Investment banks collaborated with health care entrepreneurs and managers in the 1990s to add a costly layer of investor-owned corporations to the US medical delivery system. In capitalizing and consolidating physician practices, publicly traded Physician Practice Management Companies (PPMCs) incorporated elements of the broader capitalist economy. Companies such as PhyCor, MedPartners, and FPA Medical Management turned to the equity and debt markets to generate shareholder profits and capital for acquisitions. Contemporary theories of financial economics reinforced their activities. PPMCs collapsed after shareholder lawsuits accused them of reporting false figures to the SEC and banks withdrew their credit. Physicians were both accomplices and victims in the process that made the medical delivery system less equitable, less effective, and more expensive. Although this experiment in medical capitalism failed, it widened the door for Wall Street to build new ways to profit from health care.

This article presents a business history of the Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company (BRPC) and its impact on Colombia’s Caribbean region. It explores the company’s operations, profitability, shareholders, infrastructure development, and competition with other coastal railways for insights into the role of foreign capital in regional growth. The BRPC’s railway and port infrastructure connected the coastal city of Barranquilla with the Colombian interior, allowing the city to supplant Cartagena as the country’s principal international port. Statistical analysis reveals the railway’s remarkable profitability, which attracted transnational investors, who consolidated majority control. The company’s ability to leverage engineering expertise and capital underscored its strategic significance, yet its interests centered on protecting its transport monopoly. The railway’s lack of visibility in London and information asymmetries shaped investor perceptions. Extending the pier demonstrated BRPC’s role in accommodating rising export volumes during Colombia’s “despegue cafetero.” However, the railway faced obsolescence, as the government opened the obstructing Bocas de Ceniza sandbank and pursued railway nationalization. The railway’s redundancy, demographic shifts, and rise of Buenaventura underscore its eventual decline. This paper reveals the complex dynamics between foreign capital, infrastructure, and trade monopolies in shaping uneven development. It highlights the BRPC’s overlooked yet fundamental role in Colombia’s export economy and Barranquilla’s ascendancy.

There is substantial cross-national variation in the level of regulatory clarity surrounding cryptocurrencies. What explains these differences? And, more broadly, what drives the divergent historical development of market regulation in different jurisdictions? To answer these questions, we present a new conceptual framework centered on the concept of market legibility. This term, inspired by the sociological literature, refers to the extent to which markets are made legible to the state through standardization. We contend that state supply of, and market demand for, legibility drives the primary political-economic dynamics of market regulation. Specifically, these factors combine to produce ideal type states of legibility that correspond to both distinct stages of market development and the relative level of regulatory clarity in any one jurisdiction. This framework is utilized to conduct a comparative historical analysis of cryptocurrency regulation in the EU, US, UK, and Japan. By performing these tasks, this article corrects the common assumption that states are constantly striving to impose their authority on unwilling markets. It demonstrates instead that state and private actor preferences to make markets legible vary, conditioning, in turn, the political economy of regulatory governance.

Financial globalisation has given issuers more freedom to carry out jurisdiction shopping. As a policy response, a growing number of stock markets have introduced the dual-class share structure to enhance global competitiveness. However, does the dual-class share structure help stock markets attract issuers? It is a question rarely examined empirically in existing scholarly work. This paper explores the practices of three jurisdictions with global financial centres, ie the US, China and Hong Kong, to narrow the research gap. Based on hand-collected data, it explains the infrequent listings with the dual-class share structure in China and Hong Kong in the post-reform era in two ways: low demand due to the use of substitutes; and limited allowance caused by the harsh ex ante regulation, and is the first comparative quantitative study in this field. Drawing on the empirical lessons, this paper recommends that China relax its ex ante regulation and suggests the wider community consider the necessity of introducing the dual-class share structure and the balance they aim to achieve between investor protection and market openness.

Many south-east European states made the transition from socialist to market economies. All described here had to reform their pension systems to match the new context in which these operated. The experiences of 10 countries are reviewed – seven of which were once part of Yugoslavia. Some countries’ reforms were more radical than others. Five of them merely adapted the Bismarckian systems they had inherited; four others adopted the “three pillar” model that the World Bank had been propagating. One went further than that. The four who followed World Bank model were often forced to backtrack. Whatever the longer-term benefits, they generated their own shorter-term fiscal problems. Nonetheless, the most radical reformer gives some indications of possible ways forward. The south-eastern European states do not have financial markets that can support capitalised/funded pension systems. Nor do they have the resources to pay proportional pensions that, at the same time, keep retired people out of poverty. The article suggests that their governments should concentrate upon improving economic performance to satisfy longer term aspirations and on ensuring that pensioners are able to live properly if not luxuriously by using tax-financed transfer measures. Provision above this level can be secured through savings plans, but it must be accepted that the investments to secure those savings will have to be made abroad.

