During World War I, national pride in France fostered solidarity and increased patriotism. However, after the war, the principles of self-determination and nationality reignited debates among young regionalists about federal reorganization in France and Europe. Federalism was seen as a way to promote peace in Europe and to protect national minorities within the state. This movement crystallized in 1927 when representatives from Alsace, Corsica, and Brittany established the Central Committee of National Minorities in France (CCMNF). The CCMNF advocated for self-determination and international federalism, suggesting that a federation of peoples could replace the modern state system. This structure would let each nationality decide its political status and cultural development. While the CCMNF marked a milestone in uniting minorities around federalist ideas, its efforts were slowed by the 1929 economic crisis and a resurgence of political tensions. This article examines the rise of regionalist federalism in 1920s France and its connection to the broader post-war discussions on self-determination. By placing this movement within the larger national debates on reorganizing the French state, it highlights federalism’s potential as a transformative framework for addressing political and cultural diversity.

The question of whether and how federalism influences a country's welfare state has been a longstanding concern of political scientists. However, no agreement exists on exactly how, and under what conditions, federal structures impact the welfare state. This article examines this controversy. It concludes theoretically that the specific constellation of federal structures and distribution of powers need to be considered when theorising the effects of federalism on the welfare state. Using the case of Belgium and applying the synthetic control method, it is shown in the article that without the federalism reform of 1993, the country would have had further decreases in social spending rather than a consolidation of this spending in the years after 1993. In the case of Belgium, the combination of increased subnational spending autonomy in a still national financing system provided ideal conditions for a positive federalism effect on social spending to occur.

Although federal arrangements adopt a multiplicity of forms across and within federations, this article suggests that some models of power division are better than others at enhancing clarity of responsibility and electoral accountability. This conclusion is the result of exploring responsibility attribution and economic voting in a state where decentralisation arrangements vary across regions: the Spanish State of Autonomies. Using electoral surveys and aggregated economic data for the 1982–2012 period, the empirical analysis shows that regional economic voting is most pronounced in regions where decentralisation design concentrated authority and resources at one level of government, whereas it is inexistent in regions where devolution followed a more intertwined model of power distribution. The implication of the empirical findings is that the specific design of intergovernmental arrangements is crucial to make electoral accountability work in federations.

This article uses cross‐national data to examine the effects of fiscal and political decentralisation on subnational governments’ social expenditures. It revisits the benefit competition hypothesis put forward by fiscal federalism research, which posits that subnational governments in decentralised countries match welfare benefit reductions by their peers to keep taxes low and avoid an in‐migration of welfare dependents. As a consequence, subnational social expenditures are assumed to plateau at similar and low levels. Using a new cross‐national dataset on social expenditures in 334 subnational units across 14 countries and 21 years, the author explores whether benefit competition causes subnational governments to converge on similar levels of social spending. The analysis reveals that as countries decentralise, subnational social spending levels begin to diverge rather than converge, with some subnational governments reducing their social expenditures and others increasing them. Furthermore, decentralisation is not likely to be associated with lowest common denominator social policies, but with more variability in social expenditure. The article also examines the effects of other macro‐level institutions and demonstrates that policy coordination influences the relationship between decentralisation and subnational social spending levels.

The literature on party system nationalisation has yet to provide a better understanding of the impact of short‐term factors upon the nationalisation of politics. This article helps to fill this literature gap by analysing the effect of economic conditions on party system nationalisation. The argument is that economic crises will decrease levels of nationalisation by amplifying territorial variation in preferences for redistribution, limiting political parties’ capacity to coordinate divergent interests across districts and triggering the emergence of new political forces. Data on 47 countries for the 1960–2011 period confirm this hypothesis and show that lower economic growth during the years prior to the election is associated with a decrease in levels of party system nationalisation in the next election. The result is robust to variation in the specification of the econometric model and to the use of different measures of nationalisation. Results also show that federal institutions increase the impact of economic conditions on the nationalisation of politics, whereas any moderating effect of electoral system proportionality on the economy is not found.

The recent financial and debt crisis has resuscitated the debate about European federalism – a theme that seemed not to have survived the painful constitutional adventure that ended with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. With the adoption of significant policy and institutional measures for tightening macroeconomic and budgetary coordination (including a constitutionally enshrined debt brake), the reforms of the monetary union have undisputedly brought the European Union further on the path towards an ever closer union. In an era where EU integration has been increasingly politicised, and Euroscepticism has been on the rise and exploited by anti‐system parties, national leaders have to face a political hiatus and respond to increased needs for symbolic and discursive legitimation of further federalisation. This is all the more crucial for French and German leaders who have brokered the main decisions during the crisis of the eurozone. Against this background, the purpose of this article is not to assess whether, or to what extent, the recent reforms of economic and monetary union have made the EU more federal. Rather, the purpose is to tackle the following puzzle: How have EU leaders legitimised the deepening of federal integration in a context where support for more European federalism is at its lowest? To elucidate this, a lexicographic discourse analysis is conducted based on all speeches held by the German Chancellor Merkel and the two French Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande, previous to, or after European summits from early 2010 until the spring of 2013. The findings indicate that federalism is both taboo and pervasive in French and German leaders' discourse. The paradox is barely apparent, though. While the ‘F‐word’ is rarely spoken aloud, two distinctive visions co‐exist in the French and German discourse. The coming of age of a political union through constitutional federalism is pictured as ineluctable, yet as a distant mirage out of reach of today's decision makers. At the same time, the deepening of functional federalism in order to cope with economic interdependence is a ubiquitous imperative that justifies further integration. The persisting gap between the constitutional and the functional vision of European federalism has crucial implications. Insofar as the Union is held responsible for not delivering successful economic policy, political leaders will fail to legitimise both functional and constitutional federalism.

