States have long been understood to have an obligation to protect the international legal rights and interests of others, consistent with the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use what is yours in such a manner as not to injure that of another). As the world's population becomes more interdependent, this no harm obligation becomes more significant. Further, as knowledge increases about the consequences of human activity for the climate and the environment, the no harm obligation takes on greater relevance vis-à-vis the interests of the Earth's future populations. Future generations’ legal interests have been recognized in the context of sustainable development and through the principle of intergenerational equity. The no harm rule requires that these interests be properly considered and addressed appropriately, commensurate with what is at stake. At a minimum, this may require avoidance of ‘manifestly excessive adverse impacts’.

This article maps the shared legal anatomy of climate and environmental lawsuits, in which plaintiffs claim protection for future generations before domestic or international courts. By closely analyzing the litigation strategies of plaintiffs and the inquiry of courts, the article argues that these proceedings revolve around structurally similar legal standards across domestic and international jurisdictions, which correspond to five normative requirements flowing from the rule of law: namely, respect for human rights, certain quality of law requirements, prohibition of arbitrary exercise of governmental powers, non-discrimination, and access to justice. The cross-jurisdictional analysis shows that courts appear to be increasingly willing to protect future generations against arbitrary treatment by present-day decision makers. The article appraises whether such an intergenerationally sensitive reinterpretation of the rule of law could help to change the short-termist paradigm of environmental and climate law.

This piece addresses Case C-458/19 P before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) concerning a substance of long-term exposure, namely bis(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate (DEHP). The case concerned the interplay of two complex procedures of European chemical law, namely: the procedure for authorising the use of a substance listed in Annex XIV of Regulation (EC) No 1907/2006 (REACH Regulation); and the procedure for listing a substance in Annex XIV of the REACH Regulation on the basis of its intrinsic properties as a substance of very high concern for the risks it poses, or may pose, to human and environmental health. The significance of this judgment is that it provides a better understanding of how Article 60(4) of the REACH Regulation is interpreted in an analogous manner in relation to other provisions of the same Regulation. Whether DEHP is a question of reproductive toxicity (Article 57(c) of the REACH Regulation) or endocrine-disrupting properties (Article 57(f) of the REACH Regulation), this judgment offers insights into the limits of the CJEU’s willingness and/or ability to use a teleological approach to interpret legislation in this area. Furthermore, this work supports the possibility of applying the principle of intergenerational equity to issues related to long-term exposure such as this one.

We study a stochastic model for a target benefit pension plan suffering from rising longevity and falling fertility. Policies for postponing retirement are carried out to hedge the payment difficulties caused by the aging population. The plan members’ contributions are set in advance while the pension payments reflect intergenerational equity by a target payment level and intergenerational risk sharing by an adjustment. The pension fund is invested in both a risk-free asset and a risky asset. Applying the stochastic optimal control methods, we derive analytic solutions for optimal investment and benefit payment strategies which minimize the benefit risk. Besides, an optimal delayed retirement age which can hedge against the aging phenomenon under certain parameters is given. Therefore, it can provide a basis for quantifying the delay of retirement time.

This article traces the various legal incarnations of the intergenerational equity principle. Despite its silent proliferation in international and constitutional laws over the past five decades, the principle dwelled mostly at the margins of inquiry and practice. Recent efforts to counteract global warming have allowed intergenerational claims to gain new traction. Building on a comparison of ten climate-related lawsuits, I analyze the latest advances in the representation, conceptualization, and remediation of future generations’ interests. Against the backdrop of growing willingness to engage with intergenerational disputes, legal decision makers will need to confront two thorny challenges going forward. Firstly, evolving doctrines of extraterritoriality and legal subjecthood increasingly require the protective scope of the principle to extend to foreign citizens and non-human persons. Secondly, awareness of dispersed and interlocked long-term risks may trigger the application of intergenerational doctrines beyond a narrow environmental frame. Grappling with these challenges implicates larger reflections about the role of law in contriving our collective future.