Unequal voting rights arrangements under dual class share structures are increasingly favoured by entrepreneurs and founders of technology companies, in order to retain a degree of control over the company that is disproportionate to their equity shareholdings. The rise of such share structures around the world has put competitive pressure on the UK Government and the country's financial regulator to relax the one share, one vote principle in the premium listing regime of the London Stock Exchange, to ensure the UK equities market remains world-leading and fit for the future development of the economy. There is, however, a long tradition of institutional investors’ distaste for dual class share structures. In fact, the near extinction of dual class listings in the UK capital markets can be largely attributed to the opposition of large British institutions. Therefore, this paper will critically discuss the conflict between the demands to attract listings from high-tech and innovative companies and concerns of a race to the bottom in the UK context. It rebuts criticisms based on investor protection and argues that if dual class companies were permitted to list in the Premium Segment, the higher level of regulatory protection provided in the premium listing regime would help enhance minority shareholder protection and shareholder engagement. The additional safeguarding measures, as we have seen from other global financial centres, would also help to restrain the potential abuse of controllers’ weighted voting power. Together with the market mechanism, permitting dual class listings in the Premium Segment should be welcomed.

Developing countries are often thought to be particularly exposed to the constraints of global markets. Facing scrutiny from foreign investors, why do developing-country governments enter international bond markets, especially when they can access cheaper finance from international financial institutions? I argue that borrowing governments' perception of market constraints depends on global liquidity. When bond markets are highly liquid, investors become more risk acceptant and governments perceive the political costs of borrowing to be lower, especially compared to the conditionality of concessional loans. I use data on the timing of bond issues and three case studies—Ethiopia, Ghana, and Kenya—to demonstrate that choices to issue debt were shaped by global liquidity. These findings nuance debates about how markets constrain governments, emphasizing that market constraints are conditional on systemic factors, including, global liquidity.

In 1786, the Van Staphorst brothers, America's Dutch investment bank, entered the French office of the Director General of Finance, intent on making an offer for a portion of France's holdings of American bonds. Unknowingly, their offer set off a bidding war that could have ended with poorly capitalized American financial adventurers owing a large portion of bonds which could threaten the fragile health of American credit. At the eleventh hour, the Van Staphorsts conjured up a bold, unprecedented, scheme to persuade the French that it would be unnecessary to sell their American bonds at discounted prices.

This article revisits the story of one the greatest financial frauds in history: Poyais. In the 1820s, Gregor MacGregor issued bonds for this alleged fictitious Central American state on the London capital market. Putting together scattered evidence reveals a complex, multifaceted experiment undertaken by a private adventurer hoping to politically and economically position himself in a changing world. Poyais was a failed project to establish a settlement on a territory granted by an Indigenous leader and financed through British capital markets. Studying a financial failure provides nuanced insights into the political and legal frameworks defining origination processes of early nineteenth-century foreign loans. Following MacGregor’s actions entails drawing a story with contours that extend well beyond the City of London, revealing a rich set of transatlantic actors and spaces not known to be traditionally linked to the London-based capital market. The story of Poyais constitutes a window into the early financial dynamics of private colonialism and how these contributed to British imperial expansion. The Poyais loan appears as constituting a financial endeavor born from the encounter of different “worlds,” with MacGregor mediating these together but ultimately failing to legally and politically guarantee their lasting encounter.

This article explores the development of railway nationalism and «railway imperialism» within Colombian politics during the early 20th century. It uses the experience of the hitherto unstudied Great Northern Central Railway of Colombia British «free-standing company» as a lens to evaluate the way in which these political currents impacted railway development in the Colombian department of Santander. It argues that the rise of railway nationalism intertwined with regionalism and personal interests represents an important and unacknowledged factor in the collapse of the British company, as well as the overall lack of railway expansion and subsequent economic decline in the department.