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Three concepts associated with ‘good governance’, referring to the quality of governance processes and outcomes, are examined in this chapter: accountability, legitimacy and trust. For each concept, definitions are reviewed and characteristics identified. The chapter investigates accountability through key themes of complexity and challenges associated with delivering on downward accountability in the context of decentralisation. Complexity arises from the number and range of actors involved in co-management, situated at different administrative levels, with multiple demands on and mechanisms for accountability. Different forms of legitimacy and trust are introduced and reviewed, including input, output and throughput legitimacy and dispositional, rational, affinitive and procedural forms of trust. Challenges to delivering and maintaining legitimacy and trust in the context of co-management and solutions to these are identified.
People with stronger conspiracy beliefs tend to trust others less, show more antisocial tendencies, and behave more self-centeredly. We investigated whether they are also less likely to act generously. In Study 1 (N = 850; UK), conspiracy beliefs were negatively correlated with charitable donations, though effect sizes were small. In Study 2 (N = 323; US), conspiracy beliefs did not predict sharing in a Dictator Game. In Study 3 (N = 830; US), higher conspiracy beliefs were related to more generosity, but only when donations went directly to the recipient without intermediaries. Overall, people with higher conspiracy beliefs are not less generous per se, but their generosity may be constrained by distrust in institutions or intermediaries.
Relational equality theorists have drawn attention to the expressive dimensions of social and institutional hierarchies, highlighting the ways that expressive disrespect, for example by state institutions and officials can entrench social inequalities. Meanwhile, theorists of trust have drawn attention to the ways that agents who are disadvantaged or marginalised are often treated with presumptive distrust by social institutions and excluded from the trust economy. This paper draws on these insights, on empirical findings from the literature in social psychology on procedural justice, and on conceptions of vulnerability, to argue that expressive disrespect and presumptive distrust by state institutions is a form of injustice that can entrench vulnerability. The theoretical argument is supported and extended by discussion of a notorious example from the recent Australian context, Robodebt, a government scheme that was found to be illegal, which used automated decision-making technology to identify and claw back alleged overpayments to social welfare recipients.
Clinical ethics consultation was requested by the intensive care unit regarding a young woman with a near full-term pregnancy on the brink of COVID respiratory failure. She refused lifesaving mechanical ventilation, as she embraced the religious instruction of her upbringing to distrust religious outsiders and instead allow God to personally direct her choices. A psychiatrist determined that her beliefs were atypical, but she had medical decision-making capacity to refuse ventilation. Without it, her intensivist team anticipated her death along with the fetus within hours. Ethical consultation weighed the following: rights to bodily autonomy; standards of informed refusal; religious coping; nonabandonment and trust; moral distress and sympathetic regret. With her permission, the ethics consultant contacted her family, who were dismayed by her choices and reached out to persuade her otherwise. Within hours, she provided consent for ventilation and cesarean section; despite these, she required extracorporeal membrane oxygenation for ten days. Ultimately, she and her healthy newborn were discharged home. In follow up, she described no regrets over her care nor distrust of her providers. The clinical ethicist is haunted by the uncertainties of the practice of medicine and ethics, as well as by missteps in the consultation process
This article reframes late medieval and early modern merchant governance through the lens of distrust, conceived as a structured and productive force for sustaining order amid uncertainty. Drawing on insights from economic sociology and organizational studies, and grounded in archival documents from across Europe, it introduces the art of distrust as a framework for understanding how merchants navigated both foreseeable risks and deeper, more pervasive forms of the unknown. Distrust operated as a discipline embedded in recursive documentation, distributed surveillance, rhetorical restraint, and tactical conflict management. These practices were not merely technical responses to risk but part of a broader normative tradition honed over centuries of mercantile life and codified in manuals guiding merchants in observing others and managing their own conduct. The protocols of vigilance articulated in this literature treated opacity as a terrain to be strategically navigated in the name of the common good. Their echoes in courtly and political writings invite reflection on how mercantile practices of surveillance and self-discipline contributed to shaping impersonal rule as a defining logic of modern institutional life.
