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Prosecutor v Al Mahdi (Al Mahdi) has repeatedly been criticized as a “missed opportunity” for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to engage with Islamic law. However, an in-depth analysis of trial transcripts reveals that the ICC is already deeply engaged with Islamic normativity, albeit in ways that reproduce colonial patterns of recognition: it refuses to recognize the jihadist institutions as a legal order while simultaneously validating Sufi religious practices as authentically Islamic. Combining a praxeological law-in-action approach with scholarship on legal pluralism and colonial recognition, we argue that the ICC cannot adjudicate such cases without making implicit determinations about legitimate and illegitimate forms of Islamic practice. In our view, Al Mahdi thus reveals the inherent limitations of international criminal law when confronted with alternative normative orders. The politics of recognition at work here echo colonial practice, demonstrating how international criminal justice transforms and reifies the very normative systems it claims to engage with.
As the French empire expanded throughout northern and western Africa and from Pondicherry in India east to Royal Vietnam, a new secular mission came into being, one married to the contradictions of aggressive imperialism, a revolutionary past, and democratic governance. Civilisation was elevated to the rarefied realms of imperial law. French colonial administrators and jurists equipped with the prejudices of the metropole carried with them a powerful vision of republican empire to the Mekong, the great river system that lies at the proverbial heart of mainland South East Asia. Yet republican colonialism was undermined by below. In Indo-China, young radicals, jurists, politicians, journalists and scholars engaged in bitter fighting with the creation of a panoptic model of state surveillance, economic exploitation, political repression, racism and the ambiguities of French republicanism. From the creation of the Indo-Chinese Union in 1887 to its demise in 1954, the multiple transformations of legal boundaries in Indo-China reflected the evolving international relations and anti-colonial agitations in Asia. They formed a crucial conjecture in the history of international law.
Across multiple jurisdictions, Indigenous and ethnic communities have sought recognition and protection of the legal rights of rivers as part of broader activist agendas seeking greater legal and political control over their lands and resources. Yet the legal scholarship tracing these cases of ‘river rights’ has often ignored the role of activism in driving and shaping river rights frameworks, as well as the broader implications of these frameworks for community activist agendas. In this article, we examine two legal cases in which Indigenous and Afrodescendent peoples have used legal and extralegal strategies to secure protection for the rights of rivers: for the Piatúa River in Ecuador and the Atrato River in Colombia. In both cases, we find that communities are strategically leveraging river rights frameworks, alongside constitutional and human rights protections, to assert and enhance their territorial autonomy. While the project of recuperating territorial autonomy is incomplete in both cases, our comparative analysis confirms that these cases should be seen as incremental steps in a broader project of transforming community relationships with government institutions, local authorities, and the courts, enabling more pluralist territorial governance to emerge over time.
This article examines the relevance of ‘deliberative’ constitutionalism – the idea that democratic deliberation ought to inform our expectations of constitutional law and processes – to constitutional moments in non-state contexts. More specifically, it explores the ways in which extending a deliberative constitutional lens to non-state spaces can both enrich our understanding of the legal-political dynamics within these spaces and, in turn, inform the field of deliberative constitutionalism itself. To do this, it takes an empirical approach to interpret and analyse a constitutional process through which a university student union reinvented its own democratic structures, in significant part through a ‘deliberative mini-public’ of everyday members. Drawing on interviews, observations and records, it demonstrates that a deliberative constitutional lens maps onto and usefully interprets the democratic process in this context while also offering empirical insight into an underexplored dimension of deliberative constitutionalism: that is, connections between deliberative approaches ‘to’ constitutional reform and the resulting constitutional features ‘from’ which subsequent political deliberation flows. It shows how the former carries ‘through’ into the latter by way of the internalization of deliberative norms resulting from both direct and indirect experience with deliberative approaches.
The Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) was developed to introduce simple, up-to-date business laws in its member states. It has various goals, including harmonizing business laws, attracting foreign investment in its member states and promoting broader economic integration across Africa. At its initial development stage, OHADA chose a path dependence route, which positively impacted the achievement of some of its initial goals. While OHADA has been widely praised for its efficient business laws, its commitment to path dependence is likely to create a trap for the organization, hindering its further progress. This article analyses the unification of law in African former colonies from the critical perspective of path dependence theory. It examines how OHADA’s legal choices have impacted its various objectives at different stages of its development. Ultimately, the article proposes that OHADA amend its legal framework to achieve its broader aspirations.
This article develops an evaluative framework for community-rooted justice systems through comparative analysis of South Africa’s Community Advice Offices (CAOs) and Bolivia’s constitutionally recognised Indigenous jurisdictions. Departing from courtroom-centric approaches that have dominated access-to-justice scholarship, the study employs socio-legal methodology synthesising ethnographic research, constitutional texts and institutional analyses. The examination reveals that both systems derive legitimacy from relational embeddedness rather than formal legal authority, resolve disputes holistically within social networks and navigate ongoing tensions between community autonomy and state regulation. From these practices, five evaluative dimensions emerge inductively: accessibility, responsiveness, legitimacy, empowerment and sustainability. The framework offers conceptual tools for assessing alternative justice mechanisms on their own terms, contributing to a shift from descriptive legal pluralism toward evaluative pluralism attentive to how communities themselves produce and experience justice.
Although rarely acknowledged, Buddhist monastics are among the most active lawmakers and jurists in Asia, operating sophisticated networks of courts and constitutions while also navigating—and shaping—secular legal systems. This book provides the first in-depth study of Buddhist monastic law and its entanglements with state law in Sri Lanka from 1800 to the present. Rather than a top-down account of colliding legal orders, Schonthal draws on nearly a decade of archival, ethnographic and empirical research to document the ways that Buddhist monks, colonial officials and contemporary lawmakers reconcile the laws of the Buddha and the laws of the land using practices of legal pluralism. Comparative in outlook and accessible in style, this book not only offers a portrait of Buddhist monastic law in action, it also yields new insights into how societies manage multi-legality and why legal pluralism leads to conflict in some settings and to compromise in others.
Although rarely acknowledged, Buddhist monastics are among the most active lawmakers and jurists in Asia, operating sophisticated networks of courts and constitutions while also navigating – and shaping – secular legal systems. This chapter surveys the entanglements of Buddhist monastic law and state law in Sri Lanka while also providing a general overview of Sri Lanka as a multi-religious, multi-legal site. It introduces readers to the key methods and arguments advanced in this book, including arguments about how and why one should analyse legal pluralism ‘as a practice.’
How is monastic law practised in modern-day Sri Lanka? How do contemporary monastic jurists reckon with multi-legality? This chapter draws on archival and ethnographic research with Sri Lanka’s third-largest monastic community, the Rāmañña Nikāya, to answer these questions and explore the operation of monastic law today. It introduces readers to the Rāmañña constitution, court system, judicial training materials, jurisprudential texts and other features of monastic legal practice. It argues that monastic judges practise legal pluralism in ways that both resist and embrace the parallels between monastic and state law, engaging in a form of ‘double speak’ that, on the one hand, places monastic law ‘on the scale’ of Sri Lankan law while, at the same time, highlighting its superior, more-than-human status.
How should scholars and policymakers think about legal pluralism? In this Conclusion, I reflect on that topic, insisting that analysts should move beyond the question of whether laws, themselves, are or are not compatible. Instead, they should look at the practices of legal pluralism that make such compatibility seem natural or permissible, exceptional or impossible. I argue that inter-legal harmony is not a technical feat, but a social, political, and emotional achievement – one that is often precarious. Legal pluralism, therefore, implicates more than just the ‘stuff’ of law, but involves the shifting and recursive processes that help us to assemble normative worlds, reckon with diverse obligations, and find meaningful pathways forward through a changing and complex life.
