, such as Switzerland, often exhibit lower adoption rates, as existing power-sharing structures fulfil similar deliberative functions.
During World War I, national pride in France fostered solidarity and increased patriotism. However, after the war, the principles of self-determination and nationality reignited debates among young regionalists about federal reorganization in France and Europe. Federalism was seen as a way to promote peace in Europe and to protect national minorities within the state. This movement crystallized in 1927 when representatives from Alsace, Corsica, and Brittany established the Central Committee of National Minorities in France (CCMNF). The CCMNF advocated for self-determination and international federalism, suggesting that a federation of peoples could replace the modern state system. This structure would let each nationality decide its political status and cultural development. While the CCMNF marked a milestone in uniting minorities around federalist ideas, its efforts were slowed by the 1929 economic crisis and a resurgence of political tensions. This article examines the rise of regionalist federalism in 1920s France and its connection to the broader post-war discussions on self-determination. By placing this movement within the larger national debates on reorganizing the French state, it highlights federalism’s potential as a transformative framework for addressing political and cultural diversity.
This chapter situates the Declaration of Independence in relation to another founding document of the United States, the federal Constitution. It assesses the Declaration’s role in debates over the Constitution, first during the latter’s framing in 1787, then in the struggle for ratification, and then later as political actors sought to interpret each document in light of the other. From the outset, debate over the Constitution highlighted the Declaration’s multivalence as well as its rhetorical power. Both defenders and opponents of the Constitution have sought to show how their cause best aligned with the ideals and aspirations expressed in the Declaration. Anti-federalists and their successors constructed a powerful narrative which juxtaposed the Declaration’s call to liberty with the Constitution’s blueprint for authority. Yet there was from the beginning an equally strong tradition that saw the Constitution as a consummation of the Declaration’s promise. Either way, this chapter argues, the Declaration continues to help shape the meaning of the Constitution – and to have its own meaning remolded in turn.
The question of whether and how federalism influences a country's welfare state has been a longstanding concern of political scientists. However, no agreement exists on exactly how, and under what conditions, federal structures impact the welfare state. This article examines this controversy. It concludes theoretically that the specific constellation of federal structures and distribution of powers need to be considered when theorising the effects of federalism on the welfare state. Using the case of Belgium and applying the synthetic control method, it is shown in the article that without the federalism reform of 1993, the country would have had further decreases in social spending rather than a consolidation of this spending in the years after 1993. In the case of Belgium, the combination of increased subnational spending autonomy in a still national financing system provided ideal conditions for a positive federalism effect on social spending to occur.
Although federal arrangements adopt a multiplicity of forms across and within federations, this article suggests that some models of power division are better than others at enhancing clarity of responsibility and electoral accountability. This conclusion is the result of exploring responsibility attribution and economic voting in a state where decentralisation arrangements vary across regions: the Spanish State of Autonomies. Using electoral surveys and aggregated economic data for the 1982–2012 period, the empirical analysis shows that regional economic voting is most pronounced in regions where decentralisation design concentrated authority and resources at one level of government, whereas it is inexistent in regions where devolution followed a more intertwined model of power distribution. The implication of the empirical findings is that the specific design of intergovernmental arrangements is crucial to make electoral accountability work in federations.
This article uses cross‐national data to examine the effects of fiscal and political decentralisation on subnational governments’ social expenditures. It revisits the benefit competition hypothesis put forward by fiscal federalism research, which posits that subnational governments in decentralised countries match welfare benefit reductions by their peers to keep taxes low and avoid an in‐migration of welfare dependents. As a consequence, subnational social expenditures are assumed to plateau at similar and low levels. Using a new cross‐national dataset on social expenditures in 334 subnational units across 14 countries and 21 years, the author explores whether benefit competition causes subnational governments to converge on similar levels of social spending. The analysis reveals that as countries decentralise, subnational social spending levels begin to diverge rather than converge, with some subnational governments reducing their social expenditures and others increasing them. Furthermore, decentralisation is not likely to be associated with lowest common denominator social policies, but with more variability in social expenditure. The article also examines the effects of other macro‐level institutions and demonstrates that policy coordination influences the relationship between decentralisation and subnational social spending levels.
The literature on party system nationalisation has yet to provide a better understanding of the impact of short‐term factors upon the nationalisation of politics. This article helps to fill this literature gap by analysing the effect of economic conditions on party system nationalisation. The argument is that economic crises will decrease levels of nationalisation by amplifying territorial variation in preferences for redistribution, limiting political parties’ capacity to coordinate divergent interests across districts and triggering the emergence of new political forces. Data on 47 countries for the 1960–2011 period confirm this hypothesis and show that lower economic growth during the years prior to the election is associated with a decrease in levels of party system nationalisation in the next election. The result is robust to variation in the specification of the econometric model and to the use of different measures of nationalisation. Results also show that federal institutions increase the impact of economic conditions on the nationalisation of politics, whereas any moderating effect of electoral system proportionality on the economy is not found.
The recent financial and debt crisis has resuscitated the debate about European federalism – a theme that seemed not to have survived the painful constitutional adventure that ended with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. With the adoption of significant policy and institutional measures for tightening macroeconomic and budgetary coordination (including a constitutionally enshrined debt brake), the reforms of the monetary union have undisputedly brought the European Union further on the path towards an ever closer union. In an era where EU integration has been increasingly politicised, and Euroscepticism has been on the rise and exploited by anti‐system parties, national leaders have to face a political hiatus and respond to increased needs for symbolic and discursive legitimation of further federalisation. This is all the more crucial for French and German leaders who have brokered the main decisions during the crisis of the eurozone. Against this background, the purpose of this article is not to assess whether, or to what extent, the recent reforms of economic and monetary union have made the EU more federal. Rather, the purpose is to tackle the following puzzle: How have EU leaders legitimised the deepening of federal integration in a context where support for more European federalism is at its lowest? To elucidate this, a lexicographic discourse analysis is conducted based on all speeches held by the German Chancellor Merkel and the two French Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande, previous to, or after European summits from early 2010 until the spring of 2013. The findings indicate that federalism is both taboo and pervasive in French and German leaders' discourse. The paradox is barely apparent, though. While the ‘F‐word’ is rarely spoken aloud, two distinctive visions co‐exist in the French and German discourse. The coming of age of a political union through constitutional federalism is pictured as ineluctable, yet as a distant mirage out of reach of today's decision makers. At the same time, the deepening of functional federalism in order to cope with economic interdependence is a ubiquitous imperative that justifies further integration. The persisting gap between the constitutional and the functional vision of European federalism has crucial implications. Insofar as the Union is held responsible for not delivering successful economic policy, political leaders will fail to legitimise both functional and constitutional federalism.
This paper examines the contribution of German subnational constitutional courts to the judicialization of politics in the German states, known as Länder. This research goal entails three dimensions. First, I have to define and measure judicialization. To accomplish this task, I use an index recently developed by an international group of scholars of comparative politics. Second, based on major theoretical approaches, I identify possible causes that might give reasons for judicialization, namely institutional preconditions and preferences of justices. In a third step, I use a linear regression in order to test the theory empirically and find links between causes and effects of judicial decision-making in subnational constitutional courts. The findings confirm institutionalist approaches that contribute to explaining decision-making in German subnational constitutional courts.