Starting in the 1920s, the traditional conception of what appellate judges were actually doing when they made common law became the subject of sustained critique. Often collectively labeled as the Legal Realists, or the Legal Realist Movement, those advancing this critique aggressively challenged the formalist claim that the lawmaking work of appellate judges was fundamentally an objective, value-neutral, and preference-free enterprise that relied heavily upon formal deductive logic to select among possible versions of legal doctrine.

Instead, the legal realists argued that no matter how much appellate court opinions presented in realist terms the ultimate choices being made, those choices were nearly always the product of the judges’ reliance upon personal social judgments and preferences. They asserted that there was, in fact, little objective, detached, or scientific in these judges’ decisions to make one or another possible version of legal doctrine the binding and authoritative law of the jurisdiction.

During the middle period of the twentieth century, the legal realist critique of traditional formalism came to enjoy a consensus among the professional and academic legal community. Little sincere belief in the formalist paradigm remained by the last half of the twentieth century.

Common law in America is the product of the largely independent work of thousands of different appellate judges working in hundreds of different appellate courts operating in more than fifty different jurisdictions. In characterizing this system as having experienced a profound paradigm shift from formalism to instrumentalism during the twentieth century, one is not suggesting that every appellate judge on the bench before 1,930 was a staunch formalist and that every appellate judge sitting after 1,970 has been a diehard instrumentalist.

Similarly, the legal realist movement need not have definitively established the philosophical impossibility of formalism in order to have effectively toppled it as the conventional understanding of appellate lawmaking, and to have it eventually replaced with instrumentalism. The most potent and persuasive thrust of the legal realist critique was demonstrating that formalism was advancing a false narrative of appellate court decision-making and thereby obscuring the real factors that were driving appellate court judgments.

Despite the current consensus regarding these matters, a practical and tangible transition from formalism to instrumentalism has been long delayed and is, in many ways, not yet even on the horizon. There are a number of institutional reasons for this continuing phenomenon.

The beginning of the third millennium, starting in the early noughties and increasing in strength throughout the 2010s, has seen a large shift in theoretical focus in the mind sciences. In what might be called the predictive revolution or the predictive turn, many researchers in the psychological and brain sciences have come to consider the human mind a ‘predictive engine’ or ‘prediction machine.’ Like its predecessor, the cognitive revolution, more than half a century before, the predictive revolution is grand in ambition. It tries to explain all mental processes within one common framework. In this unified theory, the functioning of the mind is no longer best explained as an information processor: Minds have become prediction systems. The predictive revolution promises to reconcile cognition and behavior as the intrinsically connected two sides of the same coin serving human interactions with the environment.

Research in “complex physics” or “nonlinear physics” is rapidly expanding across various science disciplines, for example, in mathematics, astrophysics, geophysics, magnetospheric physics, plasma physics, biophysics, and sociophysics. What is common among these science disciplines is the concept of “self-organized criticality systems,” which is presented here in detail for observed astrophysical phenomena, such as solar flares, coronal mass ejections, solar energetic particles, solar wind, stellar flares, magnetospheric events, planetary systems, and galactic and black-hole systems. This book explains fundamental questions: Why do power laws, as hallmarks of self-organized criticality, exist? What power law index is predicted for each astrophysical phenomenon? Which size distributions have universality? What can waiting time distributions tell us about random processes? This book is the first monograph that tests comprehensively astrophysical observations of self-organized criticality systems. The highlight of this book is a paradigm shift from microscopic concepts (such as the traditional cellular automaton algorithms) to macroscopic concepts (formulated in terms of physical scaling laws).

The framework of ‘Romanization’ developed by Haverfield in 1905 - that Romans ‘civilized’ their imperial subjects, particularly those in ‘barbarian’ western provinces - remains hegemonic, notwithstanding multiple revisionist attempts. It has been reasserted, rejected, or modified, but still frames the debate. Yet, the postcolonial project to decolonize the production of historical knowledge has prompted some scholars to seek fresh approaches and to rewrite the history of Roman imperialism. This book asks: what is the value of postcolonialism in the discourse on Romanization? How has it influenced the discourse on Romanization thus far? Can postcolonialism move the discourse on Romanization forward? Borrowing Said’s concept of travelling ideas, this book undertakes a comparative study between the point of departure and the point(s) of arrival of travelling ideas of postcolonialism to understand their path and impact in the discourse on Roman imperialism and Romanization.

We argue here that one common myth regarding Darwin’s influence - namely, that it led to an “immediate” change in the life sciences - is false. Darwin’s ideas regarding natural selection were not immediately and widely accepted by the scientific community. We document challenges to natural selection, alternatives considered and endorsed, and show that, rather than a rapid, “revolutionary” change, this eventual embrace of “Darwinism” was gradual, drawing in part on Kuhn’s ideas regarding revolutionary science.

11. Social theories develop and transform in and through dialogues that simultaneously take place in multiple interactions and dialogues between the creator of a theory and numerous other factors. They provide us with rich evidence of struggles and tensions between:

• creative individuals and powerful institutions dominated by political, ideological, and religious forces

• general patterns of thought in specific time periods due to cultural and historical influences (zeitgeist)

• creative individuals and audiences (peers, the public)

• creative individuals and their doubts, hopes, and imagined others.

Throughout these dialogues, we have observed responses to the question ‘who is the individual and what is society’, which dominated Moscovici’s thinking throughout his life. They also answered another query that he kept raising: ‘what is “social” about social psychology’ (Moscovici, 1972/2000, p. 54)? To that end, the theory of social representations and communication is approaching its goal. It has showed who the Self is and who Others are, and who is individual and what is society. By following this path, and by exploring in a holistic manner the dynamic and complex phenomena in daily practices, such as health, education, politics, and ecology, it has the potential of becoming an anthropology of modern culture.