Chapter 6 focuses specifically on the last two decades of the Ancien Régime. The traditional local credit market featured norms of solidarity, fairness, and cooperation and allowed its agents considerable input regarding the terms of their agreement either before contracting and/or afterwards. But structural changes in the 1770s, such as an increase in credit activities, drawing on the power and profitability of such exchanges, and especially the appearance of new investors, affected the social and legal norms and nature of these markets. The gradual and massive resort to external parties to handle and manage financial transactions remodelled these institutions into specialized and incontrovertible experts. Embedded in society, the local court system traditionally responded to the demands of its users and their input shaped the form of the institution. When a new category of investors emerged, their requests, in turn, tended to shape the judicial institution, serving their interests first and above those of other users, allowing the evolution of the judicial institution into a more specialized one. These institutions became more efficient in debt conflict resolution.
Affective polarization (AP), a concept that summarizes intense partisans’ animosity towards opposing parties and positive feelings towards their own, has recently received increasing attention. Despite a growing interest in Latin American polarization, there are very few empirical studies on the range and depth of dislike and distrust towards political adversaries in the region, and how this impacts the quality of democracies. This research note uses survey data collected after ten election cycles in six countries to estimate the scope and depth of AP in the region. We measure the extent of polarization in Latin America compared to other Western nations, assess its evolution, and makes some inroads to explain who drives AP. On aggregate, Latin America does not show large AP scores, yet there are clear signs of an upward trend. More than a widespread social phenomenon, the evidence suggests that AP is driven by large intense minorities.
The anxieties of the 1950s intensified as the Cold War heated up. JFK ’s election promised a New Frontier, and then his assassination extinguished that flame. On the one hand, the civil rights, Chicano (El Movimiento), women’s, student democracy, labor union, environmental, and public interest movements of the 1960s promoted a robust government response in which Congress passed hundreds of new laws to address the concerns raised by the movements. LBJ’s Great Society also included an array of social program that addressed the extraordinary level of poverty in the country. On the other hand, the Vietnam War significantly dampened the hopes for a Great Society as tensions arose between those for and against our continued presence in Vietnam, weakened trust in government. The political movements added to this lack of trust when they supported legal procedures to make sure that government did its job. As faith in government receded, and the reaction to the extraordinary expansion of government intensified, the table was set for a new allegiance to a market economy.
This essay aims to advance the general discussion of hypocrisy in moral and political philosophy as well as normative policy debates regarding democratic sanctions against autocracies that often trigger charges of hypocrisy. In the process of making sense of these charges, I articulate and tackle three general puzzles regarding hypocrisy complaints. The first—the inaction puzzle—asks why a charge of hypocrisy should have any effect on the moral assessment of an agent’s actions, as distinct from the agent’s character or attitudes. The second—the ambivalence puzzle—asks why we often react to hypocrisy charges with seemingly paradoxical ambivalence, recognizing such charges for the transparent deflections they often are, but also granting their normative force. The third—the preemption puzzle—asks why hypocrisy charges do not entirely lose their force when their targets openly concede that they too have suffered from the same flaws that they highlight in others. I argue that sustained reflection on each of these puzzles can enrich—and be enriched by—normative analysis of democratic sanctions.
Chapter 6 points out that people’s searching for information plays an important role in understanding different forms of distrust. People especially tend to be oriented toward what authorities think of them, in part because authorities have power over people and can exclude them from important groups or grant them permission to become full-fledged members of those groups. Furthermore, how institutions evaluate someone conveys important symbolic information whether they are viewed as a valuable member of society. In turn, when someone assesses or suspects that their views are not taken seriously into consideration, this increases the chances of distrust in the social institutions at hand, and the people representing those institutions. Processing information about what happens in society in an abstract way tends to facilitate the formation of distrusting attitudes. A central theme of this book is that fairness and justice are taking place where the individual meets the group. That is, whether your group (including your community and society) treats you in a fair way reflects how the group and important members of the group think of you. Experiencing concrete instances of unfair treatment has special significance and increases the chances of judgments of distrust to develop and flourish.
