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In contrast to liberal democracy, which translates constituent power into processes and institutions of representation and government, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri place a premium on constituent power: inspired by social movements, such as Occupy Wall Street, they argue that the constituent power of a multitude should not be translated into the constituted powers of a state. Doing so would deprive the multitude of its revolutionary and radically democratic potential. Pure constituent power seeks to repeat in perpetuity the exception of the revolutionary founding moment of democracy. That Hardt and Negri rely on increasingly theological models in their account of constituent power and revolution highlights the antidemocratic tendency of their conception of “constituent governance.” A political theology that seeks to make the exception permanent is not compatible with democracy. The enactment of pure constituent power in the democracy of the common inevitably leads to what Carl Schmitt described as “sovereign dictatorship.” Hardt’s and Negri’s “constituent governance” is an arbitrary form of governance without any checks and balances.
The 1920s saw hope as well as gloom. Coexistent temporalities comingled. Key themes overarched: (a) novel metropolitan life; (b) shifting class differences; (c) changes in the state; (d) gendering of social relations, social practices, and political action; (e) Europe’s relation to empire; (f) cultural life and ideas; (g) democracy’s uneven fortunes. The welfarist complex crossed regime differences (democracy versus dictatorship), embracing population and national health; a normative family; social services delivery; goals of national efficiency. Eugenicist ideas claimed an appealing coherence, whose refusal presumed key enabling factors: intact democracy; strong labor movements; liberal systems of law; and pluralist public spheres. By 1939–1940, that left only Sweden and Britain. Widening of democracy brought the welfarist field distinct cohorts of educated young men and freshly enfranchised young women. The 1880s generation passed 1914–1918 as young adults; the “war youth generation” missed the war but craved an equivalent; interwar cohorts joined the post-1918 world as it started collapsing. Those lives turned on an enabling modernity. They knitted together the “modernist wish.”
After 1917–1923, Europe’s polities varied across democracy and dictatorship. The agrarian east and south passed under dictatorship: Iberia, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Lithuania, Yugoslavia, then Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, and Greece. Liberal constitutionalism lasted in France, Britain, the Low Countries, Switzerland, and Scandinavia. In Austria, Germany, and Czechoslovakia democratic republics faced polarized political cultures. Italy was fascist; the USSR socialist. Corporatism – government-brokered convergence of organized interests – shaped constitutional states, above all in Scandinavia, with its strong labor movements. Corporatism in Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia was inflected by social democracy, but in societies riven by liberal-conservative enmities and religious, regional or ethno-cultural cleavage. Fascism beckoned as an extreme remedy for chronic parliamentary instability, where leftist defense impeded capitalist stabilization. Nazism and its state mapped onto this topography. Via the Belgian Plan de Man, the French Popular Front, and the Spanish Civil War, the polarizing fallout from rightwing radicalization cast western Europe into crisis.
What repressive strategies do dictators use to maintain regime stability as anti-government movements rise under conditions of economic growth? We investigate the changing function of authoritarian repression and the ways in which dictators accommodated rising opposition during Taiwan’s period of authoritarian rule. Using time-series data spanning 39 years (1949–1988), this article analyses the relationship between economic development, opposition movements, and shifts in repression strategies under the Kuomintang (KMT) rule. Drawing on historical documents and statistical analysis, we argue that economic development influences patterns of repression. With economic growth, autocrats tend to adopt selective repression rather than indiscriminate violence (e.g., mass killings), as the latter risks inciting greater social unrest and endangering regime stability. Using an additive dynamic linear model (ADLM), our findings suggest that economic development, when coupled with rising social movements, compels dictators to rely on less severe yet more targeted forms of coercion. While this adaptation may temporarily bolster regime control amid economic growth and social unrest, it may ultimately undermine the foundation of long-term authoritarian resilience. This work bridges the gap between repression literature and modernisation theory by demonstrating that authoritarian decision-making in repressive policies plays a crucial role in shaping the fate of both dictatorships and opposition movements.