The most disastrous blunder of the age was its refusal to acknowledge what most subalternised cultures and people took for granted: nature does not belong to us; we belong to nature. The reckless destruction of nature ended up threatening the survival of the human species, in the form of recurrent pandemics, extreme weather events, massive numbers of environment refugees, the disappearance of small island states, and environment-related chronic diseases. I argue in this chapter that all the main mechanisms of exclusion and discrimination at work in modern societies – whether class, race or gender – are traceable to the root dualisms between humanity and nature, and between mind/soul and body. The ways in which modern society deals with inferiority are modelled on the ways it deals with nature. If abyssal exclusion means domination by appropriation/violence, nature – including land, rivers and forests as well as people and ways of being and living whose humanity was negated precisely for being part of nature – has been the favoured target of this domination in Western modernity since the sixteenth century. I start by examining old and new contestations of Cartesian dualism, then I illustrate how this contestation has entered the field of law, what it entails and the prospects for the future. The rights of nature are a promising real legal utopia.

This chapter introduces the reflection in the book and the work of the ESG Workgroup on the Representations and Rights of the Environment (ESGRREW), with its intercultural and interdisciplinary process of Research & Dialogue: a critical appraisal of how humankind conceive its relationship with the environment, towards a clear vision of how to apprehend it in law and governance. The reflection takes heed of the change in vision in different fields of knowledge and the message of Indigenous peoples with other critical voices regarding humankind’s present predicament. It champions social and environmental justice, and highlights the crisis of representations and perception of our world. Rekindling the conscience of diversity of languages, cultures and modes of knowing and being, it advocates a wide and relational approach, considering lived experience. It contends that we need to remove ‘barriers to understanding’, create and nurture a common space towards a ‘new common sense’. Reconnecting with other legal traditions will contribute to rethinking legal frameworks and practices for a new legal consciousness.

Chapter 2 outlines the history of DNA research and the key scientists who made the discoveries that enabled the manipulation of DNA. The scope, nature and ethos of science and the scientific method are described, with models for the scientific method and support for research. The importance of gathering and evaluating data in experimental science is outlined, and some of the key aspects and terminology are discussed.

Chapter 4 examines institutional and intellectual trends in the early Qing, up to the end of Kangxi’s reign. It focuses on the intellectual and political response to the Ming collapse, which spurred a large wave of arguments, both scholarly and political, in favor of light taxes and a noninterventionist state. In contrast to the heavily moralistic tone of Ming fiscal conservatism, the trauma of the Ming-Qing transition drove early Qing elites toward a fiscal worldview that was both more “realist,” but also far more hostile toward state taxation. This hostility stemmed directly from a mainstream historical interpretation of Ming collapse that placed much of the blame on late Ming tax increases, which, in turn, seemed to have cognitive roots in Qing elites’ deep-rooted moral skepticism of state extraction. Mindful of this “history lesson,” and of ethnic tensions between Manchu and Han populations, the Qing political elite committed itself, both rhetorically and institutionally, to very low agricultural tax quotas. At the same time, however, no such commitment was made towards nonagricultural taxes due to the specific circumstances of the Ming collapse.

In the Introduction, the editors describe the motivations and aims underlying the publication of the book against the background of the importance of corpus linguistics in current research and the associated methodological diversification. The didactic orientation of the book is outlined, as is its organization into four major parts and the contribution made by each chapter. Going beyond a summary of the contents, the editors voice some reflections on the state of the art in corpus linguistics and desiderata for future research. Finally, recommendations for further reading are listed and provided with comments.

This chapter describes the development of social concepts within psychiatry and the mental services between 1960 and 2010. This occurred against the backdrop of the emergence of new social theories concerned with psychiatry, medicine, science and other institutions of liberal democracy from the very beginning of the period. Attacks on the legitimacy of psychiatry came from postmodernists on the left and neoliberals on the right and coincided with a distancing between psychiatry and sociology. Organised psychiatry reacted defensively to most, but not all, of its critics and had difficulty assimilating even those new social theories that appeared neutral with regard to the professional and scientific status of psychiatrists. In the last decade of the period, empirical evidence regarding social determinants of mental health, together with the failure of biomedical technology to deliver on promises of better treatments, led to the beginnings of a revival of interest in social factors within academic psychiatry.

The integration of theories and practices from transformative learning into language learning and language teacher education contributes to a “shaking of the foundations.” Discussing transformative learning, the author, Rebecca Oxford, explains the meaning, purpose, and processes of Jack Mezirow's cognitive-analytic approach and John Dirkx's emotional-integrative approach. Oxford indicates how she used these two approaches in her language teacher education courses. She also shows that these approaches, although seemingly opposite, are in fact linked through neurobiological research, psychological research, and dynamic systems theory.

The main purpose of this chapter is to provide a summary of the main intellectual contributions that the German sociologist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas has made to contemporary social theory. To this end, the chapter provides an overview of his life and career; principal areas of research; conception of critical theory; interpretation of relevant intellectual traditions; and his plea for a paradigm shift, commonly known as the “linguistic turn.” The final section grapples with the main limitations and shortcomings of Habermas’s oeuvre, notably with regard to his theory of communicative action.

Simon Susen is Professor of Sociology at City, University of London. He is an Associate Member of the Bauman Institute and, together with Bryan S. Turner, editor of the Journal of Classical Sociology.