The Fair Process Effect aims to shed light on why there are so many instances of distrust, polarization, and conspiracy thinking in our world and what we can do about this. The book focuses on the fair process effect as a mechanism that may help to start overcoming these important issues of societal discontent. This is a positive effect that people exhibit when they have been treated in genuinely fair and just ways by fellow human beings and societal authorities. Current insights presented in the book aid the understanding of why people may experience discontent, distrust, and disillusionment. Furthermore, these insights can be used to start countering exaggerated levels of distrust, heightened polarization, and unfounded conspiracy thinking. To this end, Van den Bos develops a coherent and modern account of the fair process effect, targeted at understanding and managing these pertinent issues.
The article calls on academics and policymakers who focus on mass atrocity prevention to engage with Trust Studies. This is needed because trust and distrust are commonly identified as a significant factor in destruction processes, yet there remains no substantive engagement with these concepts. The article combines Trust Studies, interdisciplinary research on the Central African Republic (Anthropology, Sociology, African Studies, and Political Science), and primary sources to analyse social and political trust dynamics through an exploration of (a) leadership, (b) outsourcing, (c) identity politics, and (d) witchcraft. It makes a twofold contribution. First, it provides a more informed understanding of the mass violence that took place in the Central African Republic through a historical analysis of trust dynamics. Second, it considers the implications for mass atrocity prevention, as it argues that the mainstream commitment to ‘rebuilding trust’ is built on misguided assumptions. The case study holds broader implications for both Trust Studies and mass atrocity prevention. Ultimately, it calls for interdisciplinary research to aid our collective understanding of the multifaceted roles that trust and distrust play in mass violence.
Artificial intelligence (AI) plays a rapidly increasing role in clinical care. Many of these systems, for instance, deep learning-based applications using multilayered Artificial Neural Nets, exhibit epistemic opacity in the sense that they preclude comprehensive human understanding. In consequence, voices from industry, policymakers, and research have suggested trust as an attitude for engaging with clinical AI systems. Yet, in the philosophical and ethical literature on medical AI, the notion of trust remains fiercely debated. Trust skeptics hold that talking about trust in nonhuman agents constitutes a category error and worry about the concept being misused for ethics washing. Proponents of trust have responded to these worries from various angles, disentangling different concepts and aspects of trust in AI, potentially organized in layers or dimensions. Given the substantial disagreements across these accounts of trust and the important worries about ethics washing, we embrace a diverging strategy here. Instead of aiming for a positive definition of the elements and nature of trust in AI, we proceed ex negativo, that is we look at cases where trust or distrust are misplaced. Comparing these instances with trust expedited in doctor–patient relationships, we systematize these instances and propose a taxonomy of both misplaced trust and distrust. By inverting the perspective and focusing on negative examples, we develop an account that provides useful ethical constraints for decisions in clinical as well as regulatory contexts and that highlights how we should not engage with medical AI.
Racially fearful White Americans regularly call 911 at the first sign of a “suspicious” Black person in their predominantly White space, be it a neighborhood, country club, or exclusive academic institution. These calls are met in force by armed government agents all too ready to enforce the color line.
The deepening distrust in democracy has grown out of a decade of low growth and cuts to public spending, which in turn has consolidated wage decline while also fuelling a wider sense of economic insecurity. As poverty and inequality intensify, social mobility is in reverse and the social contract is under growing strain. Support for populists has recently receded, but the inability of democratic systems to address deep-seated problems sows the seeds for future populist revolts. Both left- and right-wing governments have responded to increasing anger and alienation with policies that exacerbate existing inequalities of income and wealth, combined with disparities of decision-making power and social status. These are ethical as much as economic questions and they demand a much more robust response than technocratic administration. Otherwise, ethical social democracy and communitarian conservatism will fail to defeat the authoritarianism of both radical-right national populists and the tech-utopianism of far-left populists.
