The relationship between the European Court of Human Rights and the ideal of democracy is a complex one: Convention states tend to understand it in terms of the supremacy of national democratic arrangements, whereas the Court has conceived of the relationship in more substantive procedural terms involving Convention rights as interpreted and promoted by the Court. In recent political debates the ideal of democracy has been instrumentalized to attack the authority of the Court based on the former understanding, such that its contribution to democratic ideals has become muted. Against this background, this article seeks to rebalance political debates about the relationship between democracy and the ECtHR by clarifying ways in which we can understand the Court as playing a democratic role based on the republican democracy of Phillip Pettit. It highlights elements of Pettit’s republican democracy relevant to the Court and analyses features of the Court and its practice which can be understood as expressing those elements. In doing so it contributes to ongoing debates about the relationship between democracy and the Court with a view to protecting and promoting the ideal of democracy in an era in which it is increasingly under threat.

In the contemporary ‘age of participation’, referendums are often celebrated as cornerstones of democratic engagement. Yet political parties sometimes take the seemingly paradoxical step of calling for referendum boycotts, urging citizens to abstain from direct democratic processes. This paper investigates the conditions under which such boycott calls occur and the motivations behind them. While previous research has largely focused on single cases or experimental designs, we offer the first comprehensive, comparative study of party-led referendum boycotts across Europe since 1972. Drawing on a novel dataset of 223 referendums in 37 countries, we combine quantitative and qualitative methods to explore how regime context, institutional design, and issue type shape boycott behavior. Our regression analyses show that turnout quorum requirements, lower levels of democratic maturity, and sovereignty-related referendum issues significantly increase the likelihood of boycotts. To complement these findings, we qualitatively analyze boycott justifications and develop a typology of six motivation types: legitimacy-based, procedural unfairness, instrumental, tactical, minority interest, and ideological boycotts. These results reveal a complex interplay between democratic institutions and political strategy, challenging the assumption that referendums are universally inclusive tools. Our findings have implications for the design, interpretation, and normative evaluation of direct democratic practices across diverse political systems.

A growing body of work suggests that authoritarian regimes can enhance their external legitimacy by undertaking reform—from democratic or “pseudodemocratic” institutional changes at the domestic level to participation in international efforts to mitigate climate change. Yet the shared theoretical logic underlying this work has received surprisingly little empirical attention. This research contributes by offering findings from an iterative series of original survey experiments conducted over nationally representative samples of US citizens. Study 1 tested the foundational hypothesis—that reforms build external legitimacy—by adopting a simple independent groups design. Studies 2 and 3 subjected that hypothesis to harder tests via conjoint designs, and also evaluated extension hypotheses about when and in what sense “legitimacy” is gained. Across studies, the results consistently demonstrate that reforms (of a variety of types) do generate external legitimacy, offering both positive benefits as well as shielding benefits in keeping with theoretical arguments. The results also provide support for several new and previously undocumented findings concerning the role of reform type, type of legitimacy-derived gain, and the conditions under which such gains are more or less likely to accrue.

With major US scientific institutions supporting a program of solar geoengineering research, the UK’s ARIA agency actively pursuing open air experimentation, and the EU in the process of clarifying its position, the question of how such research should be governed has been given new urgency. This paper argues that innovation in the structures and procedures of existing institutions for the oversight of scientific research is highly desirable, to promote the level of legitimacy, procedural justice, and recognition to which recent major proposed research governance frameworks aspire. First, we argue that SRM research is importantly dissimilar from climate research, but bears more similarity to other high-risk research areas, implying the need for special institutional arrangements. Second, we identify the special challenges of legitimacy–particularly its procedural justice component–with respect to the potential global, intergenerational and cross-community scope of legitimation requirements. Third, we argue that achieving legitimacy and procedural justice in the context of SRM research governance must include considerations of justice as recognition. Finally, we consider the institutional implications of legitimate and recognition-inclusive SRM research institutions.

How do democratic states induce citizens to comply with government directives during times of acute crisis? Focusing on the onset of the Covid‐19 pandemic in France, I argue that the tools states use to activate adherence to public health advice have predictable and variable effects on citizens’ willingness to change their routine private behaviours, both because of variation in their levels of restrictiveness but also because of differences in people's political motivations to comply with them. Using data collected in March 2020, I show that people's reports of changes in their behavioural routines are affected by the signals governments send, how they send them and the level of enforcement. I find that a nationally televised speech by President Macron calling for cooperative behaviour and announcing new restrictions elevated people's willingness to comply. Moreover, while co‐partisanship with the incumbent government increased compliance reports before the President's primetime television address, presidential approval boosted reports of compliance after.

When reporting on election results, the media declare parties as election ‘winners’ or ‘losers’, which has important consequences for voter perceptions and government formation. This article investigates news coverage of parties’ electoral performance in proportional representation systems, in which election results are often less clear‐cut compared to majoritarian systems. It tests the extent to which news coverage of parties’ electoral performance is based on objective measures or on party ideology. Its focus on the aftermath of the 2019 European Parliament election allows holding the electoral context constant across the 16 countries under study. Results from a Heckman selection model show that alongside a party's status as plurality winner and changes in electoral support, parties with radical socio‐cultural policy positions are both more likely to be covered and declared election winners in the news. These results have important implications for citizens’ attitudes and perceived party legitimacy in democratic societies.

