Previous research has identified intermarriage as an important factor in immigrant integration, but what affects immigrants’ willingness to intermarry or support intermarriage? A significant and understudied aspect of attitudes toward intermarriage among immigrants is the role of religion. We focus on a particular group of immigrants, Bhutanese refugees, for whom religious persecution featured prominently in their forced migration and resettlement in the US. Using an individual-level survey, we explore factors affecting their attitudes toward intermarriage. Specifically, we analyze the impact of social interactions, socioeconomic conditions, and demographic factors on resettled Bhutanese refugees’ attitudes toward intermarriage. Results indicate that, in addition to age, income, and English proficiency, resettled refugees who spend more time interacting with individuals from outside of their own ethnic, cultural, and religious group are more likely to support intermarriage. Social interactions may allow refugees to overcome religious restrictions and advance refugee integration into American society through intermarriage.

Muslim Americans are running for and being elected to political office at record levels. Despite this trend, the literature on minority candidate emergence has yet to examine which district factors affect the likelihood of Muslim Americans running and winning their races. What district characteristics influence the emergence of Muslim American candidates, and how do voters respond when they appear on the ballot? Through examining state legislative candidates, I find that Muslim Americans are less likely to emerge in districts with a high white population share and that lean conservative. Overall, Muslim American candidates are less likely to win compared to non-Muslim Americans. However, Muslim Americans are far more likely to emerge as candidates and win in districts with a high Muslim population share. These results demonstrate that Muslim American candidates face supply-side barriers to running and electoral penalties that can be alleviated by high Muslim population shares in districts.

Between 2011 and 2018, Bulgaria enacted a series of reforms accommodating the two most salient demands of its Muslim minority in the postcommunist period: the registration of elected Muslim leadership and the provision of state funding for religious communities. This constituted a significant departure from the restrictive policies pursued during the first two decades after communism and from the repressive legacies of earlier periods. Through process tracing based on 11 semi-structured elite interviews, press releases, and secondary sources, I argue that the geostrategic concerns of Bulgarian elites from the influence of the minority’s kin-state, Turkey, from 2011 onward, and their aim to decrease the dependence of the minority on the kin-state provided the main motivation to accommodate Muslims’ religious demands. These concerns were driven by domestic political changes in Turkey in the post-2011 period and their reflections in the country’s foreign policy.

This study evaluates the extent of separation of religion and state (SRAS) in 28 countries which were European Union members in 2014 using data from the Religion and State (RAS) dataset. It applies three different standards of SRAS: absolute separationism, neutralism, and laicite. The results show that none of these countries meet a “zero-tolerance” application of any of these standards, and only five meet even very loose interpretations of any of these standards. In addition, no EU state provides full religious freedom to their religious minorities. Finally, EU states have less SRAS when compared to non-EU democracies. This calls into question either the assumption that SRAS and religious freedom are essential elements of liberal democracy or the assumption that the European Union’s member states are, in fact, liberal democracies. It also calls into question the extent of the West’s secularity.