The “EU Vaccines Strategy” launched by the European Commission in June 2020 aimed to ensure vaccine safety, equitable access, affordability, swift distribution, and global solidarity for COVID-19 vaccines. This study critiques the Commission’s centralized procurement approach, focusing on Advance Purchase Agreements (APAs) through a literature review, policy analysis, and a case study of the EU-AstraZeneca’s APA. It identifies critical challenges, including transparency deficits, accountability gaps, and anticompetitive practices by vaccine producers that undermine equitable access. Drawing on these insights, the study proposes the FACER Framework — Fairness, Accountability, Competition Law, Ethics of Innovation, and Resilience — a novel model integrating the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) oversight with ethical principles. By embedding legal and moral accountability, FACER offers EU policymakers a robust tool to enhance vaccine strategy and equity in future health crises.

Over the past decade the European Union (EU) has transformed sustainability into a dense matrix of legally binding ESG reporting obligations for companies. Compliance increasingly hinges on firms’ ability to collect and verify thousands of datapoints deep into global supply chains – an exercise that is costly, error-prone and may yield non-comparable results. (Semi-)centralised ESG data-sharing arrangements – shared hubs where suppliers post one or more verified sets of sustainability figures that all their customers can reuse – can restore some efficiency by eliminating duplicate requests and supplying standardised, audit-ready inputs, but this amplifies competition-law risk. Drawing on competition law and policy and recent Dutch banking practice, the paper devises a set of legal “firewalls” and access rules that neutralise collusive potential resulting from the information exchange that takes place while safeguarding smaller market players from exclusion. These safeguards are essential to ensure that ESG data collaboration supports – not hinders – the EU’s Twin Transition towards a green and digital economy.

The purpose of the South African Competition Act is to resolve the present problems of inequality by emphasizing its multiple goals, which differ from those of other countries. Its objectives broadly contain efficiency, state economic development and consumer welfare. In addition, the ideas of providing opportunities for small businesses and promoting a greater spread of ownership among different groups indicate its goal of favouring or protecting weak trading parties or certain groups of people. To achieve the aim of equity and fairness, South African competition law should be vigorously applied, but the existing substantive provisions may not fulfil the task of moving towards an equal and fair society. A comparative study of competition law may help to discover a proper model and a better solution for the problems of unequal economic power in South Africa.

This article applies the lessons from the prior theory of responsive regulation in criminology to EU competition law and extends these lessons to argue in favour of an enhanced form of responsive competition law. First, it finds that EU competition law enforcement is already responsive in the traditional sense as it takes the reactions of undertakings into account when deciding which instrument to apply, in accordance with the enforcement pyramid developed by Braithwaite. An enforcement pyramid for EU competition law is presented. The objectives of competition law are found to be broad, and its key norms are open, facilitating responsiveness. This also allows competition law to develop to meet new societal demands, such as the need to control market power in the digital realm and to combat climate change. Next, the article examines the role of responsive and accountable behaviour by undertakings in competition law. First, it is found that in line with new forms of regulation concerning non-financial reporting, greenwashing, data protection, digital markets and services, and artificial intelligence, the special responsibility of dominant undertakings in competition law increasingly demands a pro-active approach to compliance. This also involves considering the interests of third parties and framing private governance in accordance with fundamental rights and legal principles. An enhanced degree of responsiveness of dominant undertakings results. Second, additional space is being created within competition law to accommodate undertakings that behave in a socially responsible manner, notably regarding sustainability. This is examined in relation to the issue of a fair share for consumers, and private enforcement by means of compliance agreements. After discussing potential objections to responsiveness in terms of democratic legitimacy, legal certainty, and redistribution of wealth, the article concludes that the developments sketched above indeed point towards the reinforcement of the responsive nature of competition law.

Beyond their differences, the various currents of neoliberalism share a common legal agenda: economic constitutionalism. From ordoliberal Ordnungspolitik to new classical macroeconomics and public choice, from Hayek’s ‘constitution of liberty’ to Vanberg’s ‘constitutional political economy’, an institutional agenda has emerged around a number of key tenets: enhancing the competition between jurisdictions through (state and international) federalism; safeguarding the competitive functioning of the market through supra-legislative rules; limiting fiscal policies and disciplining public spending through balanced budget rules; neutralising monetary policy through independent and price stability-oriented central banks. These key tenets of neoliberal constitutionalism infuse the three layers of the European economic constitution: the fundamental freedoms of movement pave the way to normative competition between national legislations (microeconomic constitution); competition law guarantees the competitive structure of the market (mesoeconomic constitution); European Economic and Monetary Union implements the rules of budgetary discipline and monetary stability (macroeconomic constitution). This does not imply that the European Union is solely a neoliberal project or that the European Union’s current neoliberal path is irreversible. But it does at least raise questions about the actual room for manoeuvre left by this rigid ‘economic constitution’ to public institutions in dealing with the various current crises.