This article explores how citizens’ legitimacy perceptions are affected when decision makers deviate from the recommendations of a deliberative mini-public (DMP), and what can be done to mitigate negative consequences. The results of a preregistered vignette experiment in Belgium (N = 2659) support our two main expectations. First, citizens’ legitimacy perceptions decrease when politicians do not follow the outcome of a DMP. Second, when politicians communicate responsively about this – meaning that they show respect for the recommendations and publicly justify why they deviated from them – legitimacy perceptions substantially increase, generally reaching the level of those cases where recommendations are followed. Diving deeper into this result also shows that for this effect to occur, citizens must find the provided reasoning valid and acceptable. Finally, the results hold among both policy winners and policy losers. These findings have implications for the literature on democratic innovations, empirical legitimacy, and political representation, but also for policymakers striving to combine arrangements of public participation that go beyond triviality, with political responsibility for the whole, and sustained mechanisms for accountability.

What can policy makers do in day-to-day decision making to strengthen citizens' belief that the political system is legitimate? Much literature has highlighted that the realization of citizens' personal preferences in policy making is an important driver of legitimacy beliefs. We argue that citizens, in addition, also care about whether a policy represents the preferences of the majority of citizens, even if their personal preference diverges from the majority's. Using the case of the European Union (EU) as a system that has recurringly experienced crises of public legitimacy, we conduct a vignette survey experiment in which respondents assess the legitimacy of fictitious EU decisions that vary in how they were taken and whose preferences they represent. Results from original surveys conducted in the five largest EU countries show that the congruence of EU decisions not only with personal opinion but also with different forms of majority opinion significantly strengthens legitimacy beliefs. We also show that the most likely mechanism behind this finding is the application of a ‘consensus heuristic’, by which respondents use majority opinion as a cue to identify legitimate decisions. In contrast, procedural features such as the consultation of interest groups or the inclusiveness of decision making in the institutions have little effect on legitimacy beliefs. These findings suggest that policy makers can address legitimacy deficits by strengthening majority representation, which will have both egotropic and sociotropic effects.

The Great Recession that started in 2007/2008 has been the worst economic downturn since the crisis of the 1930s in Europe. It led to a major sovereign debt crisis, which is arguably the biggest challenge for the European Union (EU) and its common currency. Not since the 1950s have advanced democracies experienced such a dramatic external imposition of austerity and structural reform policies through inter‐ or supranational organisations such as the EU and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or as implicitly requested by international financial markets. Did this massive interference with the room for maneuver of parliaments and governments in many countries erode support for national democracy in the crisis since 2007? Did citizens realise that their national democratic institutions were no longer able to effectively decide on major economic and social policies, on economic and welfare state institutions? And did they react by concluding that this constrained democracy no longer merited further support? These are the questions guiding this article, which compares 26 EU countries in 2007–2011 and re‐analyses 78 national surveys. Aggregate data from these surveys is analysed in a time‐series cross‐section design to examine changes in democratic support at the country level. The hypotheses also are tested at the individual level by estimating a series of cross‐classified multilevel logistic regression models. Support for national democracy – operationalised as satisfaction with the way democracy works and as trust in parliament – declined dramatically during the crisis. This was caused both by international organisations and markets interfering with national democratic procedures and by the deteriorating situation of the national economy as perceived by individual citizens.

Interest groups are often included as key actors in consultation processes, with the aim of making policy more effective, fair and representative. At the same time, their influence is frequently viewed with suspicion. This research note uses survey experiments in Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States (N = 9,357) to explore how the ties citizens hold to different types of interest groups affect their perceived legitimacy of involving them in parliamentary hearings. We find that affective, behavioural and attitudinal ties shape how citizens evaluate the representation of groups, but that there are important differences between ties to different group types: ties to cause groups representing societal interests are more consequential than ties to business interests. These findings underline important heterogeneity in how different interest groups relate to their constituencies and have implications for accountability relationships between citizens and policymakers. The heightened sensitivity of citizens with ties to cause groups regarding their representation underscores the need to actively nurture and involve these groups in policy making.

International nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) are frequently criticized for failing to adequately represent or engage with grassroots stakeholders. Yet most explanations of this shortcoming have focused on factors external to the organizations, e.g., economic pressures that privilege donor interests. What has been largely lacking is an examination of the role of internal INGO characteristics. We address this by examining INGOs’ legitimacy standards: how INGOs understand themselves to be doing the right thing and seek to convey that righteousness to others. Drawing on the literature from business ethics and organizational behavior, we show that organizations’ self-selected standards of legitimacy are key drivers of behavior. Using an analysis of 57 American INGO websites, we identify 11 legitimacy types and examine their usage. We find that while most INGOs make a series of technical legitimacy claims that seem designed to attract donors, they simultaneously employ additional legitimacy standards that do not seem to be externally dictated. These additional standards generally prioritize adherence to a cause rather than stakeholder input. The findings suggest that challenges to INGO representivity or responsiveness result not only from external pressures, but also from INGOs’ own choice of values.

Small States in World Markets is about political efficacy and legitimation rather than scoring who is ahead in the economic sweepstakes. Its case for democratic corporatism rests on norms, particularly stability, rather than on narrow measures of economic efficiency. But stability, and the efficacious management of the economy and social problems requires a degree of technocracy that undermines the legitimacy of the management process itself by helping to produce populist revolts.

This paper draws upon accountability and legitimacy theories to explore for what social enterprises are accountable, how they communicate accountability, and to what extent they publicly communicate accountability. Case study methodology was employed, examining four work-integrated social enterprises in Australia. Data collection involved interviews with managers of each social enterprise, and a review of various secondary data including social enterprise websites and internal and external reports. Findings reveal a temporal dimension of accountability, as social enterprises acknowledged their dual social and financial accountability, but prioritised financial over social performance. Communication of social performance was limited, with publicly available reports partial and selective in nature. Communication of financial performance was even more limited, reporting typically directed to internal stakeholders. Implications include the need for social enterprises to communicate social and financial performance more broadly, in order to advance their legitimacy from moral (based on intentions) to consequential (based on achievements).