This article examines Turkey’s constitutional trajectory through Carl Schmitt’s concepts of sovereignty, exception and dictatorship. It argues that Turkey’s political development cannot be fully understood as a process of gradual democratic erosion alone but must be analyzed as a sequence of constitutional ruptures in which exceptional powers have repeatedly redefined sovereign authority. From Abdülhamid II’s suspension of the 1876 Constitution to the Grand National Assembly’s exercise of wartime sovereignty in 1921, the military interventions of 1960 and 1980, and President Erdoğan’s post-2016 consolidation of power, sovereignty has shifted among personal, collective and institutional actors capable of suspending legality and founding new constitutional orders. By situating Turkey within a longer history of sovereign reconstitution, the article critically reworks Schmitt’s framework to show how emergency provisions – initially designed to defend constitutional order – can be transformed into instruments of constitutional refoundation. It demonstrates how commissarial responses to crisis may evolve into sovereign dictatorships, enabling regime transformation under the appearance of legal continuity. In doing so, the article contributes to debates on authoritarian constitutionalism and emergency governance by clarifying the constitutional mechanisms through which legality is suspended, reconfigured and redeployed. Beyond the Turkish case, the article advances a broader comparative agenda for global constitutionalism: integrating the study of democratic erosion with an analysis of sovereign reconstitution in moments of exception, thereby illuminating how contemporary constitutional orders are reshaped through crisis.
Esteban Echeverría (1805–1851) was born in Buenos Aires before the May 25, 1810, revolution, but was educated in the liberal environment of Bernardino Rivadavia’s government, which sent him to Paris to further his education. Upon return in 1830, he saw the rise of Juan Manuel de Rosas and became an opponent of his regime in both a literary and a political sense. He along with others founded the Asociación de Mayo in 1837, which caused his exile in Montevideo, where he wrote the compelling ‘El matadero’ (The Slaughterhouse) and published the Dogma socialista, from which the current selection is taken. The “socialism” of the title might be somewhat deceptive, in that Echeverría’s program contained the standard tenets of liberal democracy. His thoughts on the rule of law, while not entirely original, became a powerful weapon against dictatorship, one that was seen as applicable well beyond his native land and became a classic of Spanish American political thought.
This article, which relies on underutilized archival collections as well as oral histories, is one of the first comprehensive examinations of the feminist struggle to decriminalize abortion during Brazil’s transition to democracy during the 1980s. We discuss how the consolidation of the antiabortion Christian right and its proximity to several political parties, including ones on the left, coupled with the politically moderate tone of the transition from dictatorship to democracy, constrained the space in which Brazilian feminists could make radical demands of the state. Moreover, we contend that although the creation of the state-funded feminist organ Conselho Nacional dos Direitos da Mulher in 1985 brought important visibility to feminist issues and inserted the movement’s agenda squarely within the government apparatus, it also fragmented feminists, threatened co-optation by the state, and ultimately compelled abortion rights activists to prioritize the more palatable strategy of expanding access to therapeutic abortions, which were already permitted by law. In addition to divergences in political strategy, feminists struggled to create multiracial and multiclass coalitions during this period, when many Black feminists and working-class women were organizing around other concerns. As a result, feminists were not able to fundamentally alter public opinion about the political importance of abortion, and their efforts to enshrine the termination of pregnancy as a human right in the 1988 Constitution were unsuccessful.
Chile is a paradigmatic transitional justice case illustrating the sequencing, coexistence, and intermingling of the types of victim engagement that this book examines. This chapter traces active (co)-creation by relatives in the search for the Disappeared in dictatorial and post-dictatorship Chile. It outlines the gradual accretion of different forms of engagement: denunciation and resistance, legal activism and political lobbying, and protagonism in calling for, and calling forth, a new state policy response in the form of a National Search Plan, launched in 2023. Analysing relatives’ participation in design of the Search Plan meanwhile reveals divergent and changing views about the relative importance of trials, truth, recovery, and identification of those still disappeared. Overall, Chile’s trajectory shows how many now-familiar categories of transitional justice demands were originally hard won from below. It also suggests the state may at times be needed to mediate between contrasting or contradictory victims’ voices.
Geoffrey Jones and Sabine Pitteloud present the latest research on the global history of multinationals and their impact on society and the environment. Bringing together leading international scholars, these essays survey key themes in our relationship with multinationals, from taxation and corruption to gender and the climate. Though often associated with large corporations like Apple or Nestlé, the contributors highlight the remarkable diversity in multinational strategies and organizational structures. They challenge the idea of an inescapable rise of multinationals by looking beyond the experience of Western countries and considering the effects of dramatic political shifts. Multinationals have often acted opportunistically, with their resilience carrying social costs through the exploitation of weak regulations, corrupt governments, inequalities, poor human rights, and environmental harm. This is an essential introduction to the historical role of multinationals for scholars and students as well as for policymakers and stakeholders navigating today's economic landscape.
