This chapter examines the profound impact of the Arab uprisings on the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)). While initially perceived as distant from the epicentre of the unrest, these countries underwent significant economic, political and security transformations as a result of it. It describes key events initiated by the Tunisian revolution, emphasising the interconnectedness of the Gulf region with the wider Arab uprisings. Furthermore, it explores the economic and socio-political conditions in the GCC countries that shaped their responses to the uprisings, particularly in the context of the challenges posed by the oil-based developmental model. In terms of implications, it dwells on the growing polarisation and intra-GCC rifts, particularly the conflict between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on the one hand, and Qatar, on the other, between 2017 and 2021, jeopardising regional integration. The Arab uprisings revealed the vulnerabilities of the GCC countries’ status quo, leading to a reassessment of their political and economic trajectory both from the domestic and the external relations points of view.

This chapter delves into the geopolitical landscape of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, often considered an ‘island of stability’ amid the turbulence in the broader Middle East. While this notion holds true in comparison to neighbouring countries like Iran, Iraq and Yemen, the chapter highlights that the Gulf region is not immune to internal and external conflicts. It discusses the impact of significant events such as the Iran–Iraq War, the Gulf War and the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 on the political dynamics of the Gulf states. The analysis spans four parts, each focusing on a key conflict: the Iran–Iraq War, the liberation of Kuwait, the 2003 Iraq War, and the war in Yemen since 2015. These conflicts have not only shaped the formation of the GCC in 1981 but have also significantly influenced the broader regional system. Emphasising the period since 1979, the chapter explores how over four decades of wars, revolutions and inter-state tensions have affected the security and stability of the Gulf states. Despite a generation passing since the last inter-state war, the ongoing fragmentation of Yemen into civil wars involving regional actors signals a transformation in the nature of conflicts. The chapter also highlights the challenges to regional stability, including the difficulty in reaching a comprehensive agreement addressing Iran’s ballistic missiles programme and its support for non-state actors. As the possibility of increased US disengagement from the Gulf looms, questions about the future security architecture in the region and the role of external participants gain prominence. The chapter raises concerns about potential security vacuums and the responses of regional actors in such a scenario.

This chapter advances three arguments about the politics of company creation regulation in Saudi Arabia in the first two decades of the twenty-first century. First, the liberalization of these regulations was rent-conditional. The formation and implementation of these policies occurred during periods of rising or high oil rents, but were absent during the downward trend in oil prices between June 2014 and January 2016. Second, relative to earlier periods, the ability of business and religious elites to veto economic reforms was diminished. Third, in light of this shift, the threat of popular unrest to regime stability had a non-trivial, causal effect upon the pursuit and pausing of company creation liberalization. Non-elite pressure on the Al Saud’s rule reached an unparalleled fever pitch during the Arab Spring. Record-breaking transfer payments to appease discontent were feasible in 2011, allowing regulatory liberalization to continue. However, when the fiscal realities of the 2014 oil price slump became apparent, liberalization and public munificence were sacrificed to inhibit the development of economic power outside the regime’s coalition and to maintain comparatively high military spending. Only once oil rents recovered would the reform agenda be revived.

This chapter provides an overview of the core findings of the book. It outlines the key theoretical and methodological insights gained through a qualitative comparison of the politics of corporate regulation and liberalization in Saudi Arabia and Nigeria, including the introduction of the theory of rent-conditional reforms. It further outlines the relevance of the rent-conditional reform theory to ongoing debates around the political and economic effects of natural resource wealth, particularly amid the potential global transition toward a less carbon-intensive economy.