Sri Lanka is the only Buddhist-majority country in the world without an official state-recognised monastic legal system. This is in spite of the fact that an entire section of the county’s constitution is dedicated to such a venture. How can one explain this? And why does Sri Lanka remain in this impasse? This chapter answers these questions by tracking a significant (and ongoing) series of attempts made by Sri Lanka’s leading intellectuals, educators, politicians, monks and legislators to ‘legalise’ monastic law (S: nītīgata kirīma) by creating some form of statute, tribunal or legal body that could blend monastic and state legal authority. Drawing on an un- and under-studied body of political and legal documents, it explains how a particular approach to legal pluralism – one motivated by a ‘purist’ approach to law – both motivated and sabotaged successive efforts to formally recognise monastic courts and constitutions in state law.
What is monastic law for? This chapter explores the goals of monastic law, beyond its concerns with regulation and governance. Drawing on ethnographic, archival and survey research, it examines the various ‘nonpositivist’ aims pursued by monastic jurists: preserving unity and unanimity (sāmaggi) among monks; maintaining discretion and protecting reputations; avoiding (further) conflict and identifying the root causes of strife; minimising judicial prejudice by eliminating the mental defilements (kilesa) that give rise to them; restoring offenders to the community by applying therapeutic sanctions; aligning the conduct of monks with the concerns of local laity and temple donors; and, most importantly, shortening saṃsāra and hastening nirvana. This chapter highlights the intertwining of positivist and nonpositivist elements in monastic law, shining light on a legal order that not only enforces standards of conduct but also impacts karma, saṃsāra and the path to nirvana.
Why do similar conditions of legal pluralism lead to conflict in one setting and compromise in another? This chapter addresses this question by approaching legal pluralism not as an empirical condition – a multiplicity of legal orders that individuals navigate – but as a set of practices that bring order, structure and meaning to the obligations, codes and norms that one confronts. Drawing on three relatively recent case studies, this chapter demonstrates how the same set of normative artefacts – the same texts, norms, institutions, and authorities – can be assembled, interpreted, and mobilised in profoundly divergent and even agonistic ways. The first case study involves a monk’s attempt to gain a driving license. The second involves the issuing of identity cards for Buddhist nuns (bhikkhunīs). The third relates to a parliamentary bill designed to recognise monastic constitutions (katikāvatas) in law.
How does the encounter between monastic law and colonial law look from the perspective of Buddhist monastics? The chapter offers an alternative legal history of the nineteenth century, drawing on a largely unstudied archive of Sinhala- and Pali-language legal sources written by Buddhist monks. Using these sources, I highlight the creativity and productivity of Buddhist monastic lawmaking during the nineteenth century. A close analysis of monastic legal texts from this period also reveals key differences in the ways that monastic jurists understood and enacted legal pluralism when compared with colonial officials. Rather than treating the laws of the Buddha and the laws of the Crown as conflicting, as the British tended to do, monastic jurists purposefully aligned them. Rather than hardening legal boundaries between monastic and colonial regulation, monastic jurists pushed in the direction of integration, borrowing and exchange between local and imported laws.
This chapter explores the journey from principles to the practical implementation of sustainable development and subsequently the codified global Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It begins by examining the foundational principles of international law that guide sustainable development efforts by reviewing in detail the history and motivation behind adopting a global set of goals to achieve holistic and measurable sustainable development by 2030. Then, the chapter focuses on the intersection between Indigenous peoples and the SDGs, acknowledging the historical disparities faced by these communities and how treaties have the potential to foster or frustrate the achievement of these goals. It then delves into guidelines for sustainable resource management and Indigenous development within the SDG framework, emphasizing inclusive approaches and participatory decision-making. By bridging principles with practical strategies, this chapter underscores the importance of integrating Indigenous knowledge, fostering partnerships, and implementing the SDGs to achieve sustainable development while respecting Indigenous rights and aspirations.