This paper examines the contribution of German subnational constitutional courts to the judicialization of politics in the German states, known as Länder. This research goal entails three dimensions. First, I have to define and measure judicialization. To accomplish this task, I use an index recently developed by an international group of scholars of comparative politics. Second, based on major theoretical approaches, I identify possible causes that might give reasons for judicialization, namely institutional preconditions and preferences of justices. In a third step, I use a linear regression in order to test the theory empirically and find links between causes and effects of judicial decision-making in subnational constitutional courts. The findings confirm institutionalist approaches that contribute to explaining decision-making in German subnational constitutional courts.

This article addresses the effects of decentralisation reforms on regionalist parties' electoral strength. It takes up the debate between ‘accommodatists’ (i.e., electoral loss due to policy accommodation) and ‘institutionalists’ (i.e., electoral gain due to institutional empowerment). These effects depend on the electoral venue considered – regional or national – and on the ideological radicalism of a given regionalist party – secessionist or autonomist. This study finds that increases in the level of decentralisation are positively associated with higher scores for autonomist parties in regional elections, while they are not statistically significantly correlated with secessionist parties' electoral performances. In contrast, in national elections, decentralisation reforms seem to penalise autonomist parties more than secessionist ones. These findings are based on the analysis of a novel dataset which includes regional and national vote shares for 77 regionalist parties in 11 Western democracies from 1950 until 2010.

Although it is widely accepted that a decentralised system can enhance policy learning and the spread of best practices, an under‐researched question is where that learning process takes place. Using data on the diffusion of health care policies in Switzerland, this article analyses the role of institutionalised intergovernmental cooperation and its impact on the spread of successful policies. The results show that joint membership of policy makers in health policy specific intergovernmental bodies is related to the diffusion of best practices.

Constitutional courts (CCs) in federal and quasi-federal systems are often expected to act as neutral arbiters in conflicts between levels of government. This article challenges that assumption by analysing the behavior of Spain’s Constitutional Court over four decades of constitutional litigation. Drawing on an original dataset of 1,888 rulings on all challenges to national and regional legislation (1981–2023), we examine how judicial outcomes are shaped by political alignment, institutional design, and court ideology. Our analysis reveals a consistent pattern of deference to the central government, especially when the Court is ideologically conservative or aligned with the federal executive. These results support a strategic model of judicial behavior and raise broader questions about the role of CCs in multilevel systems. Rather than acting as counter-majoritarian forces, courts may reinforce central dominance in center–periphery conflicts, limiting their capacity to protect territorial pluralism in practice.

Canadian political scientists have often taken a normative approach to political institutions like the constitution, the electoral system, and Parliament. An assumption that institutional reform can itself be a solution to political problems is also reflected in general public commentary and at times has been openly encouraged and supported by the Canadian state itself. This approach has many strengths but also deficiencies, particularly the degree to which it replicates existing understandings of the state, focused on the distribution of power among white men. The study of political institutions in Canada must continue growing to incorporate and integrate a greater diversity of perspectives, including interrogating and challenging their very foundations.

Canadian politics is shaped by three intersecting areas of constitutional law: Aboriginal rights, federalism and Charter jurisprudence. While a canon has emerged on the role of courts in Canadian democracy, it is often asserted that Charter scholarship dominates the field. Is this true—and does it matter? We address these questions through a systematic survey of 423 studies published between 2012 and 2022 in leading Canadian journals, books and edited volumes. We find that most work is produced by legal scholars, is descriptive, focuses on the Charter and examines a narrow range of cases and themes—most notably the court’s relationship with other institutions, its legitimacy and its power of judicial review. We argue that advancing our understanding of courts in Canadian democracy requires moving beyond our tendency to stick to our lanes—engaging core theories of judicial politics, employing explanatory methods and analyzing multiple areas of constitutional law.

Event history analysis (EHA) revolutionized the study of policy diffusion. However, many diffusion studies are snapshots of a policy’s spread. This begs the question of what we are learning from studies of (often) incomplete diffusion. The simple question that we ask – when should a diffusion study be conducted? – is complex to answer. We offer insight into this question using literature on EHA and empirical observation. We use data from the State Innovation and Policy Diffusion database on 83 policies that were adopted by at least 42 states to demonstrate how key results change as the observation window changes. We conclude with advice on how to approach modeling and interpreting incomplete policy diffusion in the future.

This essay links Jeremy Bentham and Immanuel Kant more closely in their politics and political theory through a shared, substantially similar debt to Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations. In particular, I argue that on some key political questions that are foundational to liberalism, they draw strikingly akin lessons from Smith and build on his ideas in a similar direction. That is, even otherwise very different strands of early liberalism find agreement on a constellation of ideas about trade, federalism, and peace. I show that these are not just preoccupations of Kant’s potentially idiosyncratic Perpetual Peace, but help define the whole political tradition.