This chapter advances three primary arguments about the politics of corporate regulation in twentieth-century Saudi Arabia. First, that the state’s legislative regulation of company creation was the product of two often-opposing pressures: the private sector’s demand for a domestic regulatory environment that reflects prevailing international norms, and the religious establishment’s reticence to cede their traditional competences. Second, that Ibn Saud’s legislative initiatives in the early 1930s constituted a critical juncture, after which subsequent Saudi kings would promulgate corporate reforms, while the religious establishment would contest their judicial recognition. These tensions pushed judicial institutional development into a pattern of oscillation between unification and separate systems for corporate issues. Third, that the 1990 Gulf War and the contemporaneous liberal and conservative reform movements constitute another somewhat broader critical juncture in Saudi politics. Cross-class movements for greater political influence tangibly shaped corporate regulations, the state’s political institutions, and, consequently, how any future regulations would be formulated.

This chapter introduces the arguments and structure of the book. It surveys how the liberalization of company creation regulations in Nigeria and Saudi Arabia across the first two decades of the twenty-first century defy the predictions of the existing resource curse literature. To explain the political constrains on economic liberalization in resource-wealthy, autocratic and hybrid regimes, the chapter introduces the rent-conditional reform theory. It also details the shortcomings of earlier quantitative studies of economic regulation and liberalization in contexts of resource wealth and outlines the methodological innovations of this book.

This chapter systematizes the comparison of the Nigerian and Saudi cases to offer four primary insights about the past and future trajectories of economic liberalization in resource-wealthy, autocratic and hybrid regimes. First, at the level of political actors, the Nigerian organized private sector appears dynamic and competitive in its pursuit of procedural rents when compared to the ossified Saudi Chambers of Commerce. Second, at an historical level, the Saudi and Nigerian histories of corporate law reform share a common experience of initial foreign importation, before a process of local tailoring and, eventually, their liberalization becoming rent-conditional. Third, at a theoretical level, the diverse causal processes evidenced within the two cases illustrates the potential for greater causal processes within the flexible rent-conditional reform (RCR) framework. Fourth, considering the potential global transition to a lower-carbon economy, the application of the RCR theory suggests diverging future potentials of liberalization in high- and low-cost oil producers, and potential newfound relevance for non-fuel mineral producers.

Saudi Arabia is undergoing a transformational shift, leveraging regulatory reforms to position its non-profit and impact sector as a driving force for national and regional development. This chapter explores how Vision 2030’s ambitious agenda has unlocked new opportunities for philanthropy, impact investing, and catalytic capital, enabling a once-traditional charitable landscape to evolve into a $2.7 billion economic powerhouse.

With the number of non-profit organizations surging from 4,000 to over 62,000 in just seven years, Saudi Arabia is pioneering a new model of impact-driven growth. The chapter delves into groundbreaking regulatory reforms, digital philanthropy, innovative financing models, and multi-sector partnerships. It highlights how Saudi Arabia’s rise as a regional leader in the impact space can set the stage for a more dynamic and globally connected non-profit ecosystem.

We identified three centers in Saudi Arabia that implemented observation units (OUs). The presence of an OU helps with patient flow, reduces overcrowding, enhances patient care, safety and experience, and improves daily key performance indicators. Following this chapter, the authors’ own organizations are keen to develop observation units.

This chapter examines the implications of Saudi Arabia’s net zero by 2060 goal for domestic politics and on the kingdom’s stature in the international community. The gargantuan task of decarbonizing Saudi Arabia is evident in its disproportionate oil use: The kingdom is the world’s No. 4 consumer of oil, despite overseeing the world’s 20th biggest economy and its 41st largest population. There are legitimate doubts about the credibility of Saudi commitment to net zero, given the regime’s track record of noncompliance with prior clean energy goals. A realistic net-zero undertaking would require an overhaul of a fossil fuel-driven society and economy in less than four decades. Sweeping changes would affect the consumption of energies and services, resulting in enormous shifts in ingrained behaviour and in consuming technologies. Difficulties aside, Saudi Arabia holds major advantages in decarbonization. These include unused land with copious solar radiation, as well as geological storage near carbon emissions clusters. Since the global transition could not happen without the kingdom’s cooperation, a documented achievement of decarbonization milestones would increase global goodwill and provide added credibility required to shape the energy transition in ways that could ensure long-term roles for hydrocarbons.