The German Federal Constitutional Court’s climate decision provides a nuanced acknowledgment of climate change’s constitutional relevance. In this Article, the author critically assesses how the Court innovatively sought to capture the intergenerational equity dimension of climate mitigation through a combination of negative and positive duties stemming from constitutional law. The Article demonstrates how despite progressive findings on intergenerational equity and the innovative invocation of negative duties, the operative part of the decision turned out to be rather limited. Because of remaining uncertainties about the allowable national carbon budget, the Court was unable to require the legislator to enact a stricter reduction path. The author argues that the Court could have narrowed remaining uncertainties, without engaging in judicial activism, by adopting an international and constitutional minimum approach to calculating the national budget and by adjusting the burden of proof. Finally, the Article highlights how the German legislator, by going beyond what was required by the Court “trapped itself” on an ambitious reduction path, opening opportunities for future constitutional complaints.

This paper provides new insights into the effect of birth cohort size on cohort lifetime wages and its sensitivity to the future trajectories of immigration and fertility. The main innovation is to relax the typical assumption of perfect substitution of labor by age. The effect of imperfect substitution of labor by age is to qualify the standard result that smaller birth cohorts are likely to enjoy relatively high wages since that result depends on the size of co-worker cohorts. The positive small cohort effect on lifetime wages therefore depends on demographic patterns, which are simulated here through low and high fertility and immigration projections. The analysis applies to actual and projected cohorts for Australia and tests the sensitivity to alternative demographic parameters, and the substitution and discount parameters. The effects of imperfect substitution can amount several percentage points of lifetime wages.

Attitudes to ageing can predispose decision-making as governments, interest groups and electorates negotiate competing demands in the context of economic constraints and social change. This paper, based on national survey data, investigates change and stability in Australian attitudes to intergenerational equity from 2009–2010 to 2015–2017, alongside concurrent socio-economic and policy change as well as cohort succession. The emphasis is on the baby-boom cohort who are viewed as significant beneficiaries of social change relative to opportunities of younger and older cohorts. Views of older people as a needy group may be changing slightly as more enter later life with substantial wealth and resources. Our results show that there is little perception of intergenerational conflict with the exception of the Millennial cohort whose life chances are compromised by economic and expenditure constraint over the past decade. Overall, attitudes remain sympathetic to older people, especially among women and people rendered vulnerable by poor health, non-home-ownership and low socio-economic positions. The findings do not align with government portrayals of intergenerational inequalities notwithstanding many having negative views of the future and ongoing expenditure restraint strategies. At what appears to be a critical turning point in the life chances of successive cohorts, the findings indicate the interplay between attitudes and social and policy change, as well as implications for social equity and processes of attitudinal change.

In recognition of the intrinsic links between climate change and human rights, many have argued that human rights should play a leading role in guiding state responses to climate change. A group whose human rights will inevitably be affected by climate action (or inaction) today are the members of future generations. Yet, despite their particular vulnerability, future generations so far have gone largely unnoticed in human rights analyses. An adequate response to climate change requires that we recognize and address the human rights consequences for future generations, and consider the legal, practical and theoretical questions involved. This article attempts to answer these questions with a particular focus on the Paris Agreement. It argues that the recognition of state obligations towards future generations is compatible with human rights theory, and that these obligations must be balanced against the duties owed to current generations. The article concludes with a number of suggestions for how this balance could be pursued.

Several areas of welfare economics seek to evaluate states of affairs as a function of interpersonally comparable individual utilities. The aim is to map each state of affairs onto a vector of individual utilities, and then to produce an ordering of these vectors that can be represented by a mathematical function assigning a real number to each. When this approach is used in intertemporal contexts, a central theoretical question concerns the rate of pure time preference, i.e. the evaluative weight to be applied to utility coming at different times. This article criticizes the standard philosophical account of pure time preference, arguing that it ascribes to economists a methodological commitment they need not accept. The article then evaluates three further objections to pure time preference, concluding that it might still be defensible under certain circumstances. I close by articulating a final argument that, if sound, would constitute a decisive objection to pure time preference as it currently figures in much intertemporal welfare economics.