To address limited data on whole grain (WG) consumption in the UK, we investigated trends and sociodemographic patterns of WG consumption from the National Diet and Nutrition Survey (NDNS) from 2008/12-2016/19 and examined the relationship between WG and dietary intakes. We analysed 15,655 individuals aged ≥1.5 years who completed a four-day food diary. WG consumption was quantified by estimating the WG content of individual foods using publicly available ingredient information. Survey-weighted mean WG consumption over time, and by population sub-group was calculated. Survey-weighted trend tests and Wald tests were used. Total WG intake in the general population did not change from 2008/2012 to 2016/2019. WG from high-fibre cereals and bread declined by 16.2% (11.1 to 9.3g/day) and 19.4% (12.4 to 10g/day) respectively, while other cereals (e.g., rice/pasta) increased by 72.5% (4.0 to 6.9g/day), but contributed considerably less than other categories. In the most recent data (2016-2019), older adults (65y+) had the highest energy-adjusted WG consumption, followed by children 1.5-3y. Individuals with lower incomes, adolescents, and current smokers consumed the least WG. Whole grain intake was associated with generally higher quality diets, specifically consuming more fibre, potassium, calcium, iron, magnesium, fruits/vegetables, pulses/nuts, and oily fish, and consuming less free sugars, total fat, saturated fat, sodium, and red/processed meat (p-trend < 0.001 for all). Despite some dietary improvements in the UK, WG intake appears unchanged from 2008/12 to 2016/19.

Amateur and professional athletes often consume protein supplements to accelerate muscle gain; however, it has been suggested that these products not only are associated with risks when consumed excessively. Several recent reports have indicated that certain products are contaminated with heavy metals. Therefore, in this study, we aimed to investigate protein powders in Hungary for heavy metal contamination. A total of 22 commercially available protein powders (including whey, vegan, and beef based) were purchased on the internet for testing. We analysed the samples using laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) and inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) to assess heavy metal contamination. The products were analysed for the presence of 16 elements (Be, Al, Cr, Mn, Co, Ni, Cu, As, Se, Rb, Cd, Sb, Cs, Ba, Hg, and Pb). The LIBS spectral analysis revealed the characteristics of the protein elements (C, C2, H, N, and O) and alkaline metals (Ca, Na, K, and Mg), which were consistent with the previous results. Neither LIBS nor ICP-MS measurements detected significant heavy metal content in the investigated samples above the limit specified in the regulations. Heavy metal contamination of protein supplements can be a serious health threat. Based on the varied results of the previous studies, it is prudent to include testing for heavy metals as part of the routine and mandatory quality control of these products.

The transformation in the purposes, instruments, and conditions for the deployment of coercion was a central aspect of the modernization of Western European states during the long nineteenth century. Nowhere is this transformation as evident as in the emergence and diffusion of public, specialized, and professional police forces at the time. In this article, we employ automated text analysis to explore legislative debates on policing in the United Kingdom from 1803 to 1945. We identify three distinct periods in which policing was highly salient in Parliament, each of them related to more general processes driving the modernization of the British state. The first period (1830s–1850s) was marked by the institutionalization of modern police forces and their spread across Great Britain. The second period (1880s–1890s) was dominated by Irish MPs denouncing police abuses against their constituents. The third period (1900s–1940s) was characterized by discussions around working conditions for the police in the context of mounting social pressures and war-related police activities. Whereas the first and third periods have attracted much scholarly interest as they culminated in concrete police reforms, the second period has not been as central to historical research on the British police. We show, however, that policing became a major issue in the legislative agenda of the 1880s and 1890s, as it highlighted the tensions within a modernizing British state, torn between the professionalization of domestic police forces under control of local authorities and the persistence of imperial practices in its colonial territories.