Various critics have labeled Achebe’s Anthills of the Savannah as a dictator novel, a dictator-novel, or a novel about dictatorship, forcing the questions that inform this chapter: isn’t there a well-defined genre where Anthills fits unproblematically? Is the African novel that thematizes dictatorship a sub-genre, or the unwieldy name for the genre from which the African dictator novel emerges? Or are they co-existent genres? If genres “change when new topics are added to their repertoires” (Fowler 233), I explore the germinal novels of disillusionment in the 1960s, the imprecise “dictatorial literature” and “dictator” novel descriptors used in the early 1990s for clues that illuminate the difference between the dictator novel and novels about dictatorship. Playing off Derrida’s argument that the word “genre” establishes a “limit,” a line of demarcation (57) that simultaneously creates “an edgeless boundary of itself” (81), I argue that this indeterminacy fits the African novel variously labeled as the dictator novel or the novel about dictatorship, and the delimitation should be flexibly located in the “edgeless boundary” defined by the themes and function the novels serve. Further, the rise of increasingly authoritarian rulers globally lends currency to the African dictator novel in unmasking their rhetoric of dictatorship.
In this article, the probability of opening to trade is related to a country's propensity to learn from other countries in its region. It is argued that countries have different motivations to learn, depending upon the responsiveness and accountability of their political regimes. Whereas democracies cannot afford to be dogmatic, authoritarian regimes are less motivated to learn from the experience of others, even if they embrace policies that fail. Using data on trade liberalisation for 57 developing countries in the period 1970–1999, it is found that democracies confronting economic crises are more likely to liberalise trade as a result of learning; among democracies, presidential systems seem to learn more, whereas personalist dictatorial regimes are the most resistant to learning from the experience of others.
Socialist democracy appeared in the theory of democracy as an eminently non-western form of democracy in the period of de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The concept of socialist democracy based on the theses that can differentiate socialist democracy from liberal or parliamentarian democracy: (1) the unity of the power of the proletariat, led by its vanguard political force of the communists, and (2) the setting of the framework of democratic decision-making in the field of labor. Socialist democracy was indeed a form of directed democracy beyond that it had systemic aspirations to create an alternative socio-economic model. This article aims to trace the historical-semantic formation of socialist democracy and discuss its main institutions in the years of post-totalitarian socialist Hungary between 1956 and 1989. What is remarkable in the case of Hungary is that the development of socialist democracy was accompanied by economic reforms to the planned economy from the first half of the 1960s. Thus, socialist democracy focused on the democratization and institutional system of the workplace, mainly as factory democracy and cooperative democracy. With the liberalization and capitalization of socialist economy in the eighties, however, these forms failed to manage the problems of economic incentives and social atomization.
This paper attempts to take the first steps toward developing a theory of non-governmental organizations (NGO)–state relations under dictatorship. Drawing on evidence from East Asia, the author argues that dictatorships typically employ one of two strategies in attempting to govern NGOs. First, some dictatorships follow a corporatist strategy, in which business associations, development, and social welfare organizations are co-opted into the state and controlled through a variety of strategies. Second, other dictatorships pursue an exclusionary strategy in which NGOs are marginalized and replaced with state institutions. Variation in the strategy chosen may be explained by differing levels of elite competition and the type of development strategy. Single-party states tend to regulate elite conflicts better and thus often choose corporatist strategies. In personalist regimes dictators tend to fear the organizational and mobilizational potential of NGOs and thus tend to pursue exclusionary strategies. This choice, however, is conditioned by the development strategy employed, as socialist development strategies reduce the incentives to allow NGOs.
The question of how to adequately represent the demos in a democracy has always been an issue. Of the many different aspects in the debate between representative and direct democratic approaches, one key point of contention is “the will of the people.” Here, an oft-overlooked question is what takes precedence: “the will” or “the people.” This article addresses the issue by examining Carl Schmitt’s reading (and one-sided slanting) of Rousseau and how it has influenced today’s debate in unacknowledged ways. In scrutinizing Schmitt’s body of work and its particular development of “the will of the people,” I demonstrate that “identitarian” democratic concepts must ultimately remain trapped in a dilemma produced by Schmitt’s reading—one that can only be resolved through representation.