Determining whom to trust and whom not to trust has been critical since the early days of ancient civilizations. However, with the increasing use of digital technologies, trust situations have changed. We communicate less face-to-face. Rather, we communicate with other people over the Internet (e.g., Facebook) or we interact with technological artifacts (e.g., chatbots on the Internet or autonomous vehicles). This trend towards digitalization has major implications. It affects both the role of trust and how we should conceptualize trust and trustworthiness. In this chapter, insights on phenomena related to trust in a digital world are reviewed. This review integrates findings from various levels of analysis, including behavioral and neurophysiological. The structure of this chapter is based on four different scenarios of trust in a digital world that were developed by the author. Scenario A describes a technology-free situation of human-human interaction. Scenario B outlines a situation of computer-mediated human-human interaction. Scenario C denotes a situation of direct human-technology interaction. Scenario D refers to a situation of computer-mediated human-technology interaction. The common denominator of all situations is that a human acts in the role of trustor, while the role of trustee can be either another human or a technological artifact.
Many different scientific disciplines have come to some type of agreement as to how trust and distrust are similar to one another and how they are different. Elucidating the mechanisms involved in trust and distrust holds the important potential of improving the way people communicate with one another and are able to work effectively within groups. In this chapter, scientific literature on what constitutes trust and distrust will be summarized and reviewed. This research shows that while trust and distrust are opposite to one another in some respects, trust and distrust also each include a set of unique social, cognitive, and emotional attributes. Furthermore, this chapter seeks to develop a cohesive model of the neurobiological basis for trust vs. distrust. Lastly, this chapter will explore several open questions and directions for future research will be discussed.
As part of the roundtable, “The Responsibility to Protect in a Changing World Order: Twenty Years since Its Inception,” this essay asks the reader to consider the role that trust, distrust, and ambivalence play in enabling and constraining the use of force under pillar three of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). Drawing on interdisciplinary studies on trust, it analyzes the 2011 military intervention in Libya for evidence on how trust, distrust, and ambivalence help explain the positions taken by member states on the United Nations Security Council. In so doing, it challenges the mainstream view that the fallout over Libya represents a shift from trust to distrust. We find this binary portrayal problematic for three reasons. First, it fails to take into account the space in between trust and distrust, which we categorize as ambivalence and use to make sense of the position of Russia and China. Second, it is important to recognize the role of bounded trust, as those that voted in favor of going into Libya did so on certain grounds. Third, it overemphasizes the political fallout, as six of the ten elected member states continued to support the intervention. Learning lessons from this case, we conclude that it is highly unlikely that the Security Council will authorize the use of force to fulfill the RtoP anytime soon, which may have detrimental implications for the RtoP as a whole.
This chapter offers a broad reflection on the difficulties and challenges that the notion of trust presents for judges. After a historical excursion, it demonstrates how basing the operation of an area of law on trust is likely to clash with a rich and powerful bundle of ideas and historical experience at national level. This epilogue invites us to consider a shift in paradigm from law based on trust to trust based on law: ‘Seen this way, trust is not a pre-requisite for the law, but rather something that the law and social interaction generate. Trust becomes the end destination, not the starting point.’
This study aimed to assess the level of trust in the Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) risk communication efforts in Nigeria.
Methods:
We conducted a descriptive cross-sectional study among community members aged 15 years and above in Ondo State in October, 2020. Data were collected using an interviewer-administered questionnaire, and analyzed using SPSS version 22. Descriptive statistics were summarized using frequencies. Trust was ranked from “1” suggesting “Low level of trust” to “7” denoting “High level of trust”. We conducted Chi-square test between respondents’ level of trust in the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control (NCDC) and socio-demographic characteristics. The level of significance was set at p < 0.05.
Results:
Among the 691 respondents, 244 (35.3%) were aged 21 to 29 years, and 304 (51.4%) accessed COVID-19 information through the NCDC. Overall, 205 (41.8%) had high level of trust in the NCDC, and 51 (51.5%) individuals aged 30-39 years had high level of trust in the NCDC (χ2 = 17.455; p = 0.001). Also, 114 (48.5%) persons who lived with children below 18 years had high level of trust in the NCDC (χ2 = 8.266; p = 0.004).
Conclusion:
Policy-makers should prioritize the involvement of young and educated persons in COVID-19 risk communication strategies.