This paper evaluates the UK Government’s decision to increase the main form of social security by £20 per week during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic, exploring whether increasing the generosity of social security for some, but not all, claimants affected food insecurity. Using the Family Resources Survey, we found a decline of about 7 percentage points in food insecurity amongst benefit claimants affected by the uplift compared with claimants not affected (95% CI −13.9 to −0.9%). This association did not change substantively following adjustment for covariates, nor when the model was re-estimated using matching methods. Results were not driven by changes in the composition of claimants over time. These analyses suggest food insecurity could be reduced if the generosity of the social security system increased. In actuality, the UK government went in the opposite direction, removing the £20 uplift in October 2021, potentially exposing claimants to higher rates of food insecurity again.

We construct a Divisia money measure for U.K. households and private non-financial corporations and a corresponding dual user cost index employing a consistent methodology from 1977 up to the present. Our joint construction of both the Divisia quantity index and the Divisia price dual facilitates an investigation of structural vector autoregresssion models (SVARs) over a long sample period of the type of non-recursive identifications explored by Belongia and Ireland (2016, 2018), as well as the block triangular specification advanced by Keating et al. (2019). An examination of the U.K. economy reveals that structures that consider a short-term interest rate to be the monetary policy indicator generate unremitting price puzzles. In contrast, we find sensible economic responses in various specifications that treat our Divisia measure as the indicator variable.

This study explored the social policy context for international students in the UK and its implications for social exclusion (an inability to fully participate in society). Within a rapid review policy literature addressing international student experience, forty-two articles from the Web of Science and Social Science Research Network (SSRN) were selected through multiple screenings. Migration and education were the most explored policy areas, followed by inequalities, work, health and wellbeing, security, and housing. Results demonstrated that policy both creates barriers to inclusion (e.g. hostile environment migration/bordering practices) and supports inclusion/adaption to social exclusion-related challenges (e.g. sanctuary scholarships for forced migrants, Graduate visas). All international students to some degree lack equitable participation in wellbeing-relevant provision. Overall, policies are constructed so the state and universities can extract value from internationals without fully including them in British society. Policies abdicate responsibility for students’ inclusion, making it expensive and complicated to build a life there.

How do different regime types execute a security response during a pandemic? We interrogate the politics of monopolistic securitization which we argue to have significantly directed and influenced the COVID-19 policy strategies adopted in the ‘democratic’ United Kingdom (UK) and ‘authoritarian’ Thailand. Despite their stark political differences, we contend that the British and Thai states’ parallel resort to monopolistic securitization as an overarching pandemic approach effectively made them ‘functionally similar’ by producing security responses that differed only in magnitude and scale but not in kind. Integrating securitization and democratic standards violations frameworks, we find out that the British and Thai authorities’ monopolistic securitization of COVID-19 initially constrained the intersubjective process required to socially construct the pandemic as a primary existential threat endangering both countries. This significantly diminished their public audiences’ individual/agential and collective/institutional capacity to deliberate the immediate emergency measures they unilaterally deployed, particularly during the pandemic’s early stages. Consequently, whether it was in the UK with a supposedly robust democracy or in Thailand with at best a hybrid regime if not outright authoritarian, the security responses that emerged constituted varying types and degrees of violations within the illiberal-authoritarian spectrum. Nevertheless, as the pandemic progressed, the fundamental deliberative-iterative mechanism underpinning securitization enabled the British and Thai public audiences to gradually reclaim their role and space, allowing them to challenge the appropriateness and legitimacy of the existing emergency measures, thereby weakening the states’ monopolistic control over the process.

One reason given for declining levels of trust in politicians and institutions is the incidence of scandals involving voters' representatives. Politicians implicated in scandals, especially financial scandals, typically see their constituents' support for them decrease. It has been suggested that these specific negative judgements about a representative's misconduct spill over onto diffuse political trust in the system as a whole. We argue that the 2009 Parliamentary expenses scandal in the United Kingdom is a strong test of these scandal spillover effects in a non-experimental context. Yet, using a multilevel analysis of survey and representative implication data, we find no evidence for these effects. This is despite voters being aware of their MP's scandal implication, and this awareness affecting voters' support for their own MP. We conclude that voters' judgements about their constituency representatives are unlikely to affect their diffuse political trust.