Scholars debate whether the presence of multiple parties in the legislature stabilizes dictatorships or promotes their demise. We show that authoritarian regimes face a dilemma: allowing for multipartism reduces the risk of bottom-up revolt, but facilitates protracted top-down democratization. Concessions to the opposition diminish the long-term benefits of authoritarian rule and empower regime soft-liners. We test our theory in Latin America—a region with a broad range of autocracies —using survival models, instrumental variables, random forests, and two case studies. Our theory explains why rational autocrats accept multipartism, even though this concession may ultimately undermine the regime. It also accounts for democratic transitions that occur when the opposition is fragmented and without a stunning authoritarian defeat.
1942 represents the apex of the global wave of autocratization associated with the Era of Fascism, and the expansion of Axis Rule during World War were responsible for this impressive growth of authoritarian 'occupation' regimes. Starting in Asia with the Imperialist expansion of Japan, followed by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy in Europe, the number of dictatorships increased substantially. This Element analyses how the three poles of Axis rule, Italian Fascism, Nazi Germany, and Authoritarian Japan, lead the dynamics of institution-building of political regimes of occupation under their direct or indirect control, respective diffusion models and, in some cases, coercive transfers.
Attending to Latinx South American writing generates a more expansive understanding of how violence and migration shape Latinx literary history and narrative forms. This chapter elucidates the theoretical salience of el Hueco through its multiple significations as gap, hole, hollow, space of detention, liminal status, and form of undocumented migration. Likewise, the chapter demonstrates how the term desaparecido illuminates the emotional holes and the gaps in kinship structures left by those who are disappeared by state terror practices and immigration policies. Using texts by Karla Cornejo Villavicencio, Romina Garber, Juan Martinez, Carolina de Robertis, Ingrid Rojas Contreras, Daniel Alarcón, and Cristina Henríquez, the chapter demonstrates how prose narrative draws linkages between various kinds of state-perpetrated violence in the Américas. The chapter analyzes genres – from creative nonfiction to speculative fiction – and narrative strategies – from temporality and spectrality to focalization and characterization – to illuminate how Latinx South American fiction activates narrative as a form of reappearance and as a means of imagining different Latinx futurities.
Totalitarian systems, marked by extreme violence, are fundamentally bound to an ideology, such as Marxism-Leninism, which is instrumental to their creation and persistence, from the Bolshevik revolution in Russia to modern China. The chapter examines the genesis of communist totalitarian ideology in early Christian communal equality, connecting it to Rousseau’s and Babeuf’s anti-property ideals, which ultimately influenced Marxism and its vision of a dictatorial society in the name of absolute equality. The enduring pull towards egalitarianism, when pushed to extremes, can encroach on private property rights, ironically culminating in totalitarian rule and unprecedented inequality.
This chapter connects the burning and removal of the Praia do Pinto favela in 1969, the development of the Cidade Alta housing project on Rio’s north side, the development of the middle-class apartment complex Selva de Pedra on the former site of Praia do Pinto, and the preeminent soap operas of Globo Television in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The chapter shows how the Brazilian military dictatorship (1964-1985) carried out a process of state-sponsored gentrificaion through favela removal and subsidized development for the conservative middle class.
On June 27, 1973, Juan María Bordaberry, the democratically elected president of Uruguay, dissolved the general assembly and remained in office, sharing executive power with the military command. Uruguayans mention this date when asked when was the last coup d’état in their country. However, political and social actors have long disagreed over the exact meaning of this event and few would now reject that it was just one, albeit final and dramatic, step in a relatively long path toward authoritarianism. Things were different after that date in terms of state institutions as well as freedoms and rights for the citizenry, but many analysts have shown that most of these changes were in the making since at least 1968, when Jorge Pacheco Areco took power and governed under repressive measures of exception. A more recent body of literature has gone further back in time to show the importance of previous steps that aligned national politics with the polarized order of the Cold War. This chapter aims at offering a plausible narrative of what happened in the fifteen years before the date of the coup, combining basic historical facts with the changing interpretations that placed and displaced meaning and importance among them.