Dark patterns that manipulate consumer behaviour are now a pervasive feature of digital markets. Depending on the choice architecture utilised, they can affect the perception, behaviour and purchasing patterns of online consumers. Using a novel empirical design, we find strong evidence that individuals across all groups are susceptible to dark patterns, and only weak evidence that user susceptibility is materially affected by commonly used general proxies for consumer vulnerability (such as income, educational attainment or age). Our conclusions provide empirical support for broad restrictions on the use of dark patterns, such as those contained in the EU’s Digital Services Act, that protect all consumer groups. Our study also finds that added friction, in the form of required payment action following successful deployment of dark patterns, reduces their effectiveness. This insight highlights the instances in which dark patterns would be most effective – when no further action is required by the user. Consumer vulnerability is therefore more pronounced when dealing with online providers who store users’ payment details and can rely on a ‘single click’ to complete the purchase.

Democratic backsliding is becoming increasingly widespread, filtering into not just constitutional law but other areas of substantive Union law. This article explores this phenomenon by focusing on how domestic judicial reforms spread to the day-to-day operation of EU competition law. It references two fundamental principles of Union law – mutual trust and effective judicial protection – before focusing on the European Competition Network, which requires national competition authorities to cooperate when discharging their duties under Union law. Lastly, it discusses the systemic consequences this can have for the operation of EU competition law, the internal market, and EU law more broadly.

The unfettered authority of sport-governing bodies (SGBs) has given rise to human rights claims and led to the distortion of EU free movement of persons and competition law. Following International Skating Union and European Super League Company, SBGs cannot exercise their right to achieve legitimate sporting aims like integrity and sporting fairness at the expense of competition rules. Nor are they allowed to prevent their member associations from organising/operating competitive leagues/events or to inflict sanctions on them for attempting to do so. These judgments will revolutionise the transnational sport law landscape, reshaping SGBs’ institutional rules and member relationships.

Competition law is experiencing a transformation from a niche economic tool to a Swiss knife of broader industrial and social policy. Relatedly, there is a narrative that sees an expansive role for competition law in broad areas such as sustainability, privacy, and workers and labour rights, and a counternarrative that wants to deny it that role. There is rich scholarship on this area, but little empirical backing. In this article, we present the results of a comprehensive empirical research into whether new goals and objectives such as sustainability, privacy, and workers and labour rights are indeed endorsed in EU competition law and practice. We do so through an investigation into the totality of Court of Justice rulings, Commission decisions, Advocate General opinions, and public statements of the Commission. Our findings inject data into the debate and help dispel misconceptions that may arise by overly focusing on cherry-picked high-profile decisions while overlooking the rest of the EU’s institutional practice.

We find that sustainability is partially recognised as a goal whereas privacy and labour rights are not. We also show that all three goals are more recent than classic goals, that EU institutions have not engaged much with the areas of sustainability, privacy, and workers and labour rights, and that the Commission’s rhetoric is seemingly out of pace with decisional practice. We also identify trends that may bode for change, and we contextualize our analysis through the lens of the history and nature of the EU’s integration and economic constitution.

This article explores the responses of the South African competition authorities to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the socio-economic rights of consumers in relation to the price gouging of essential and medical supplies. After discussing the constitutional and legislative context of socio-economic rights and excessive pricing, it examines the first case in which the competition authorities were called upon to decide on the excessive pricing of medical supplies during COVID-19. The article finds that, while the competition authorities were swift to interpret the Competition Act widely and act against suppliers charging excessive prices, there remains a gap in South Africa's legislative framework as there is no specific legislation regulating price gouging during states of pandemic or disaster. The article identifies the need for legislative development and concludes by offering recommendations for addressing future incidents of price gouging.

Security of supply refers to governmental policies that aim to secure the availability of critical products at all times. The COVID-19 pandemic brought to fore the importance of such policies, as suddenly there was an overwhelming need for critical medical supplies that the markets were not able to fulfil. Following the pandemic, the EU has started to construct its own security of supply policy, although lacking an explicit competence for it. This Article shows how competence on security of supply is actually split between the EU and the Member States, and highlights the consequences of this division.