This paper explores how unrecognised separatist entities in Eurasia – de facto regimes such as Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics – engage with international law. It examines whether, and to what extent, these regimes comply with international law, analysing court decisions and legislation to move beyond simplistic views of non-recognition or assumed legality. The findings reveal that de facto regimes tend to mirror the international law approaches of the states they are most closely connected to – whether the territorial state (e.g. Ukraine) or an outside state exercising effective control over the entity (e.g. Russia or Armenia). This pattern is explained by the theory of “acculturation to statehood”: through sustained legal and institutional interaction, these regimes internalise and replicate the legal systems of their reference states. The study contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the role of de facto regimes in the international legal order.
This essay examines how Law and Society approaches have transformed historical analysis by reconceptualizing law as constitutive of social reality rather than as an isolated formal system. Tracing this methodological revolution from 1960s American legal history through scholars like J. Willard Hurst and Lawrence Friedman to 1990s legal consciousness studies by Patricia Ewick, Susan Silbey and Sally Engle Merry, the essay demonstrates how these frameworks reveal law as lived experience operating through documentary practices and administrative procedures rather than overt coercion. Through examples from British colonial Singapore and Hong Kong, the analysis shows how legal mechanisms normalized authority, how marginalized subjects strategically navigated plural legal systems and how legal transformations eventually became invisible within naturalized landscapes. Law and Society approaches provide historians with three crucial innovations: revealing agency through strategic legal engagement, reconceptualizing power as operating through capillary networks of documentation, and reframing historical transformation as gradual reconfiguration of legal categories that denaturalizes what appears inevitable.
Solomon Islands’ plural legal system, in which customary law operates in parallel with common law, and its practice and effects on society have drawn scholarly attention in spaces of legal studies, policy, economics, and state governance. An area that remains understudied is the dynamic nature in which landowners use Indigenous cultural heritage such as ancestral sites or genealogies as kastom evidence in courts. We explore this intersection through a critical review of the literature, Solomon Islands court judgments, and the nation’s lacking cultural heritage legislation. Two major infrastructure development projects in Solomon Islands, the Tina Hydro Project located on Guadalcanal and the Bina-Talifu Project on Malaita, are also examined to explore the nuances of state-led compulsory versus negotiated land acquisition. Fueling the perception that the customary land system is more of a hinderence than a strength to its peoples, these case studies demonstrate the fluid and unpredictable nature with which kastom evidence has been implemented in legal forums to substantiate or dispute claims. Ultimately, we argue that this largely reflects an incongruence between the British legal framework and traditional land tenure systems. Furthermore, we highlight how greater integration of archaeological expertise into legal processes of land surveying in Solomon Islands has the potential to mitigate some of these challenges.
On December 6, 2023, the Indonesian Parliament passed Indonesia’s Criminal Code. The new Criminal Code replaces the Dutch-language colonial-era Penal Code and after fifty years of debate marks a milestone in Indonesian law. However, the new Code is controversial. It continues to criminalize interpersonal relations such as adultery and cohabitation. The framing of those offences is an accommodation of conflicting preferences among a wide range of domestic and international actors including those from the Islamic world, notably Saudi Arabia. This chapter examines the new Code as an arena of contestation, among inter-regional influences and between secular and religious actors seeking to shape Indonesian state law. It highlights three under-studied phenomena in Asia: inter-regional religious networks; their intersection with colonial legal legacies; and the migration of legal values, not only geographically or jurisdictionally, but also across internal domains within pluralist legal systems.
Between the 1570s and 1680s, England established more than two dozen overseas colonies and trading posts throughout the world. In mainland North America, the colonies included Virginia, Maryland, Massachusetts and several other New England colonies, North and South Carolina, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. In the Caribbean and the North Atlantic, colonies were founded in Newfoundland, Bermuda, and Barbados, among several others, to which Jamaica was added by conquest in 1655. Various trading posts, or factories, were established—usually with the permission of the local populations—in Hudson’s Bay, India, Africa, and the East Indies. As a result of these activities, by the end of the seventeenth century, more than half a million English subjects, or about ten per cent of the nation’s population, lived across the seas.